IN THE MATTER OF
REPRESENTATIVE RAYMOND F. LEDERER

REPORT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 20, 1981.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

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IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE
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MAY 20, 1981.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. Stokes, from the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, submitted the following

REPORT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS

The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct submits this Report to the House of Representatives in order to summarize the proceedings in the Committee's investigation of Representative Raymond F. Lederer and in explanation of its recommendation to the House of Representatives pursuant to Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, Section 3 of House Resolution 67, and Rule 14 of the Committee's Rules, that Representative Lederer be expelled from the House.

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 2, 1980, reports were widely circulated in the media to the effect that a number of named Congressmen allegedly were involved in a so-called "ABSCAM" investigation being conducted by the Department of Justice. Mr. Lederer was one of those so named. On March 4, 1981, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed House Resolution 67, which "authorized and directed" the Committee "to conduct a full and complete inquiry and investigation of alleged improper conduct which has been the subject of recent investigations (commonly referred to as ABSCAM) by the Department of Justice * * *", and to "report to the House of Representatives its recommendations as to such disciplinary action, if any, that the

1 The 96th Congress passed House Resolution 608 on March 27, 1980. This resolution was identical to House Resolution 67 and "authorized and directed" the initial inquiries and investigation of alleged improper conduct by members of the House of Representatives arising out of ABSCAM.
committee deems appropriate by the House of Representatives * * *” (Lederer Exhibit A).2

On May 28, 1980, Messrs. Lederer, Angelo J. Errichetti, Louis C. Johanson and Howard L. Criden were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in the Eastern District of New York in a four-count indictment charging violations of Title 18 of the United States Code. The first count of the indictment charged that from on or about July 26, 1979, until on or about November 1, 1979, Messrs. Lederer, Errichetti, Johanson and Criden engaged in a conspiracy in violation of Section 371. The second count of the indictment charged that Mr. Lederer, aided and abetted by Messrs. Errichetti, Johanson and Criden, committed the crime of bribery in violation of Section 201(c). The third count of the indictment charged that Mr. Lederer, aided and abetted by Messrs. Errichetti, Johanson and Criden, committed the crime of accepting an unlawful gratuity in violation of Section 201(g). The fourth count of the indictment charged Messrs. Lederer, Errichetti, Johanson and Criden with traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of carrying on an illegal activity—namely, bribery—in violation of the Travel Act, Section 1952 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

The charges against Messrs. Errichetti, Johanson and Criden were severed from those against Mr. Lederer by the District Court so that the Representative was the sole defendant tried before the jury. On January 9, 1981, after a five-day trial, Mr. Lederer was found guilty by a jury on all four counts charged in the indictment.

In a March 3, 1981, letter to the Honorable Louis Stokes, Chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, James J. Binns, Esq., counsel for Mr. Lederer, informed the Committee that the District Judge who presided over Mr. Lederer's trial had completed the testimonial phase of a post-trial due process hearing. Mr. Binns proposed that the Committee refrain from acting until the District Judge had rendered his decision on the defendant's post-trial motions seeking to overturn Mr. Lederer's conviction. Mr. Lederer's counsel stated in the letter that the Congressman would resign if the District Court rejected his arguments and would request a hearing before the Committee if the District Court ruled in his favor and overturned his conviction (Lederer Exhibit B). Special Counsel opposed Mr. Binns' requests.

The Committee met in Executive Session on March 11, 1981, and, after deciding to treat Mr. Binns' letter as a formal motion to defer the preliminary inquiry, voted 9-0, to deny the motion. On that same date, pursuant to House Resolution 67 and Rules 11(a) and 14 of the Committee's Rules, the Committee voted, 9-0, to initiate a preliminary inquiry into the Lederer matter (Lederer Exhibits C and D). Mr. Lederer and his counsel were immediately notified of the Committee's action and were afforded an opportunity to present written or oral statements to the Committee (Lederer Exhibit D).

On March 11, 1981, and March 12, 1981, Special Counsel exchanged correspondence and spoke with counsel for Mr. Lederer in order to

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2 Exhibits introduced at the Committee hearings in this matter are appended as exhibits to the Report of Special Counsel Upon Completion of Preliminary Inquiry, submitted March 17, 1981, and are cited throughout as "Lederer Exhibit —."
stipulate to the authenticity of certain materials from the criminal trial record and to reach agreement as to the appropriate portions of that record to be presented to the Committee (Lederer Exhibits E, F and G). Ultimately, both counsel agreed by stipulation to include in the record essentially all trial testimony, exhibits and non-testimonial portions of the transcript (Lederer Exhibit G). In addition, while Special Counsel felt that other non-testimonial portions of the trial transcript (e.g., bench conferences and certain legal arguments) were irrelevant for the Committee’s purposes, he agreed not to object to including such materials in the Committee record if Mr. Lederer wished to offer them. On March 16, 1981, the agreed-upon portions of the written record were distributed to the offices of Committee members, and on March 17, 1981, the stipulated audiotape and videotape exhibits were made available for listening and viewing at the Committee offices beginning on the same day.

The Committee met in Executive Session on March 17, 1981, and heard arguments from counsel for Mr. Lederer and Special Counsel concerning a renewed motion by Mr. Lederer seeking to defer the preliminary inquiry until the District Court had delivered its decision on the post-trial motions. Counsel for Mr. Lederer argued (1) that Mr. Lederer’s conviction was not yet final since he had not been sentenced; (2) that the trial was not completed since the trial judge had yet to rule upon post-trial motions to dismiss the indictment based on alleged due process violations; and (3) that deferral of the preliminary inquiry might save the Committee the expense of further proceedings because Mr. Lederer would resign if the District Court decided against him. Special Counsel argued that the pre-sentence status of Mr. Lederer’s criminal case and the pending post-trial decision of the District Court were irrelevant to the Committee’s task, which was to examine Mr. Lederer’s conduct leading to the indictment and trial and to determine, based upon the Committee’s own review of the record, whether Mr. Lederer had violated one or more House Rules and, if so, what sanction the Committee should recommend to the House.

After hearing arguments from both counsel, the Committee voted, 7-1, to proceed immediately with the preliminary inquiry and to permit Mr. Lederer to file with the Committee the transcript of the due process hearing conducted before the District Court between January 12, 1981, and February 10, 1981 (which is available as a Committee print), as well as the motion to dismiss the indictment based on alleged due process violations and supporting memoranda filed by counsel for Mr. Lederer before the District Court. (See Appendix.) Mr. Lederer himself did not present an oral or written statement to the Committee.

At the same hearing on March 17, 1981, Special Counsel presented to the Committee and to Mr. Lederer and his counsel the “Report of Special Counsel Upon Completion of Preliminary Inquiry” and delivered an oral summation of the evidence to the Committee. Upon completion of this presentation, counsel for Mr. Lederer was provided an opportunity to respond but chose to defer his response to a later date.3

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3 A transcript of the March 17, 1981, hearing appears in the appendix.
The Committee met again in Executive Session on April 2, 1981. After hearing argument from Special Counsel and counsel for Mr. Lederer concerning certain aspects of Mr. Lederer's motion to dismiss the indictment and concerning the finality of Mr. Lederer's conviction in the District Court, the Committee voted, 11-1, that Mr. Lederer had committed offenses over which the Committee had jurisdiction, and that the Committee should "proceed promptly to hold a disciplinary hearing for the sole purpose of determining what sanction to recommend that the House of Representatives impose on Representative Lederer for these offenses * * *" (Lederer Exhibit H). Mr. Lederer and his counsel were immediately notified of the Committee's action and were afforded an opportunity to submit a list of proposed witnesses and written evidence (Lederer Exhibit I).  

The Committee's April 2, 1981, Resolution read:

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Committee's Rules, the Committee, having reviewed the evidence relating to the conviction of Representative Raymond F. Lederer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for the offenses of violating Sections 371, 201(c), 201(g) and 1952 of Title 18 of the United States Code; and upon consideration of the Report of Special Counsel Upon Completion of Preliminary Inquiry filed on March 17, 1981, in the above-captioned matter, and of all relevant evidence, including the exhibits and record herein, now determines that such offenses were committed and constitute violations over which the Committee is given jurisdiction under Clause 4(e) of Rule X of The Rules of the House of Representatives, including House Rule XLIII, Clauses 1-3, and it is hereby:

Resolved, That the Committee shall proceed promptly to hold a disciplinary hearing for the sole purpose of determining what sanction to recommend that the House of Representatives impose on Representative Lederer for these offenses:

And Be It Further Resolved, That Representative Lederer and his counsel shall be promptly advised of this action and informed of the Member's rights pursuant to the Rules of this Committee. [Lederer Exhibit H].

Pursuant to that Resolution, the Chairman set a sanctions hearing for April 9, 1981, and Special Counsel so informed Mr. Lederer through his counsel and notified him of his rights (Lederer Exhibit I).

On April 9, 1981, the Committee held its sanctions hearing in this matter. Neither counsel for Mr. Lederer nor Special Counsel presented any substantive evidence, and Representative Lederer did not present a written or oral statement to the Committee, although afforded that opportunity. The hearing was largely confined to the arguments of counsel. The Committee next met at the call of the Chairman on April 28, 1981, and voted, 10-2, to recommend that Representative Lederer be expelled from the House of Representatives.

* A transcript of the April 2, 1981, hearing appears in the appendix.
* A transcript of the April 9, 1981 hearing appears in the appendix.
B. THE COMMITTEE'S CONCLUSIONS

The extensive evidence admitted at the Lederer trial is summarized in the Report of Special Counsel Upon Completion of Preliminary Inquiry, which was received by the Committee and which appears in the appendix. Substantial testimony against Mr. Lederer was given at his criminal trial by a number of witnesses, including agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and an informer. A videotape and numerous audiotapes were presented at trial. The trial court charged the jury that, in order to convict, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Lederer received money at the time he was a public official in return for being influenced in his performance of an official act and that he acted with specific intent in a knowing, willful and corrupt manner. Mr. Lederer was found guilty of acts which constitute extremely grave violations of House Rules and, indeed, of the public trust, and this Committee independently concurs with those findings.

1. FACTUAL FINDINGS

In mid-1978, Melvin Weinberg, an FBI informant, began working on the so-called ABSCAM operation. ABSCAM was a code name derived from that of a fictitious company named Abdul Enterprises, Ltd. This company, operated by the FBI, ostensibly was in the business of investing money and purportedly was owned by two sheiks who were, in fact, fictitious. Anthony Amoroso was an FBI agent who worked in an undercover capacity with Weinberg and used the alias "Tony DeVito." Amoroso held himself out as the President of Abdul Enterprises, while Weinberg pretended to be a consultant or financial advisor to the company. The initial focus of the ABSCAM operation in early 1979 was upon gambling casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey, but in July of 1979 the focus shifted to political corruption.

On July 26, 1979, Amoroso (posing as DeVito), Weinberg and several undercover FBI agents met on a yacht in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, with Angelo Errichetti (then mayor of Camden, New Jersey), Louis Johanson and Howard Criden (law partners in Philadelphia), and a businessman associated with Johanson and Criden. At the meeting, Criden, Johanson, Errichetti and the businessman presented a legitimate proposal to DeVito and Weinberg, purportedly representing the Arab sheiks, for funding a casino in Atlantic City. During the latter part of the meeting, DeVito related the sheiks' concern over what had happened to former President Somoza of Nicaragua. He recounted news reports which indicated that the United States was considering returning Somoza to his native country, and said this concerned the sheiks because they anticipated the potential need to come to the United States at some future time to live here as a result of political turmoil in their own country.

Errichetti responded to this expression of concern by stating that there would be no problem since he had connections with the right political figures and that he "could handle it." Errichetti indicated that the Arabs had enough money to take care of all expenses, and

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Citations to the record supporting all of the factual findings set forth in this section are contained in the Report of Special Counsel Upon Completion of Preliminary Inquiry.
DeVito directed him to proceed and see what he could do “along those lines.” According to Weinberg, Errichetti told him that he had “congressmen to bring in that were willing to take bribes,” and Weinberg encouraged him.

After the July 26, 1979, meeting in Florida, Criden told another of his law partners, Ellis Cook, that Errichetti had, in turn, told Criden that if Criden’s law firm “knew any politicians there was money to be made in introducing the politicians to the sheiks.” It was understood that the politicians also would receive money in order to be “beholden” to the sheiks. In one of these conversations, Criden brought up the names of Congressmen Raymond F. Lederer and Michael J. Myers. He reminded his partner Johanson, who was also a Philadelphia City Councilman, that he knew them and asked Johanson, “Why don’t you see if they will meet with the **sheik**?” Johanson said he would talk to the two Congressmen.

On July 29, 1979, three days after the meeting on the yacht in Fort Lauderdale, Weinberg in Florida called Errichetti in New Jersey and recorded the telephone conversation. During that discussion, Errichetti suggested that Congressman Lederer was a possibility but that he would have to meet with Mr. Lederer personally. On the next day, July 30, 1979, Weinberg again telephoned Errichetti and recorded the conversation. Although Mr. Lederer’s name was not specifically mentioned, the conversation apparently concerned “the same subject” as the prior conversation. Errichetti asked when he should “schedule those people that we talked about,” and Weinberg said he needed a week’s time in order to raise the cash. They did agree that the meeting should take place in New York.

On the following day, July 31, 1979, Weinberg again called Errichetti and recorded the call. Errichetti told him that he was getting “those guys lined up,” and Weinberg replied that everything was ready. After a mention of “the two from Pennsylvania,” Weinberg and Errichetti talked about “What price we using.” Errichetti initially indicated “one”—meaning $100,000—but there was an agreement that this price should be cut to “50”—meaning $50,000. Errichetti said: “I thought I was explaining to them what the deal was. How it was gonna be done. And they said fine.” Weinberg took this latter statement to mean that Errichetti was explaining to the Congressmen what “they have to do for us, for the money.” An hour later, Weinberg called Errichetti back and, in a recorded conversation, asked Errichetti to obtain for him the names of “these Congressmen.”

Five days later, on August 5, 1979, DeVito, Weinberg and Errichetti met in the Northwest Airlines lounge of the John F. Kennedy International Airport. During the ensuing audio-recorded conversation, Errichetti referred to Congressman Myers and then added: “Congressman Lederer, he’s from Philadelphia also.” DeVito asked: “Leder?”, and Errichetti replied “Lederer * * *.”

On the next day, August 6, 1979, DeVito and Weinberg again met with Errichetti, this time in the Hyatt House Hotel in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. During the audi-taped meeting, Weinberg after referring to the fact that the money had been arranged for Congressman Myers the next week, went on to say, “** and then on the rest we’ll go one right after another.” Errichetti rejoined: “They’re there.”
The following day, August 7, 1979, DeVito and Weinberg met in the same hotel with Errichetti and Criden in a meeting that was audiotaped. After a discussion of other Congressmen, Criden said: "And you know there's a third guy," Errichetti added: "Lederer. * * *, Lederer from Pennsylvania." Later in the conversation, Criden stated: "Besides another guy by the name of Lederer, Congressman from Philadelphia, and the guy you know, first mentioned." Weinberg replied: "That will be in touch er, er if not next week, week after next we'll move on that—that's that's the easiest part. That that's no problem, that can be handled. We give you the O.K. on that now, it's no problem with that. * * *,"

On the following day, August 8, 1979, DeVito and Weinberg again met with Errichetti in the same hotel. During the meeting, which was audio-recorded, after a discussion of Congressman Myers, Weinberg asked, "Alright, then who would be the next one after him," and Errichetti replied, "I guess it would be Lederer." Weinberg asked, "Lederer?", and Errichetti replied, "Congressman Lederer, O.K. * * *

Almost a month later, in early September 1979, after DeVito had met with Congressman Myers on August 22, 1979, Errichetti and Weinberg conversed in a telephone call which was recorded. During that conversation, Weinberg asked Errichetti, "** * did you find out who the next one is?", to which Errichetti replied, "Yes. * * * Congressman Lederer, as I told you before. * * * He's all set. ** * The only problem he's got is he said he has to make it early because he has to be in Washington for an important vote in the afternoon." Errichetti then suggested that the meeting between Lederer and DeVito occur on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, and Weinberg agreed.

A few days later, on September 6, 1979, Errichetti and Weinberg again spoke in a telephone conversation which was recorded. Errichetti confirmed that everything was set for Tuesday, September 11, with "the candidate." According to Weinberg, "the candidate" referred to in this conversation was Congressman Lederer.

Three days later, on September 9, 1979, another audio-recorded conversation occurred between Errichetti and Weinberg. Errichetti, referring to "Number Two," "the candidate," and "Congressman," told Weinberg that he would "pick him up" at LaGuardia and meet Weinberg "at the Hilton." They agreed to schedule the meeting for 5:30 p.m.

Sometime after the August 22 meeting with Congressman Myers but before the September 11 meeting with Congressman Lederer, Johanson told Cook, his law partner, in the presence of Criden, another law partner, that he, Johanson, had spoken with Lederer and had set up a meeting with the sheik's representatives. According to Cook, Johanson had told Lederer that the Johanson-Criden-Cook law firm could make a fee for introducing Lederer to the sheik's representatives and that Lederer would receive $50,000 for going to the meeting. Lederer reportedly responded that "he would be glad to do it for Lou [Johanson] and all he wanted was a $5,000 contribution for the spring primary." Johanson indicated that he had told Lederer that the Congressman would receive the money at the meeting, and that, just prior to the meeting, Lederer would meet with Errichetti. Cook was also told
that Errichetti either would prepare, or had prepared, Lederer to speak with the sheik's representatives "about immigration matters, finance in the district ** *," but it is not clear whether Cook was told this before or after the September 11 meeting.

Criden also told Cook that Lederer would be flying from Washington for the September 11 meeting, and that Criden and Johanson would pick up Lederer at LaGuardia Airport and drive him to meet Errichetti who, in turn, would take him to meet the sheik's representatives. However, Criden and Johanson would not themselves attend the meeting.

On Tuesday, September 11, 1979, at 5:18 p.m., Congressman Lederer met in Room 717-718 of the Hilton Inn at John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens, New York, with Errichetti, DeVito, Weinberg, "Ernie Poulos," an undercover FBI agent whose real name was Ernest Haridopolos, and another agent. The meeting was videotaped. Just prior to the meeting, at the beginning of the videotape, DeVito identified $50,000 and placed it in a brown paper bag and put the bag into a briefcase. Shortly thereafter, Errichetti and Lederer arrived, and Errichetti introduced the Congressman to DeVito. Poulos left the room after the introductions and joined another special agent in the bar downstairs. Sitting nearby, at the entrance to the lounge area, were Criden, Johanson, and Errichetti's nephew, who had driven Errichetti to the hotel the previous night.

Meanwhile, at the meeting upstairs, Lederer acknowledged that Errichetti had told him "some things" in which DeVito was interested, and that he (Lederer) was very interested in the port of Philadelphia. Lederer then went on to explain that he was a member of the House Ways and Means Committee, that he was on the Subcommittee on Trade, and that he was the ranking member of the "Miscellaneous Subcommittee which is race tracks, casinos, Vegas interests, anything else that falls under the cover of Ways and Means."

Weinberg and DeVito explained to Lederer that the sheiks were concerned about what had happened to President Somoza and the Shah of Iran and what might happen to them if the government in their country was overthrown. They explained that the sheiks wanted a sponsor on whom they could count for help in the event that they had to get out of their country. The sheiks wanted to be sure that they would not be sent back to their country as was President Somoza:

DeVito. Well, this is what, this is why we're here to insure that *** uh. I understand that you can introduce legislation.


Mr. Lederer indicated that he wanted to meet the sheik, and Weinberg told him that would be no problem. Errichetti said he would have the sheik attend a cocktail party at which Mr. Lederer would be present. The conversation then moved to a discussion of specific measures which Mr. Lederer could undertake for the sheik, and the following colloquy occurred:

Lederer. See, you want to protect him too, you know. Why all at once does a Philadelphia Congressman want to help somebody to * * *

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* Emphases have been added throughout the entire following sections quoted from the transcript.
DEVITO. Well, that's what we came up with.

LEDERER. That's doing your homework.

DEVITO. Alright. What we came up with, okay, our position in this thing is we want to get him into the position where you're going to stand up for him, okay, if need be, the legislation to get him into the country, okay? I understand possibly we can work something out through contacts with the State Department and whatnot to bring him into to start with. Then introduce the legislation or I understand that you can introduce the legislation, you know, prior to him being brought, not prior to him coming from over there, but him all of a sudden appearing here, maybe on a visa of some sort.

LEDERER. See that's gonna be experience here, that's why I'm talking about doing your homework. Just get him here.

DEVITO. Okay, well, what we came up with was the fact that, through the Mayor's ingenuity is that if we can show that he's involved in some type of enterprise here and he's putting dollars into the country, this would sort of help you. In other words * *

LEDERER. It helps him. That's what's more important.

DEVITO. Well, it helps him but it gives you something . . . to protect yourself. In other words, if you're going to stand up, somebody may say, well, why is this guy standing up for him? Well now you've got . . . If we do that and we invest some money in Philadelphia and in that area, what that does is that it not only protects us, okay.

ERRICHETTI. It protects you.

DEVITO. It protects you.

LEDERER. Sure.

DEVTTO. And that's what it does. It will, you know, protect you from, you know, from sort of standing out and saying why the hell is this guy so interested in helping these people.

LEDERER. You see I have a track record already on private bills. I've introduced a couple. I'm working on one right out of New York City now. Somebody I met down in Wildwood went back to Czechoslovakia. I got Charley Vanik working on it. So I have a track record. But it's so much nicer if, you know, if a guy's got a legitimate interest in the port of Philadelphia.

DEVITO. That helps you.

LEDERER. Oh certainly. Helps him. It helps, helps my argument to get him in here. You know, *,*, this guy's like one of us. He's one of the family. He's got our people working. He took a chance on us. Let's take a chance. I'll get all Philadelphia Congressmen on, then I'll get Pennsylvania Congressmen, you know, to support the bill.

WEINBERG. That's no problem for him to do. We can take care of that. But the main thing is he wants sure that he's buying friendship.

LEDERER. Sure. Let me ask you this. How many members of his family do you want to bring in?
Weinberg. We don’t know. We’re only talking about him and the other one. That comes down the line later on.

DeVito. Right now, what we’re concerned of, concerned with, is the two, the two sheiks, okay? And if this thing you know if this thing works right, there could be a lot of money in this thing, as I told Angelo before, in that we may wind up with, the way those guys talk, they may want to spread it around that, you know, this can be done, therefore, these other guys may come forward to get themselves the same type of insurance and, hey, they’re looking to pay.

Lederer. I’m not worried about that. He’s my friend. He wants to help this guy, that’s where I’m at, you know. If you want to do it down the road and it helps somebody I’ll do it. First get a track record with me.

DeVito told Mr. Lederer that the Sheik was hedging his bets and that he might never have to leave his country:

DeVito. He may never have to leave there.
Weinberg. He wants to * * *
Lederer. Hopefully he won’t. That’s the best of all worlds.
DeVito. Exactly.
Weinberg. He wants to sleep good at night.
Lederer. A little insurance.
DeVito. That’s all he’s doing. He’s, you know * * *
Lederer. I understand.
DeVito. It’s like at the table, he’s got blackjack and he wants to insure the bet and * * *

Lederer. But Tony, I know I’m stopping you. If he wants to buy insurance you have to sit down and do the policy. Part of the policy is he gets to know me. Hopefully my main thing is the port of Philadelphia, he’ll have some interests there. We’ve got Levino Shipping, you know. Imagine if you tried to send Levino back to Greece. The * * * city of Philadelphia would go off the wall.

Weinberg. I think what most of these Arabs are scared of is Carter and this * * * human rights * * *. That’s what they’re all scared of, that he comes out with his human rights, Somoza the thing and Shah.

Lederer. See I don’t know nothing about his country to give you that and I can’t talk for Carter. I just can’t give you that. No, I can give you me though and I’ll work * * *

Weinberg. That’s what we want.
DeVito. That’s what we’re here for.
Lederer. You got that when I, Mario got * * *
Weinberg. That’s what we want, you’ve got to say that you’re with him that’s what we’re sayin.

Lederer. If I’m going to be the captain of a football team, I’m gonna have to, you know, call some plays.
DeVito then told Lederer that Errichetti had suggested that the Sheik should invest some money—to “put money in the right people’s hands” in order “to insure things”—and that Errichetti had suggested that Lederer would help him.

DeVito. If he leaves there with all the money there, hey, let’s face it, nobody’s going to want to help him, so what he’s doing is he’s investing his money around the world, both of them are, and Angelo’s suggestion was something that we were looking for and saying, hey, I’ve got this guy, meaning you, who will do it for him, okay, but what the key is, is, if we can invest money in Philadelphia in the Congressman’s area where it gives him a lot of protection on his own position to say, “This is why I’m standing up for the guy, not only, you know not because * * *”

Lederer. Well that helps, that helps.
DeVito. Well it helps an awful lot, I mean * * *
Lederer. Yeah. But the thing is, you know, like so much with this guy. If he’s got that kind of money and I think if certain things are happening in Philly, he’ll make bucks, you know he don’t just put it there he might have enough, but the name of the game is to make more of it I think.

Weinberg. Well we’re moving down near there now, we’re going to take an apartment down there to work out of.
Lederer. But you know and I, this might not be things you want to hear, but do you guys, businessmen, did you know to make sure that the guy * * *
DeVito. Oh yeah.
Weinberg. That’s our job. Well that’s my job and Tony’s job.
DeVito. That’s what we’re getting paid for.
Lederer. Alright then we’re not boy scouts.
DeVito. No.
Lederer. Ok.

Lederer then pledged his support for the sheik:

Lederer. Well, I like the idea that if you have the political climate, you have a man who’s got a lot of bucks I guess, who can conceive to become an American citizen. You know because the political climate says, Gees, the Arabs are buying the farms, the Arabs are buying this, and they’ll take it all back, they’re not here, the guy gonna leave the paper here. He’s going to stay here to enjoy it.

Weinberg. That’s the whole idea. They realize the end is coming soon. They want to keep their money in this country.
DeVito. That’s why he’s willing to pay for, you know, for what he gets. He, you know, he figures with people like you on his side, okay, introduce legislation, from there stand up for him, you know, in case it comes to * * * you know I’m trying to envision like the worst situation, you know.
LEDERER. I want you to give me the worst. I'll tell you how far I can get.

DeVito. Well, that's what I'm saying. Like it's, it's not like a Somoza, okay, where this guy has been involved in, they're saying atrocities and different things like that. I mean this is what you see in the newspapers, before the public.

Errichetti. He's a clean businessman.

DeVito. This guy is not like that but what he wants us to do is to insure that, you know, if like these Arab students that revolt because they don't like what's going on. What he wants to do is to insure that you're going to stand up for him.

LEDERER. He's got it.

LEDERER. Bring him in on a visa right, sooner or later he's gonna invest, gonna have through whoever his accountants, and his underlings, business people doing things. If he can't go through the regular naturalization, right, when the time comes, then I'll introduce a private bill to keep him in the country. Well it'll take time, it's not gonna happen overnight, there's a law on that. We'll get him to be a naturalized citizen. Now with that his family will come in, his immediate family, but I'm a little scared he wants his cousins, nieces.

WEINBERG. No, no. He wants that, that's extra.

LEDERER. I don't know if I can do that, I don't know if I can do that.

Errichetti. Him he can do.

LEDERER. Him we can do, we'll get his wife * * *

* * * *

Lederer then described the mechanics of admitting the sheik and said he would "introduce a private bill" and ensure the bill's passage through the Judiciary Committee. He then reaffirmed his support for the sheik:

LEDERER. I don't want to * * * bargain with you but it's very important to me that Philadelphia's gonna, I don't care if he goes into scrap metal or what but I want him to do something in my city.

WEINBERG. Well once we can go back and tell him that you're on his side.

LEDERER. No. You got that when I walked in the door.

Errichetti. That's all.

* * * *

After telling DeVito the importance of the sheik's investing in Philadelphia or wherever he decided to put his money from the standpoint of having a Congressman support him, and cautioning DeVito that he would not necessarily help others who wanted to gain admission to the United States, Lederer emphasized his support for the two sheiks who currently were under consideration:
DeVito. Maybe by that time, listen to me. Maybe by that time you know somebody else in another state that we can.

Lederer. Right.

DeVito. In other words we can do.

Lederer. And maybe I don’t, though, Tony.

Weinberg. We’re only interested.

DeVito. I’m not asking. You’ve gotta commit yourself in that respect too.

Weinberg. We only got two that we worried about.

Lederer. I’m telling you I’m going to the wall for these two guys for this man.

DeVito. I’m only asking you to commit yourself is what I’m saying.

Lederer. Yeah.

DeVito. To me, I’m just throwing this out, as far as, if this comes about, which may never come about, maybe they’ll be somebody, a Representative from another state that we can do a similar thing, you know, and have one of these other guys invest money there and have those people come forward.

Lederer. Okay, I understand that.

Weinberg. But right now we’re just worried about these two, they’re the ones we work for.

DeVito. We’re just worried about these two.

Lederer. What kind of shape are they in now about coming?

Weinberg. No problem.


Weinberg. No problem whatsoever. But they know that the end.

Lederer. Because I’m giving a commitment you know and I want to know a timetable.

Weinberg. No, no is the end. We don’t know. The end may come five years, ten years, it may never come. But they are scared.

Lederer. I’m prepared if it’s this next week. That’s what I am saying.

DeVito. I’ll tell you what. You just said it. We depend on Angelo to.

Errichetti. To bring the right people.

DeVito. To bring the right people to us, okay.

Errichetti. Period.

Lederer. I don’t think what you’re asking is impossible because if it was I’d walk through the door. It’s a big ballgame, alright. I don’t think you’re Boy Scouts. I’m not a Boy Scout.

DeVito. No, I know we’re not Boy Scouts, we’re talking money investing.

Lederer. But I don’t wanta go down the road, you know.
DeVito. Yeah.
Lederer. Things I can't deliver. I believe I can deliver this, how important it is to you, all right.
Weinberg. That's good enough.
DeVito. Well. Let me, let me.
Lederer. No, go ahead I want you to be satisfied (IA).
DeVito. Yeah, yeah. I mean you say you believe you can deliver.
Errichetti. [laughter] (IA) * * *
Lederer. I know. Any talents I have they're yours. I won't slack off.
DeVito. All right.
Lederer. But I can't tell you that the umpteenth person, that's one of the things I wanna set out right away.
Weinberg. No, no there is no umpteenth person.
Lederer. That's where I'm hedging. I want that clear.
DeVito. I'm just hedging. I'm just taking. All I'm doing is I'm taking you as being on our team. In other words you're being loyal to us.
Lederer. It's gonna be a two way street.
DeVito. Yeah.
Weinberg. Congressman.
DeVito. Hay. That's why we're gonna come into Philadelphia.
Lederer. Call me Ray.
Errichetti. [laughter]
Weinberg. Ray, Ray, when it comes if there's a third or fourth or fifth person, even a third, we'll come to you, and tell ya it's a third, and we'll make our deal then.
Lederer. Okay.
Weinberg. We're just talkin' about two people, no third.
Lederer. Okay.
Weinberg. Alright, so that you understand that.
DeVito. We don't wanna push. Like I say * * *
Weinberg. We're not gonna put the whole team on this here, okay.
DeVito. The team protects itself. We don't want to put any burden on your back that's * * *
Lederer. I'm wanna deliver on this one, deliver it clean. (IA) Can I tell you I can do it (IA). I know I'll bust em.
Ah, I'm sure you'll be satisfied.
DeVito. That's a guarantee for me.

After the discussion limiting Lederer's commitment to the two sheiks under discussion and affirming that commitment ("I'm wanna deliver on this one, deliver it clean"), Lederer suggested that the group take the sheik around the city and have him donate money to charities. Lederer then advised DeVito that he should not "overdo spreading money." The meeting closed shortly after DeVito handed Lederer the brown paper bag containing $50,000 and said, "Spend it well."
Lederer then left the meeting and went to the lounge area of the hotel where he was seen by the FBI agents meeting briefly with Cridon and Johanson. According to Cook, Errichetti took $20,000 as his share and gave the bag containing the remaining $80,000 to Criden. Criden told Cook that, of the $30,000, $5,000 had gone back to Weinberg and DeVito; $15,000 was to be split between Criden and Johanson; $4,500 would go to Cook; and $5,000 was to be placed in an envelope bearing the initials “RL.” Criden gave Cook $5,000 in the marked envelope and told him to put it in a safety deposit box to hold until Lederer’s spring primary. On September 12, 1979, Cook and Johanson placed this envelope in a safety deposit box which previously had been opened in the names of Cook, Criden and Johanson.

On September 20, 1979, about a week after Cook’s conversation with Criden, Johanson told Cook that he had met with Lederer, that the Congressman needed $500, and that Cook should withdraw that amount in $20 bills from Lederer’s $5,000 share. Cook went to the bank on September 25, 1979, and withdrew the money, converting the $100 bills in the envelope into $20 bills. Within a day or two after Cook had given the money to Johanson, Johanson told Cook that he had seen Lederer and given him the $500, but that Lederer, when he previously had said he needed “five,” had meant $5,000, not $500. Accordingly, Cook was told to go back to the bank and withdraw the amount remaining in the envelope. Cook did so on September 27, 1979, and gave the $4,500 to Johanson, who thereafter told Cook that he had given the money to Lederer, who needed it to repair his house on the shore.

On February 2, 1980, two FBI agents interviewed Lederer in his home in Philadelphia. The Congressman was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights with respect to self-incrimination, and he executed a waiver of his right to remain silent and to have an attorney present. Lederer told the agents that Johanson had approached him on behalf of persons interested in investing large sums of money in the port of Philadelphia. He said that he met with “Tony” and “Mel,” who told him that they represented an Arab sheik interested in investing $100 million in the City of Philadelphia and that they wanted Lederer to put them in touch with the right people to handle their investments. Lederer denied to the agents that his aid had been solicited on immigration problems, that there had been any mention of private bills, that he had been offered, or had solicited, money, that Errichetti had been present, or that he recalled leaving the meeting with a paper bag. After this discussion, Lederer declined to be interviewed further.

On June 2, 1980, Lederer reported in his Ethics in Government Act Financial Disclosure Statement, filed with the House of Representatives, that he had received $5,000 during 1979 as a consultant’s fee from Johanson at his law firm’s address. Cook testified at trial, however, that he was not aware of any payment by his law firm to Lederer as a consultant and that he would have been aware of any such payment.

Lederer did not testify at trial in his own defense. Instead, he presented twelve witnesses who testified favorably as to his reputation for honesty, integrity and good character generally. It was stipulated
that, prior to his involvement with DeVito and Weinberg, Lederer had introduced private immigration bills for which he had not sought or discussed being paid. Through his counsel, Lederer presented only one issue to the jury: whether the Congressman had been improperly entrapped. In effect, Mr. Lederer admitted committing the crimes charged in the indictment but claimed that he did not have the requisite predisposition to commit those crimes at the time he embarked on his course of conduct. Thus, for purposes of the criminal trial, Lederer's attorney, acting on the Congressman's behalf, did not contest that $50,000 had been passed to him in a brown paper bag; that he knew the bag contained money when he took it; that he knew he was violating the law by accepting it; and that he acted voluntarily, intentionally and corruptly.

The District Court instructed the jury that the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lederer had a predisposition to commit each offense prior to doing so or he must be found not guilty of each offense. On January 9, 1981, after the five-day trial, the jury found Representative Lederer guilty on all counts.

The jury obviously discredited the defense that Lederer was entrapped into committing the crimes charged, and so does the Committee. Based upon all the evidence, the Committee is convinced, as was the jury that was instructed on this issue, that Lederer had sufficient criminal predisposition to negate the entrapment defense. Even if this were not true, the evidence shows that he did in fact commit criminal acts, with or without predisposition, but with a full sense of what he was doing at the time. The government presented to Lederer an opportunity to commit crimes, and he willingly seized that opportunity.

2. CONCLUSIONS

Based upon the foregoing, the Committee concluded on April 2, 1981, that Representative Lederer did commit exceedingly grave offenses within the jurisdiction of this Committee. He violated the public trust by accepting a bribe in exchange for promises to perform legislative acts. The Committee could find no ameliorating, extenuating or mitigating circumstances in his conduct. On the contrary, after taking a substantial amount of money in return for promises in connection with his duties as a Congressman, he spent the money for his personal advantage, lied to the FBI about what he had done, and then proceeded to lie to the House about the same sum of money. This House cannot countenance such acts which threaten the very integrity of the nation's legislative process. The Committee therefore recommended on April 28, 1981 that Representative Lederer be expelled from the House of Representatives by having the House adopt a resolution in the following form:

8 These include violations of House Rule XLIII. Clause 1 ("[a] Member * * * shall conduct himself at all times in a manner which shall reflect creditably on the House of Representatives"), Clause 2 ("[a] Member * * * shall adhere to the spirit and the letter of the rules of the House of Representatives and to the rules of the duly constituted committees thereof"), and Clause 3 ("[a] Member * * * shall receive no compensation nor shall he permit any compensation to accrue to his beneficial interest from any source, the receipt of which would occur by virtue of influence improperly exerted from his position in the Congress"). See also Rule 5 of the Code of Ethics for Government Service, House Concurrent Resolution 175, 72 Stat. pt. 2, B12 (July 11, 1958) ("Any person in Government service should * * * never accept, for himself or his family, favors or benefits under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the performance of his governmental duties").
Resolved, That, pursuant to Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, Representative Raymond F. Lederer be, and he hereby is, expelled from the House of Representatives.

On April 29, 1981, the Speaker laid before the House a communication from Representative Lederer. In this communication Representative Lederer advised that he had submitted to the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania his resignation from the House of Representatives effective at the adjournment of the House on May 5, 1981.

In light of Representative Lederer's resignation, the Committee considers that the decisions it reached and the action it took on April 28, 1981, have been rendered moot, and it makes no further recommendation to the House of Representatives in this matter.

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE XI, CLAUSE 2(1)(3)(A)

The Committee makes no special oversight findings in this report. This report was approved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct on April 30, 1981, by a vote of 11 yeas and 1 nay.
DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE
DON BAILEY

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
The attached is submitted as my additional and dissenting views to the report submitted to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in the matter of Representative Raymond F. Lederer. I hereby request that the same be published and submitted with the Committee report as is provided in the Rules of the House of Representatives and in the Rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.

The procedures followed by the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, hereinafter referred to as the Committee, were faulty in the following particulars:

(1) The committee chose to proceed under the truncated procedures provided for in Rule 14 of the Committee's Rules. That procedure is dependent upon, or is triggered by, a "conviction" in a Federal, State or local Court of a criminal offense.

In the Lederer matter, this procedure was chosen even after a poor precedent was laid down "In the Matter of Representative Michael O. Myers." That precedent was established at a committee hearing in which the definition of the word conviction in and for the purposes of Rule 14 was deemed to mean "a jury verdict". The decision to so define the word conviction for the purposes of Rule 14 was reached after a lengthy discussion which occurred in a Committee Executive Session on September 3, 1980, during which the procedural means to establish the substantive end of disciplining Mr. Myers was decided upon subsequent to a discussion that made it quite clear that without altering the Rules and/or definition of the Rules that it would be impossible to move against Michael Myers before adjourning for the Fall election period.

Such a course of action was fundamentally unfair. Not only was it improper in a Constitutional sense, but it defies everything for which this country and our basic history of civil liberties represents.

In short, the decision was very much an ex post facto type of approach. Once it had been ascertained that there was some type of political necessity for punishing Michael Myers, then and only then was it decided that definitions in the Rule would have to be either changed or altered in order to fit the desired end.

The alleged authority for this decision was found in an interpretation by Special Counsel to the Committee, that it could really do practically anything it wanted, without deference to the Court or to the Constitution, because supposedly the authority of the House to discipline was unchallenged and separate from Constitutional restraints or the powers of any other Branch.

This may be the case but only because our institutions or decision-makers determine it thus. No decent or plausible, intellectual, ethical
moral or even suitably legalistic argument can be made in support of proceeding in this manner.

Rule 14, with its now altered definition of convictions, was again applied “In the Matter of Representative Raymond F. Lederer”. Two wrongs of whatever degree of individual severity can, when used together, never make a right. The House of Representatives in its disciplinary functions, cannot and never should be free from at least a basic adherence to the requirements of the Bill of Rights or of the 14th Amendment, all of which are part of the Constitution of the United States of America.

The mentality of the report of Counsel to the Committee, whose memorandum in re the Constitutional power of the House to expel a member for misconduct (it’s included as an Appendix to the Committee’s report and these dissenting and additional views and is attached hereto and made part hereof in the Appendix), provides a striking example of the potential conflicts that can be encountered as a result of the action we have taken.

“No Court ever has had occasion to review Congress’ exercise of this power, but it appears to be virtually unlimited by Constitutional restraints.”

Such a point of view is not only repugnant but is patently absurd. While there’s certainly no requirement that in a disciplinary proceeding, the House must follow the procedures or interpretations laid down by the Court, we are asking for an incredibly serious conflict raising questions not only of separation of powers but serious questions about the relationship of disparate parts of the Constitution, one to the other, if we for one minute attempt to argue that we are not bound by at least some semblance of respect and duty to the basic guidelines laid down in that document; guidelines that purport to protect and defends the rights of individuals in our society against any and all institutions and action of government.

It’s my sincere and heartfelt belief that the Bill of Rights and the dictates of the 14th Amendment do indeed take precedence over and are indeed superior in their application to any of our laws and behavior than is any bloated or distorted, arrogant and presumptive, interpretation of the powers of the House of Representatives under Article I, Section V.

It’s incomprehensible that we would assume, that completely unaffected by any other part of the Constitution or Bill of Rights, that we could decide that for the sake of discipline, an individual had committed a crime prior to our review of his or her behavior resulted in our classifying the conduct which we did not like as criminal, and then devise for the sake of convenience, the procedures necessary to carry out our preconceived ends. In the finite analysis, that’s exactly what we did in these ABSCAM cases because it’s never been decided that a crime was committed, nor did we ever hold an evidentiary of our own. This is wrong.

Therefore, we lack the authority upon which our actions are based, and thus the sanctions that we have imposed are without proper justification.

(2) That the Committee could have proceeded under different Rules, initiating a complaint via a procedure beginning with Rule 16
that could have resulted in a proper action. Such a course would have provided the basic safeguards necessary to prevent abuse. And by allowing the Committee to review evidence, relevant materials, and witnesses, before rendering a decision and without being dependent upon either the competent or incompetent work product of any other Branch, the Committee could have acted in accordance with all Constitutional mandates.

Such a procedure also would not have required any modification or perversion of definitions and/or existing Rules.

Therefore, it is the opinion of this Member that we have not only acted injudiciously but improperly, that we have acted in violation of our own Rules and in violation of basic principles of natural law, and that we have in fact violated the specific letter of the Constitution of the United States of America.

The original precedent in the Myers case was faulty. That precedent was used to proceed in the Lederer case and is naturally also faulty there. That procedure was originally used as an expedient. The definitions of Rule 14 were altered as an expedient. This is not a good and proper way to proceed when defining or effecting the rights or privileges of any American citizen.

We do not need to abide by those definitions of due process as expanded and developed by the Judicial Branch because, provided some semblance of the requirements upon which that law has developed have been met, we are still within the proper authority and spirit of the Constitution of the United States of America, when performing our duties under the authority given us in Article I, Section V. But we must at least meet a basic common sense definition of these requirements.

Although the Courts may never have the courage to interfere in our process, although the Courts may not even have the courage to comment on our process, we have indeed invited them to step in and embarrass the House for this improper and unfair procedure. And, in fact, we have violated, and this is even more unfortunate and sad, our basic concept of fairness.

If it would only have taken at the very, very most, an additional 50-60 days to proceed under Rule 16, without having to pretend that a conviction that never took place, actually did take place.

For these reasons I must respectfully dissent from the Committee report filed in this case. Incidentally, there has been no conviction of any Congressman, as of the date of this report.

**Summary**

The Committee lacks jurisdiction by virtue of procedural and substantive violations of the Constitution of the United States of America and of its own Rules. Its actions are therefore improper and lacking in authority.
EXECUTIVE SESSION, PENDING BUSINESS

TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 1981

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT,
Washington, D.C.

The committee proceeded in Executive Session at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2359-A, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Spence, Conable, Myers, Forsythe, Brown, Bailey, and Holland.


Staff present: John M. Swanner, Staff Director, Donald E. Kelly, Counsel; and Jan Loughry, Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. We are meeting today in Executive Session pursuant to the motion adopted at our meeting this past week.

As the members of the committee are aware, Representative Lederer and his counsel, Mr. James J. Binns, were notified on March 11 that the committee adopted a resolution authorizing a preliminary inquiry into the matters for which Mr. Lederer was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on January 9, 1981.

Pursuant to committee rules, Mr. Lederer has the right to present an oral or a written statement to the committee during its preliminary inquiry.

Before recognizing Mr. Lederer or his counsel, I will ask if Mr. Prettyman wishes to address the committee at this time.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. Mr. Chairman, normally I would, but I understand that Mr. Binns has a preliminary motion that would come before any business that I have and therefore I will defer to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Binns.

Mr. BINNS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to renew the motion which I made by letter of March 3, 1981, that this matter be put over pending the outcome of the due process hearing that is currently pending before the Honorable George Pratt in the Eastern District Court of New York.

My reasons for making and renewing that motion are that substantial new evidence has come to light by virtue of the due process hearing which commenced after the verdict in the Lederer case.

Chairman Stokes, I would like, if I may, to call attention to the word "convicted" which you used in your opening statement. I understand that it has been brought before the committee before, but in fact, Congressman Lederer has not been convicted of a crime as of yet.
There has been a guilty verdict rendered by a jury, but the Court has made it quite clear that it is taking seriously the motions that have been made on behalf of Congressman Lederer and until the time that he is sentenced, he will not be convicted.

I have with me and I offer for the committee’s use copies of the briefs that have been submitted on behalf of Congressman Lederer to Judge Pratt. They were filed yesterday according to the briefing schedule set down by Judge Pratt one month ago. If there is a staff member available, I would be more than happy to afford courtesy copies.

Mr. Prettyman. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that normally I would object on relevancy grounds, but I think that the Congressman ought to be entitled to submit anything he wants to to the committee. Consequently, on that ground, I do not object.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Mr. Prettyman could substantiate. What would the relevancy argument be?

Mr. Prettyman. Well, the same reason that the committee turned down the previous motion to defer the hearing until the due process motion had been decided by Judge Pratt; namely, that that substantial new evidence which he refers to goes to issues such as governmental misconduct and do not affect the determination by this committee of whether this record which is about to be presented to you shows that the Congressman has violated the House rules.

Mr. Bailey. Well, in light of that, without belaboring the committee with the problem that I see a connection to; again, on the interpretation of the rule and the use of verbiage, Rule 14, the use of the word “conviction”, I just bring that to the members’ attention, because I think it would be relevant.

Mr. Holland. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Holland. I will not ask a lot of questions as we go along here, but I want to clear something up in my mind. Are we or are we not bound by the rules of court procedure in this committee?

Mr. Prettyman says he is going to object to something on the grounds of relevancy. I remember that being a procedure in a court of law. What I want to know is, do we proceed in here as a court of law bound by the rules of evidence, or do we not?

The Chairman. No. I would say we do not.

Mr. Prettyman. That is my understanding, too. Maybe the Congressman misunderstood me.

I said ordinarily I would object on grounds of relevancy, because I do not think that what he has submitted to the committee is at all relevant to your determination today; but at the same time, I think out of a sense of fairness, the Congressman should be allowed to submit what he wants to to the committee. Therefore, I was not objecting.

Mr. Holland. It just raised a question in my mind. Nothing else binds us, as I understand it. I have seen it do that as it would in a court of law. We walk around like jurors reading everything in the newspapers and all the rest and making our decisions like that. So I just wanted to know, Mr. Chairman, should I dismiss all I know about the law when we are talking about these cases? I would like to know that in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. I think we have answered the gentleman’s question. I do not want to elaborate any more.

Mr. Binns, would you care to continue?

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir. My reason for making the motion is that we feel so strongly about the position that we have taken before Judge Pratt that with respect to not only the due process argument, but to the argument having to do with whether or not Congressman Lederer was entrapped as a matter of law, that we have offered to the committee the alternative of pushing this hearing back so that it would await the outcome of the decision by Judge Pratt, which is not long in coming, and that if the decision of Judge Pratt is unfavorable to the Congressman, that he would resign forthwith.

If the decision of Judge Pratt was favorable to Congressman Lederer, we would then request that this type of hearing take place.

I say that in an effort to obviate the necessity of this committee spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to do something which in our opinion at this point would be tantamount to disenfranchising the voters of Congressman Lederer’s congressional district.

He is the only Abscam defendant, if you will, who has been re-elected after his indictment. His case has not yet been tried to finality and he has substantial rights which are awaiting decision by a Federal District Judge.

I point out to you only for the sake of reference that another Federal District Judge, John Fullam, in a different circuit, has found that entrapment and due process violations in fact exist in the total of Operation Abscam as a matter of law.

If you take the fact of Judge Fullam’s decision and couple it with the evidence that has been adduced since that decision in the due process hearing before Judge Pratt, it is readily apparent that there is something amiss in Operation Abscam and that there is no need for a speedy determination of anything at this point.

Coupled with Judge Fullam’s decision is the admonition of the Chief Judge of the Federal District Court of Washington, who said that there is something “odoriferous” about what is going on in Operation Abscam.

The packet of materials that I have offered for use by the committee is a brief that has been written and submitted to Judge Pratt at the conclusion of the oral testimony in the due process hearing. Without going into it in detail, yet me tell you that attached to the main brief is an Exhibit A, which is the motion to dismiss the indictment that was filed prior to the trial and prior to any pretrial discovery. In that motion, that was filed back in June of 1980. I set forth as a defense attorney a scenario that would be the most horrible scenario of rights violations that could be envisaged by a defense lawyer. That was without the benefit of one iota of pretrial discovery.

The main brief sets forth the instances of governmental overreaching and entrapment that have been proven both during the pretrial, the trial and post-trial stages.

The actualities that developed as a result of the due process hearings are far in excess of that which I dreamed up in my wildest expectations as a defense lawyer. I am sure that all of you have read about the testimony of the Newark Strike Force, a respected United States
Attorney's office, who came before Judge Pratt, Messrs. Weir and Plaza, and testified that in their opinion throughout the entire Operation Abscam, they filled both the Justice Department files and the FBI files with documentation of overreaching and entrapment and they came in and testified to that under oath.

This is unprecedented in the United States of America, and this was not as a result of jealousy between competing prosecutorial offices. This was the result of men whose good faith and morality mandated that they come forward and make public to a Federal Judge that which they felt was improper about Operation Abscam. All of this was developed subsequent to the trial of Congressman Lederer and subsequent to the trials that this committee has presided over.

I state for you as a matter of fact that the lawyers representing Congressman Jenrette and Congressman Myers did not have at their disposal that which I am able to set before you and have set before Judge Pratt.

All that we are asking at this point is that in the face of the seriousness of the allegations, and if you look through the pages of the brief, I am sure your eyebrows will be heightened and each and every allegation is substantiated by testimony elicited at a due process hearing.

I ask that this committee take the time to read these materials and if need be, request verification of the allegations from me which I will be able to do by reference to the notes of testimony of the due process hearing, which are voluminous, in which the government agents in the person of United States attorneys testified against FBI agents, other assistant United States attorneys, other administrative personnel in the Justice Department, because of the methods that they used to ensnare, entrap and deprive individuals of substantive due process rights.

Now, we are not just talking procedural due process. We are talking substantive rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment, that government lawyers allege to place here. These matters were not made public to you gentlemen heretofore. They are now matters of record under oath.

I do not think that it would be proper for you to look the other way. It may be that as a congressional body you have a great deal of difficulty with the allegation that a man accepted a bribe and a man was seen on television taking a bag; but I ask you to step back and take a deep breath and as lawmakers do what you must do, afford him and his constituents the substantive due process rights that they are entitled to under the laws of this nation.

Mr. Prettyman. May I respond, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Let me recognize Mr. Prettyman and we will come back to the committee for any questions they have.

Mr. Prettyman. First of all, Mr. Binns made reference to the disenfranchisement of the voters in Mr. Lederer's district.

I would point out to you that the Pennsylvania primary election was held on April 22, 1980, before he was even indicted; he was indicted on May 28, 1980, the general election then followed on November 4, 1980, before his conviction. He was not convicted until January 9, 1981.

So certainly the voters were not aware in the primary election that he was even going to be indicted and they were not aware in the gen-
eral election that he was going to be found guilty and, of course, he was entitled to a presumption of innocence until he was.

I dispute the fact that Judge Fullam decided anything in his decision that related to the totality of Abscam. His decision was specifically related to two Councilmen in Philadelphia and as I have previously addressed the committee in another session pointing out the many differences, there are nine or ten differences, that made that decision very special to those particular Councilmen that in no way relate to the present circumstances.

So far as entrapment is concerned, beginning at pages 1167 of this brown volume in front of you, which is the trial transcript that Mr. Binns and I have stipulated to, the Judge for some six pages—seven pages, instructs the jury in detail on the issue of entrapment and instructs the jury, in fact, that unless the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Congressman did not have the requisite degree of guilt and predisposition and so forth, that they were to find him not guilty. They had to find that as to each of the four counts that he is charged with and the jury, nevertheless, brought back a guilty verdict on each of the four counts.

As for the due process issues, I would submit to you that that is for the Judiciary Committee, rather than this committee if there was, in fact, overreaching by the government.

Even if the indictment is thrown out, it need not affect in any way this committee’s deliberations.

I would call your attention to beginning at page 982, and I do not want to make my closing argument here now, but I just want to point out to you that beginning on page 982, Mr. Binns on behalf of his client does not contest in any way that the Congressman received $50,000, that he knew that the money was in the bag, he was not acting under duress, he acted voluntarily, intentionally, that he knew it was a violation of law, he acted corruptly.

In other words, he admits everything except entrapment, and that is the issue that he wanted submitted to the jury. It was submitted to the jury on the evidence and the jury found that he had the requisite predisposition.

That does not bind you. You can find that he did not; but I submit to you that a review of the record as a whole clearly shows that he did.

Now, I submit that in view of that, it is inconceivable to me that this committee with this record in front of it of what occurred would put anything to one side because the government might have overreached or engaged in some kind of improper conduct or because some new evidence of that type has come before another body. That simply is not relevant, I submit to you for your consideration.

It makes no difference what happens in the due process hearing, whether the indictment is thrown out or not.

Thank you.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. Binns. May I respond to that, please, sir?

The Chairman. Certainly.

Mr. Binns. The portion of the transcript that Mr. Prettyman is quoting from is a side bar conference with Judge Pratt, wherein the Judge and Mr. Puccio, the prosecutor, and myself, were discussing
exactly what technical matters were being raised in defense of Congressman Lederer and all that is is a colloquy between the Judge and myself, saying to the Judge, and I direct you to page 983 in the middle, line 14, where I specifically say to Judge Pratt, "For the purposes of this defense, I don't contest that."

So that this was not a blanket admission on the part of Congressman Lederer or myself as to any factual matters that transpired during the meeting of September 11, 1979, when the bag is alleged to have transferred hands. This is a side bar conference where technical legal matters were being discussed between the Judge and myself, and you will note throughout if you go down to the next line 20, again the opening statement, "For the purposes of this defense."

So for the purposes of the defense of entrapment, what I was telling the Judge was, I concede everything, but that entrapment still exists here as a matter of law.

Lest you be swayed by eminent counsel's arguments about what the jury has decided, Judge Fullam's case, the jury decided that the defendants were guilty. The Judge overturned that verdict on the basis of entrapment as a matter of law, in addition to finding that there existed due process violations; so please do not be swayed by the fact that there has been an irrevocable act done by a jury here. That is not the case at all.

If you read the brief which we submitted to Judge Pratt, the issues are entrapment and due process, which he is free to overrule the jury's verdict.

So please do not be swayed thinking that something has gone on here that cannot be undone. That is not the case at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a couple questions. Your motion which is before the committee is for us to postpone. Are you able to give a postponement date certain?

Mr. BInNs. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that date?

Mr. BInNs. The date is four weeks from next Monday when the Government is to submit its briefs to Judge Pratt and Judge Pratt has admonished counsel that he will render a decision forthwith upon receipt of those briefs. Both sides' briefs would then be in. There will be no right of rebuttal or surrebuttal or anything else and the Judge will decide the case.

The CHAIRMAN. On that date then?

Mr. BInNs. Well, no, I cannot tell you that he is going to decide it that afternoon, but he is going to decide it forthwith. It is not going to be a drawn-out procedure and nothing is going to happen in the interim that will in any way affect what is going to happen here, if eventually it is going to happen, and I say to the committee that in the event that the decision is not favorable to the Congressman, his resignation will be submitted forthwith that day.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this, considering that this committee is not a court of law——

Mr. BInNs. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And this is, in effect, a disciplinary proceeding, I would like to know how you feel that the arguments presented here today would impact a disciplinary procedure, since this is not a court of law where we can find him guilty as such.
It would seem to me that different standards would apply with reference to a disciplinary procedure, notwithstanding overreaching by the Government or entrapment.

Mr. Binns. I would agree with that, sir. The difference that I see existing is that in the event that you were to take the time and to read these materials and you were to take the time to read the various portions of the transcript that are referred to here, it may well impact upon the decision of this committee as to whether any factual matter occurred that is worthy of disciplinary action, because the standards for entrapment that are set down and the standards for due process that grew out of the entrapment defense, and they are not totally separate as you might think or have been instructed heretofore, one evolved from the other, are such that they may well impact upon the decision of this body as to whether or not they want to find that Congressman Lederer need be subjected to disciplinary action, and more importantly, the type of disciplinary action that can be imposed. You do not have a standard where you are going to say we found that disciplinary action is needed and, therefore, we are going to do “X”. You have alternatives. You may administer a censure. You may expel him from the Congress. There are gradations.

I do not see how you can logically make that finding until you have seen all of the evidence surrounding what took place. It is not different from a situation where you would discipline a child of your own if that child did an act. Whether you would administer a sanction and the type of sanction you would administer does not exist in a vacuum. You take into consideration all the relevant factors. Was the child led astray? Did someone overcome his will? Did he do it voluntarily? All these things cannot be decided until you have seen all the facts.

Now, I just point out to you for a point of information that there is a Federal Judge somewhere who has said there was not a willful act done here. The man’s will was overborne. That is the basis of the entrapment defense. I am not talking about—I am disassociating the entrapment defense for the purpose of this colloquy from due process.

Mr. Pretzman. Mr. Chairman, the committee, of course, is not bound by court decisions in this area, in the particular area that we are talking about; but I would point out what I think is a highly significant case in 1975 before the California Supreme Court sitting en banc in which an attorney supposedly participated in a scheme to bribe police officers. He was thereafter acquitted by reason of entrapment. He was, nevertheless, disbarred. Even though he was entirely acquitted, he was disbarred and that was upheld by the California Supreme Court.
There is a Nebraska case in accord with that, the theory being, just as the chairman has pointed out in his question, that the disciplinary proceeding can be based on what the evidence showed happened and it did not make any difference whether he was ultimately thereafter found guilty or not.

That is what I am saying, that you can look and I will, of course, summarize this evidence for you, I hope, at the end of this hearing; but you can look at what actually occurred and say, "We don't care whether he was found guilty or not. We don't care whether the government overreached. We don't care whether the conviction is reversed. We will not stand, we will not permit the type of conduct that is shown by this record.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard?

The Chairman. Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Bailey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have thoroughly, I think like Mr. Prettyman has and hopefully many of us here studied these issues, and I must say that I think Mr. Prettyman is technically 1000 percent correct in terms of the authoritative base from which we start, how we render a decision. We are not bound by what the Court decides. I do not think there is any question about that, but I do not think, with due deference to counsel’s argument, that that is the issue here. It may appear to be tangential, it may appear to be connected; but I think it is quite different.

I have argued, and I would like to ask unanimous consent that the members of this panel, and hopefully before they decide this issue, and unfortunately, we will probably decide it today, would look at the proceedings of September 3, 1980, and the reasoning that went into the decision to adopt the Rule 14 procedure.

I would offer this to all of us. This issue would not arise, in my opinion, if we were to proceed under a Rule 16 procedure, because first of all, there is no reason given present circumstances to proceed under a Rule 14 procedure, because the reasons that were used to support the Rule 14 procedure were the nearness of the upcoming November election.

I would invite you to read the proceedings, the Executive Session proceedings of the committee in September that took place concerning the Myers matter. That is point No. 1.

No. 2, the totality or the environment in which an accusation takes place, and I have to agree with defense counsel, it is absolutely crucial and is a fundamental fairness issue in evaluating what happens to someone.

Mr. Prettyman is correct, in my opinion, when he says that if the Court ponders up tomorrow and says that the issue is one of government responsibility, this issue is absolved of willful intent and, therefore, he violated no law because of government overreaching which the Federal government has used in its vernacular when dealing with entrapment proceedings: but we could still proceed.

Question: We have gotten to the point where we have disregarded our rules; I guess it probably doesn’t make any difference whether or not we proceed under the resolution of a conviction in that case, or what Rule 14 means in terms of a conviction or a jury verdict.

I know that ultimately it does not make any difference in terms of our authority. There is no question about that, nor are we bound; but
we should have a due and proper respect for the rights of an accused
dividual who comes before us when it comes to fundamental recog-
nition of what we are doing.

All Rule 16 would do would set up a different procedure where we
can evaluate independently the court procedures, etcetera, whether or
not this individual is responsible for what he has been accused.

Now, what we are doing is a bifurcated thing. We are taking for
the benefit of prosecution and moving forward the Court’s argument
and then we are disregarding that, what those things mean and the
procedures we built into Rule 16 in arriving at the result.

I really do not think it is a fair way to proceed. I think we really
in terms of what that word means, it is ironic. I made these arguments
to our committee before and although I have not discussed them out-
side of the committee room concerning the word conviction, the role
and function in our rules and what we are doing. Our procedure lacks
credibility because of it.

I think we are making an error. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Binns. Mr. Chairman, just one thing with respect to Mr. Pretty-
man’s argument.

I am not at this time saying that you may not or you shall not or
you will not discipline him. All I am asking is to take all the facts in.
You have not been able to do it. They have not been presented to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown.

Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Binns, I personally appreciate your
concern over the funding of the committee and the willingness to short-
circuit the costly procedures that might be involved should the appeal
go against you.

Mr. Binns. This is not an appeal, sir. This is merely a post-trial
matter.

I am not asking you to await the outcome of an appeal. Now, I want
to make that clear. I do not know if you are an attorney, but I want to
make that clear.

I am not asking this committee to defer pending the outcome of the
appeal of Congressman Lederer.

This is a post-trial matter on the same level as the trial, just so you
understand. The trial in this case is not yet over in the sense that Con-
gressman Lederer is not convicted. We cannot appeal until he is con-
victed. By that I mean we cannot appeal until the Judge imposes
sentence, so I am not talking about an appeal, sir, just so you under-
stand.

His trial is still going on in the sense that this is a post-verdict hear-
ing which the Court is now considering and may well turn around the
whole case, so that is all we are asking for.

Mr. Brown. Thank you for that clarification.

My question is. should the ruling on that hearing be in your favor
and the finding of guilty or conviction be overturned, would you oppose
a preliminary inquiry by this committee?

Mr. Binns. No. We would ask for it. That is what I said to the chair-
man. At that point——

Mr. Brown. If all we are considering is a preliminary inquiry at this
point, and a preliminary inquiry is appropriate regardless of how that
ruling comes out, why is it not then appropriate to proceed?
Mr. Binns. Because I am giving you a heads you win, tails I lose proposition, in that you do not even have to do that if the hearing is unfavorable. We go away. You will never hear from us again and you do not spend a dime, so you win, we lose.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to his question?

The Chairman. Mr. Bailey. Will the gentleman yield?

I could respond to you, because counsel may not be aware of a better answer to that question, or an additional part of it.

One of the reasons is that, under the proceedings that were undertaken in the Myers case, once this proceeding was instituted it was a matter, from beginning to end, of 32 days before it was disposed of. Counsel may not be aware of that fact. But the fear I would have is that we would render a decision prior to—and I hate to keep bringing this up—but prior to a conviction in this case. You see, that's a possibility.

Mr. Brown. Whether there is a conviction, finally, however we choose to describe that, or not, if it doesn't make any difference—

Mr. Bailey. Well, it makes a huge difference, I think.

Mr. Brown. Our proceedings, why is there cause to delay it?

Mr. Bailey. Well, I think it could make—I don't want to answer for counsel, but I think, in terms of the outcome, relative to the issues involving this body, there might be some very relevant and important issues there that would affect our determination. I don't know. It doesn't go to the issue of authority, as I said. I agree with Mr. Prettyman. He is right. We could proceed. But the question is: Should we proceed fairly and not posthaste, especially when there is not an election coming up where we want to boot somebody out before then?

Mr. Prettyman. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that—

The Chairman. Mr. Brown has the time.

Mr. Brown. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Prettyman. Mr. Chairman, I would point out to you that I believe that, while obviously the committee can do anything that it pleases, I personally believe that a vote to defer would be in violation of the rules.

Rule 14 says that if a Member is convicted and you have interpreted conviction as you know to mean either a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt by a jury, the committee shall conduct a preliminary inquiry. The triggering event has occurred. A jury has found him guilty, and this is—you are not allowed leeway here. You are instructed under this to conduct a preliminary inquiry. Consequently, I don't think, unless you choose to interpret it otherwise—I think you have no discretion here.

The Chairman. Mr. Binns has been seeking recognition.

I recognize you, sir.

Mr. Binns. Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond, in addition to Mr. Brown and also to Mr. Prettyman.

We are not challenging the authority of this committee. The only thing that we are doing is to say, "Wait."

The portion of Rule 14 that Mr. Prettyman states does not prohibit you from waiting. It is mandatory language. You shall conduct it.

What we are offering is that you may not have to, because if the hearing goes against Congressman Lederer, we will resign. If it goes
in his favor, then you shall conduct a hearing. And we would ask for one, because at that time we would arm you with additional factual data that you don't have. And before you have to go through it—and I am talking about thousands of pages of testimony and substantial numbers of witnesses who have testified before Judge Pratt, in addition to the witnesses who have testified in other due process hearings around the country, because the judicial system is treating Abscam as a whole.

So that what happens, for instance, in a hearing in Philadelphia inures to the benefit of defendants who tried in New York. And that, in turn, inures to the benefit of defendants who are tried in Washington and Florida, or wherever else these Abscam cases take place. And before you will be able to make an intelligent and logical finding as to (a) should you discipline him and (b) how sternly, you would have to have at your fingertips all of this material.

Now, what sense does it make for you to go ahead at this time and embark upon that task, spend hundreds of thousands of dollars, when you don't have to?

You may have to. But at this point you don't have to because it may come that we will say, "Here is a resignation. The judge ruled against us."

Now, that won't prohibit the Congressman from pursuing his own legal remedies of appeal, but he will be finished as a Member of Congress. And that's the deal that we are offering, and it makes eminent sense to me. You are going to lose, at most, in time a month, a month and a half, two months.

I hope I have answered you, Mr. Brown, with respect to why we would ask that, sir.

Mr. Brown. The point I was concerned with was a bit different.

If I understand it, if the conviction is overturned——

Mr. Binns. Then we would want to embark upon a hearing.

Mr. Brown. We would still have a preliminary inquiry.

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir. And a full blown hearing.

Mr. Brown. I guess my problem is understanding why then, if we have a preliminary inquiry, in either case why it is appropriate to delay.

Mr. Binns. Because I don't know how much it is going to cost you in time or money to have a preliminary inquiry, but there is a chance that you may not have to have it. Because if the decision goes against him, you won't need it. There will be a letter of resignation, and that's it.

The Chairman. Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, the other thing that I would throw out is: We also face the possibility—let's be hypothetical and presume our hearing doesn't get done, our preliminary hearing doesn't get done, and the conviction is overturned. We are back again with the semantic difficulty of the interpretation of Rule 14, which, you know, again, doesn't make much difference in the long run.

One of the difficulties, of course, with proceeding too quickly is what after-mentioned evidence, what impact it may have, and that kind of thing, on our proceedings.

I just wanted to comment, though, in response to what Mr. Prettyman said, I don't think there is any question that we want to pro-
ceed. I wouldn't have signed the resolution to proceed if I didn't think we should have. I think it was appropriate.

But the question is how and when.

In your interpretation of the language of Rule 14, the issue is not when. The issue is mandatory language when you make a decision to do so. And that is the issue here. It is not one of whether or not we are going to proceed under 14 or not, even, because even with 14, Mr. Prettyman, as I am sure you are aware, and I think this is important for the committee to know, that does not go to the issue of whether or not this postponement motion is recognized or advocated or supported here.

Mr. Prettyman. Well, Mr. Congressman, I have stated at a previous hearing, and I will state here, my own view which, of course, is not binding upon anybody. But my own view is that a Congressman who has accepted a bribe and received money for it, promised his vote in Congress in return for a substantial sum of money, should not remain in Congress one day more than is absolutely necessary.

If the committee finds that Congressman Lederer did that, I think it is a perversion to allow him to remain, whether it is three days or a month or two months, or whatever other period it is, beyond the time that is necessary. I think the evidence is here. I think this committee has a duty to proceed.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Prettyman, let me say this to you, sir: I am a politician, and I deal with confrontations of this sort and opinions of the sort you have just suggested many times.

I do not disagree with anything that you have just said and any inference to the contrary notwithstanding. I would just reiterate a very deeply held conviction and love for a thing called the Constitution of the United States, the words "due process," a Bill of Rights, a Magna Carta, concepts of natural law—and I could go on and on and bore you to death.

There is one little problem with what you just said. It is assuming one hell of a lot that I am very concerned about, that has to do with the procedures whereby we arrive at conclusions concerning a person's guilt.

I'll make those decisions very well myself, thank you.

Mr. Binns. Mr. Chairman, can I respond to Mr. Prettyman?

The Chairman. Let me recognize Mr. Holland, and I'll come back to you, Mr. Binns.

Mr. Holland. Mr. Chairman, if we presume that we delay this matter and a due process hearing results in the reversal of the conviction, we would then proceed with a preliminary hearing, I take it, under Rule 16; is that correct?

Mr. Prettyman. Not necessarily.

Mr. Holland. If you eradicate the word "conviction," doesn't that remove Rule 14 from our consideration?

Mr. Prettyman. That would be an interesting question that the committee would face at that time. But my own feeling is that the jury, having once found him guilty, and that merely triggering Rule 14, that you could proceed under 14 whether or not—

Mr. Holland. I know how I feel about eradicating from our midst convicted people. But it seems to me that we would be putting our-
selves into one hell of an extenuating problem. Because if either Mr. Lederer's counsel—and at some subsequent date this conviction is reversed, and this committee and this Congress had proceeded under Rule 14, I would find my way into somebody's courtroom who might decide that this Congress acted in violation of its own rule, in violation of the term "conviction," in violation of all fairness, and they may come in here with a judicial robe and start running this Congress and this committee's considerations. And I don't think that that is going to save us any time, Mr. Prettyman. I think that would put us in one confrontation that would last not for only one Congress but for many Congresses to come.

I may be a little supersensitive about this, but I can see down the road that if we go forth, the conviction is subsequently reversed, that Mr. Lederer and his counsel may see fit to challenge the congressional wisdom and the procedure that we applied, and then the court may see fit to supplant its judgment for our own, and then we have got one hell of a confrontation between this Congress and the court system, which is going to cost millions of dollars to resolve and take many Congresses to resolve.

MR. PRETTYMAN. Well, Mr. Congressman, I just simply very respectfully disagree with you. I think that, for example, if Mr. Myers' conviction is reversed tomorrow and he goes to court and claims that he was expelled based upon a conviction which was then thrown out, I would be happy to defend that suit and I would win it, in my own view, because what the committee has done, in my view, is simply taken a finding of guilty, of guilt by a jury, as the starting point for its own investigation, then conducts an independent investigation of the facts based on the trial record, reaches its own independent determination, and it does not matter at all when eventually happens to that man in a court of law. The issues are entirely different. In a court of law he has to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and by an overwhelming amount of evidence, and the government has to prove all kinds of things. That isn't true here. You make an independent determination.

I think the California case that I cited supports that. It supports the idea that you can disbar an attorney based on actions that he took, whether or not his conviction is reversed or upheld.

I am saying that you have in front of you sufficient evidence of what occurred in regard to this Congressman so that you would be derelict of your duty if you did not proceed, and it is totally irrelevant what happens hereafter in regard to that conviction.

MR. HOLLAND. I would simply say, in reply, I am not quarreling with counsel. I am looking for legal judgment. I know a lot of lawyers who would love that kind of a case, which may have something to do with the dollar values we are throwing around here today.

Second, I would never underestimate the resourcefulness of legal minds around this country for devices to get into court, and I think that probably we are facing that threat, and so be it.

But it seems to me like a Member of the Congress is just as expelled if we do it under Rule 16 as if we do it under Rule 14. And I am just asking: What is the difference. when you get to the bottom line here, except for another month?
Mr. Binns. Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that my view of
the American system and what is right and what is wrong does not
differ one iota from Mr. Prettyman's, so that I can be just as vitupera-
tive in my condemnation of a person as he can.

I will also say that I don't quarrel with the California case which
he cites that says that a body of this nature can discipline Members,
the same as the Bar Association can discipline its members. We don't
contest that. We don't quarrel with that. All I am saying is that the
California people certainly did not go ahead and discipline the lawyer
until they had all the facts in front of it.

Whether or not Congressman Lederer is acquitted, finally, may not
have an impact on this body. But all we are asking for is a chance to
spare you that by not moving forward in a rush to judgment when
there is no need for it, because if the due process hearing results un-
favorably, he will resign. If it doesn't, then we would want a hear-
ing, which will be a protracted evidentiary matter, requiring hun-
dreds of hours of your time, hundreds of thousands of dollars of your
time, before you take the final action, if you take any action.

The CHAIRMAN. Would either counsel care to comment on the fact
that some kind of precedent, whether it be right or wrong, has been
established in prior cases? That is, in the Myers' case, Mr. Myers still
had pending in the trial court a due process hearing which the court
had retained until after the finding of guilty by the jury. And, not-
withstanding that, this committee proceeded to recommend expulsion
to the Congress or to the House, and the House so voted.

In the case of Mr. Jenrette, he also had pending in his court and
at the trial level—I might say that in both cases the arguments were
that the trial had not been completed for that reason—and, notwith-
standing that action, this committee proceeded under rule 14 and was
about to recommend expulsion at the time that he resigned.

It would seem to me that whether the House is right or wrong, that
precedent has been established to some degree, and I would just like
to hear any comments on that from either counsel.

Mr. Binns. I will be happy to respond. I'll defer to Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. Prettyman. I do think that the precedent has been set. I don't
think this committee is absolutely bound by it. I think this commit-
tee can decide to do what it pleases to do. But I do think that some
deference is due to prior actions of the committee.

In the Myers case not only was the motion made, but it was renewed,
just as it has been by Mr. Binns. Both times it was turned down.

In the Jenrette case, it was made only once and turned down.

I would just like to add one word, if I could, to what has been said,
because there is repeated reference by Mr. Binns to having all of the
evidence in front of you.

You have got to understand what the evidence is that he wants you
to look at. It is of two types. One is of Government misconduct.

Now, surely, that has nothing to do with this committee. If the
Government has engaged in this conduct in these cases, the Judiciary
Committee should look into it and make sure that it doesn't happen
again.

The other is evidence that he claims would show entrapment.
The Nebraska court that I referred to before, in upholding disbarment said that, even if entrapment could be proved, it could do no more than demonstrate the unfitness of the lawyer to continue the practice of the law.

So that the evidence he is asking you to look at, I submit to you, is totally irrelevant to your deliberations. There is no need to wait. You have enough in front of you now to proceed. I merely wanted to add that.

Mr. Binns. I would like to deal with the problems in reverse, sort of taking last what Mr. Prettyman just touched on.

Evidence of government misconduct has everything to do with the issue of entrapment. This is not Binns on constitutional law. This is United States v. Sorrels, United States v. Hampton, United States v. Russell. It is the total evolvement of the doctrine of due process violations that evolved out of an entrapment case that was first proffered to the Supreme Court in 1915, and then later went through the time periods of prohibition, into drug dealing, and into now where we are, police misconduct and the entrapment of public officials.

So that government misconduct, while it is in itself a separate reason for an acquittal, has everything to do with whether or not an individual's will was overborne, thereby prohibiting him from committing a willful act.

So please don't go to bed on that admonition of Mr. Prettyman that government misconduct is not your business. It most certainly is, if you find out that the government misconduct was of such a nature that it went toward overriding the free will of an individual—getting back to the analogy of how you would discipline a child.

So that the evidence that I want you to look at is, of course, in part evidence of government misconduct, not for the purpose of having you march to the Justice Department and say, "Here is a new set of rules." That function does lie within the Judiciary Committee. But you can certainly take it into account when you are making the grave decision as to whether to discipline Congressman Lederer and how strongly you should discipline him.

It is most certainly relevant. It is just as relevant as the evidence on entrapment because the issue of entrapment—and this is not to give you a legal lecture—is based solely upon whether or not the defendant was predisposed. Once you have government inducement, which in this case it was ruled by Judge Pratt that there was, as a matter of law, the only issue left is predisposition.

Now, that is the law of the Supreme Court of the United States. I think that this committee would do well to take that into consideration when thinking whether or not they should discipline a Member of Congress. Was he predisposed?

You don't have before you the facts. The record that has been presented to you has nothing to do with what transpired from the time the jury came back until the present day. It has nothing to do with the testimony of reputable and credible United States Attorneys that criticized Operation Abscam, that said that there was the possibility and probability of entrapment, that disagreed that the FBI should have collaborated with a convicted felon, that disagree with the fact.
that the chief prosecuting attorney was writing a book about Operation Abscam.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you finished, Mr. Binns?

MR. BINNS. Well, in sum, to get back to you—I forgot what your initial question was now.

The CHAIRMAN. On the precedent.

MR. BINNS. On the precedent, just because something has been done wrong once doesn't rectify to do it wrong twice. And I say to you, Mr. Chairman, that at the time this committee made those decisions, it didn't have before it what we are now putting before it. Those unfortunate individuals didn't have the guns. Now they exist. And then just simply to say because there is precedent that we just simply keep going down a blind road is improper. If that were the case, there would never be a reversal in the Supreme Court of the United States.

MR. CONABLE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conable.

MR. CONABLE. Mr. Binns, in the charge to the jury that the judge made, and which you called to our attention, must not the jury have considered the issue of predisposition? You don't believe they were charged improperly, do you?

MR. BINNS. Yes, we do.

MR. CONABLE. You do?

MR. BINNS. Yes, sir. In fact, the judge did not follow the standard entrapment charge as set forth in Devitt and Blackmer.

MR. CONABLE. But isn't that assuming during the jury trial—if the judge charged improperly, that properly refers to an appeal, not to the—

MR. BINNS. Due process.

MR. CONABLE. Due process hearing?

MR. BINNS. You are exactly right, sir, and that is the reason I say to you that you must give some weight to the fact that the judge himself has granted a due process hearing. He is not waiting for it to go on appeal. He himself is entertaining a due process hearing. This is not done routinely in every criminal case. Here we have, after each of the Abscam defendants being convicted, the trial judge himself entertaining additional testimony to see if it is possible that the jury erred in its findings. And that is why the brief that has been submitted to you deals with those points.

MR. CONABLE. But, once again, they have had the same due process hearings in the other cases before this committee.

MR. BINNS. No, sir, they did not. That is the difference between this case and the other cases, and that is why I referred to those individuals as unfortunate. They did not, solely because of the time factor. The due process hearing did not commence until after Congressman Lederer's case before Judge Pratt. Congressman Myers never had one. Congressman Jenrette had the benefit of some that took place in other jurisdictions, and I don't know how strongly his counsel urged that upon you, sir. But they did not have that which we are now in possession of. They didn't even know about the existence of Mr. Plaza or Mr. Weir, the eminently qualified strike force United States Attorneys who took the stand, put their hand on the Bible, and said what was done here was improper.
They didn’t even know it existed, and I will tell you why. Because I didn’t know they existed until the second day of the trial when Mr. Puccio sprang a letter from Mr. Heymann, who is No. 1 and 2 in the Justice Department down here and said, “Well, we thought that perhaps Mr. Binns might have this, because it may amount to what is called Brady material.”

It was the most startling piece of evidence that came forth in any Abscam trial to date, and it may result in Senator Williams never coming to trial. None of that was discovered until the Lederer case, sir.

Mr. Conable. Mr. Chairman, may I have Mr. Prettyman’s comment on that issue?

The Chairman. Certainly.

Mr. Prettyman. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, I think what we have lost sight of here is that the cases cited by Mr. Binns are criminal cases going to the question, for example, for predisposition to accept a bribe, let us say, in this particular case.

What I think we have lost sight of is that this committee, in order to discipline Congressman Lederer, does not have to even find that he took a bribe. There is evidence in this record that he knew when he went to the meeting that he was going to be offered money and that he was going to have to pledge his vote in regard to immigration.

You can discipline on the basis of his merely going to that meeting. There is evidence here that he lied to the FBI repeatedly, what he is his own papers called blatant falsehoods, when they came to see him about this, lied about what had occurred.

There is evidence of all kinds of things. He reported in his official report to the Congress the $5,000. He claimed it as a consultant’s fee from Mr. Johanson. And there was testimony that no such consultant fee was ever paid.

There are all kinds of things in this record that you could find in addition to the simple issues that were before the jury, namely, conspiracy, bribery and taking an unlawful gratuity and violation of the Travel Act. You look at the evidence as a whole to find out whether he has engaged in improper conduct and violating the House Rules.

And I don’t think predisposition on the bribery thing even touches those issues.

The Chairman. Mr. Conable, are you finished?

Mr. Conable. Yes.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, may I ask two very brief questions of Mr. Swanner?

Mr. Swanner, to your knowledge—and I invite anyone to correct me if I am wrong—has there been, aside from the interpretation of Rule 14, has there been a conviction in any of the Abscam cases?

Mr. Swanner. That is, if the question is, has the due process hearing been completed in any of them and the judge made a final determination—

Mr. Bailey. Yes.

Mr. Swanner [continuing]. To the best of my knowledge, that has not been the case.
Mr. Bailey. Well, that’s what a conviction means. They have all been deferred. That’s to the best of my knowledge. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Prettyman. Not involving the two city councilmen. Judge Fullam came down with——

Mr. Bailey. No. Involving the Congressmen.

Mr. Prettyman. Oh, I am sorry. Not the Congressmen. None of them have been decided.

Mr. Bailey. Then let me ask one last question to counsel on both sides. Is the trial record complete in the Lederer matter?

Mr. Binns. It is complete in the sense that—yes, the due process hearing has now been transcribed, and that is extent, yes, sir. The only thing that is incomplete about it is the finding of Judge Pratt with respect to whether or not there has been a violation of due process of entrapment, as a matter of law.

Mr. Bailey. There has been no certification of judgment or sentence?

Mr. Binns. Oh, no, sir. There has been no conviction.

Mr. Bailey. Then the trial record—am I wrong?—the trial record is not complete?

Mr. Binns. No, sir.

Mr. Bailey. For the sake of the record, I think it is important to make that point.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Holland.

Mr. Holland. Is the due process hearing in this file?

Mr. Binns. No, sir.

Mr. Holland. Is it available to us?

Mr. Binns. Absolutely.

Mr. Holland. Mr. Chairman, why don’t we have it?

Mr. Prettyman. You don’t have it, Mr. Congressman, because, in my view, it has nothing to do with the matter before you. Now, you are the committee. I am merely your counsel. I am just giving you advice. In my view, it would be not only a departure from past precedents in these other cases that we are talking about, but it would entirely go against common sense, it seems to me, because getting it into the record would be a concession that it was in fact relevant to your consideration.

And, as I have just explained to you a few minutes ago, in my view it has nothing to do with your consideration.

Mr. Holland. Does not Mr. Binns have the right to at least offer to this committee the transcript of that due process hearing in defense of his own client?

Mr. Prettyman. I think he has the right to offer anything he pleases to this committee.

Mr. Holland. And then when he offers it, doesn’t this committee have the duty to decide whether or not we will receive it?

Mr. Prettyman. Absolutely.

Mr. Holland. Mr. Binns, are you prepared to offer that transcript?

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir, and I discussed that with Mr. Prettyman beforehand, that the purpose of my motion at this time is to try to maybe
never have to go through that for you. If we can get the hearing postponed until the decision of the judge is rendered, you may never have to go through it, because Congressman Lederer has made an independent determination that, should that hearing be unfavorable to him, he is going to resign.

If we do get to a point where he is successful—and let me just interrupt for one second. I never finished my answer to the Chairman's question.

Mr. Stokes, I didn't come here on a fool's errand. I know what happened with Myers and I knew what happened with Jenrette, but, as I say, they didn't have available to them that which we now have available to you gentlemen. Of course, we would request that the record of the due process hearing—because it is part of the posttrial stage—it is all pretrial, trial, and posttrial, it is all one level, it is not appellate—would be made available to you for your study and for your questioning of me as to how the matters that are set forth in this brief are provable, and we are prepared to do that. But that is going to be a very lengthy and exhaustive hearing.

The Chairman. Mr. Binns, assuming that the decision in the due process hearing is unfavorable to Mr. Lederer, then what you are saying to the committee is that you would then subject—or, let's say—I am sorry. Let's say it is favorable to him.

At that point he would then request to come before the committee in terms of a preliminary hearing?

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir, because he would not be convicted. So then Rule 14 would not be applicable, and we would then embark on a preliminary hearing and go the whole ten yards, yes, sir.

The Chairman. He would not be convicted in the legal sense.

Mr. Binns. There is only one sense of conviction, sir.

The Chairman. Let me say this to you: If this committee has previously established that a finding of guilty by the jury is conviction within the meaning of Rule 14, then he would still be in that posture, wouldn't he?

Mr. Binns. Well, if the committee were to say that once the jury has done whatever it did, regardless of what a judge later does, he would be, yes. But I don't know—I mean, what is the purpose of the question?

Mr. Prettyman. If I may suggest, I think the committee should probably vote before we proceed with our arguments, if that is the proper—

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. Mr. Binns was asking a question.

The purpose of the question was to ascertain how the committee would be in a different position a month from today than the position that it is in today, in terms of a preliminary hearing.

Mr. Binns. They would be in a different position if a due process hearing resulted in the judge saying, "I am not overturning the conviction."

The Chairman. Well, wouldn't he still have to—in light of the fact that we are talking about a disciplinary procedure—

Mr. Binns. No. You wouldn't have to discipline anybody. He would be gone. You wouldn't have to spend one dime.
Mr. PRETTYMAN. No. He means suppose it comes out the other way, Jim.

Mr. BINNS. Oh, that is different. Then all you are losing is a month. What I don’t understand is, what is the reason for the rush to judgment?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. The question is: what is the reason for delay? That is the question.

Mr. BINNS. How about taking one for $350,000? That’s one reason. How does that stand?

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bailey.

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, I figured at some time we would come to a juncture of this sort.

I would like to recommend to the committee that we take a reasonable date certain, postponement. Once this cup passes from us, that we sit down and that we rewrite these rules and set up some kind of a procedure that presents this kind of a problem.

I will again reiterate, there is a uniqueness in the court procedure in this case, given the deferring of the due process hearings—at least in my knowledge, these two attorneys are far more experienced than I am, I am sure—to my knowledge, the court did a different thing here. I have not bumped into it before in my legal researches, where they deferred the due process hearing until after the jury verdicts had been decided.

It is very important for nonlawyers to know and realize that in most cases a judge makes decisions about what goes to a jury to effect the fact-finding process before the jury is allowed to reach that decision. That is not the situation here. It is a little different.

It has a tremendous bearing on our rules of procedures and fundamental fairness, and I would simply recommend that there is no upcoming election right now, why we have to demonstrate something, in terms of time, like we did in the Myers case—and I hope all of us will read the transcript of that hearing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does either counsel have anything more to submit to the committee on Mr. Binns’ motion?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. No, sir.

Mr. BINNS. No, sir.

Mr. BAILEY. Counsel, what is your date certain?

Mr. BINNS. The Government’s brief is due one month from next Monday.

Mr. BAILEY. What is the date, do you know?

Mr. BINNS. It is April 20. April 20 or 27.

One thing I want to point out with respect to the date-certain question is that other defendants have requested an extension of time with respect to the filing of their briefs, et cetera. We did not, knowing that this committee wanted to move as expeditiously as possible, we filed ours. We are the only one out of perhaps 10 or 12 other defendants that did that, so that we have preserved an earlier date for the judge's resolution than the others.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. But, Mr. Binns, isn’t it true that the judge indicated that he is going to rule on all of them at the same time?
Mr. BINNS. He hasn't indicated it to me, but I don't know.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. I have read where he did indicate that he was considering them all together and would rule on all of them at one time.

Mr. BINNS. I will just leave you with this: I have tried to put as much distance between this gentleman and the rest of the defendants, and in fact it has been recognized as such by the judge himself, as possible.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. I appreciate that. But if you are talking about when you are going to hear from the judge, you not only have these motions for extension of time, but a judge saying that he is going to rule forthwith doesn't mean that he is going to rule on the next day. He has got to read all of these materials and digest them.

Mr. BAILEY. May I throw out a hybrid possibility for discussion, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just say at this time that if either counsel has no further submission to the committee, then the Chair will excuse counsel on both sides from the room while the committee deliberates.

Mr. HOLLAND. Can I ask a question before they go?

Has the offer by Mr. Lederer by Mr. Binns to resign in the event the hearing doesn't go their way been made public?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think it has been made public.

Mr. BINNS. I only communicated it to the Chairman and the members of the committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. It is not a matter of public knowledge?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. It will be made a part of your record in a few minutes. Unless you decide to stop right now, I will come back and submit certain exhibits to you, and that will be one of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further? All right.

You are excused.

[Whereupon, Representative Lederer, Mr. Binns, Mr. Prettyman, and Mr. Cassidy left the hearing room.]

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that counsel have returned to the room.

Mr. Binns, your motion to postpone has been overruled by the committee.

At this time the Chair will recognize Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. Mr. Chairman, for the record I would like to move the introduction of Lederer Hearing Exhibit A—you have these, incidentally, in the folder in front of you—Lederer Hearing Exhibit A being House Resolution 67 relating to the committee's hearings; Lederer Hearing Exhibit B, which is a letter to the Chairman from Mr. Binns, dated March 3, 1981, which, as you recall, was treated as a motion and denied on March 11; Lederer Hearing Exhibit C, the resolution which was adopted March 11, 1981, by the committee; Lederer Hearing Exhibit D, my letter to the Congressman informing him of the action of the committee on March 11th; Lederer Exhibit E, my letter to Mr. Binns of the same date, attaching a proposed stipulation; Lederer Hearing Exhibit F, Mr. Binns' response to me, attaching Lederer Hearing Exhibit G, which was the stipulation signed by both of us that we entered into.
Are those received, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection——

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, what is the purpose of receiving all of this into the record?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. In the past, in order to have a complete record of precisely what has gone on, so that people will understand, can start at the beginning and follow through as to the exchange of correspondence and what we have agreed to and what we haven't and the resolution we are proceeding under, and so forth, so that it is all part of one package, that is the way we have done it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am just curious as to how it goes to the ultimate question we are going to have to answer.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. Well, it doesn't, but, without the stipulation, you might not understand that we have agreed that this is the volume that one or the other of us thinks is relevant to the proceeding and, for example, I do not, because of that stipulation, I do not have to have a witness here to introduce this videotape. We have agreed that this is a true and accurate videotape of what occurred on September 11th, et cetera.

So we have cut through a lot by that stipulation.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, will all of this data be included, this brown volume I have in my hand, be included in the committee report presented to the House, if we ever get to that point?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. Yes, sir, absolutely.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, all of the House will read it with great interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman have further objection?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I withdraw my objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, all of the exhibits proffered will be received into the record.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. And now I should also move—although without an exhibit number, I move that the excerpts from the transcript of trial proceedings in the case of United States v. Lederer be received and the exhibits contained therein, and, in addition, that this videotape of September 11, 1979, meeting also be received.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Chairman, may I just say that the excerpts are not to be printed in the record but to be referenced in the report so that we don't have the costs of running this thing into thousands and thousands of dollars. We have done this same procedure in the past; that is, that it will be received but not to be printed—reprinted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you incorporate that?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

Without objection, all of the documents will be received into the evidence and made a part of the record.

[The excerpts referred to were received but not to be printed.]

Mr. PRETTYMAN. With the committee's permission, I would like now to make a brief summary of the evidence, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.
Mr. Binns. Mr. Chairman, before he does that, would it be appropriate for me to offer anything into evidence, or should I wait until the summation is finished?

The Chairman. Mr. Prettyman, do you have any preference?

Mr. Prettyman. No. You can go ahead and offer it now.

Mr. Binns. What I would like to do is move that the transcript of the due process hearings be memorialized in a similar fashion and presented, be presented to the full committee.

The Chairman. Is there objection?

Mr. Prettyman. I would oppose it, Mr. Chairman, on the ground that it is not relevant to the proceedings before you.

The Chairman. Is there an objection from the committee?

Mr. Conable. Mr. Chairman, isn't that for the committee to decide?

Mr. Prettyman. Of course, it is. Mine is just advice from counsel.

The Chairman. The Chair is asking if there is an objection from anyone on the committee.

Mr. Conable. In other words, Mr. Chairman, as I understand Mr. Binns' offer is that it be memorialized in a similar way as the other evidence.

The Chairman. That is correct.

Mr. Conable. That is be available, and people be able to refer to it, and so forth.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry, very briefly?

The Chairman. Certainly, Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Bailey. Is the gentleman going to offer the brief that he has presented us? Is that a part of the due process to which he referred?

Mr. Binns. In the event that the committee rules that the due process transcript is properly received, then I would, in addition, incorporate by reference and offer the brief that I filed on behalf of Congressman Lederer.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, I move that the materials which counsel just referred to, the due process hearing and the brief that he is offering, be admitted as part of our record.

The Chairman. You are offering that as a committee print?

Mr. Bailey. I am offering that as a motion, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Your motion is that we receive this as a part—

Mr. Bailey. I think counsel, Mr. Prettyman, can give us advice, but he can't object as a member of the committee.

The Chairman. All I am saying to you is that we are trying to understand your motion in terms of a committee print.

Mr. Swanner. Yes, sir. The excerpts of the trial transcript are in the form of a committee print. This is a distinct form of printing we use, Mr. Bailey, so that it does not require it being distributed to all the depository libraries and other things. It is tremendously expensive. So we are printing this in a thousand copies so that all of the Members and the various counsel may have them available.

If your motion was that the due process things be printed similarly, then they will be printed as a committee print and not as a part of the committee report.

Mr. Binns. That is what I meant.
The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the motion. Is there any discussion? All in favor, say aye; those opposed, say no.
The motion is carried. So ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, Mr. Binns?
Mr. BINNS. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Prettyman.
Mr. PRETTYMAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this is a largely new committee in terms of its membership, and it is an entirely new case. I believe that the matter involving Congressman Lederer should be approached totally afresh, as if no other Abscam case ever occurred. He should not be tainted or disadvantaged in any way by anything that has gone before, including subtle preconceptions that each of us might have acquired by listening to or reading about or watching news stories about other people in different circumstances.
I assure you that, to the best of my ability—and I admit to being as unwillingly subject to bias and preconception as the average person—I have at least attempted to be fair here in my approach and to treat this matter wholly within the confines of its own particular facts.
It is true, as you will find, that, to some extent, the evidence in this case intertwines itself with evidence that involved other Congressmen, such as Congressman Myers, but it is one thing to look at the totality of the evidence in the Lederer case and to do so dispassionately, and it is another matter entirely to judge the Lederer case in any way by what has previously been done in regard to Congressman Myers or to anyone else.
That is by way of introduction. With that in mind, let us turn to the only evidence before us today.
This afternoon, hopefully, at the conclusion of this hearing, I will submit to the committee my Report Upon Completion of the Preliminary Inquiry.
There is no requirement that this report be shown to or served upon Congressman Lederer; nevertheless, in the past, out of a sense of what I regard as fundamental fairness, I have given copies of my report to the Congressmen involved and their counsel, and I propose to do so here, unless the committee instructs me otherwise.
That report is 85 pages long. It treats in detail what I regard as the pertinent evidence that leads inexorably to the conclusions that I have reached and the recommendations that I make to the committee.
It quotes from the record, for example, quotes extensively from things that Mr. Lederer said and things that were said to him. It contains specific citations to the records so that any member of the committee can check the accuracy of what is in the report.
In view of the length and the detail of that report, I will only briefly synopsize for the committee at this time the highlights of the case against Congressman Lederer and his defenses.
He was indicted on May 28, 1980, along with Mayor Errichetti of Camden, New Jersey, Mr. Criden, a Philadelphia attorney and Mr. Johanson, Mr. Criden's partner, and also a Philadelphia City Councilman.
Those three however, were severed from the case, so that Congressman Lederer was tried alone.
There were four counts: conspiracy, bribery, receiving an unlawful gratuity and violations of the Travel Act.
Mr. Myers. Violation of what?

Mr. Prettyman. Violation of the Travel Act, which makes it a crime to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of intent to carry out, in this case, bribery.

Mr. Lederer’s name first surfaced in a recorded telephone conversation between Mr. Weinberg, who was a confessed con man being used by the FBI in the Abscam matter, and Mayor Errichetti. On July 29, 1979, Errichetti, mentioned Mr. Lederer as an additional Congressman to bring in. And then followed a series of calls and two meetings about getting the Congressman lined up, about the amount of money to be paid, Mr. Lederer’s name was specifically mentioned as “after Myers.” The Myers meeting occurred on August 22, 1979.

And following that there was a call indicating that Mr. Lederer would be set up for September 11, 1979.

Errichetti said that Lederer wanted to meet at 5:30 because he had a vote in the House earlier on that day.

Mr. Cook testified at the trial, a very important witness. He was an associate, or, rather, a partner, in the Criden-Johanson law firm. He committed crimes. He was not prosecuted in return for his testimony in this and other cases.

He said that Mr. Johanson told him that he had spoken to Mr. Lederer prior to September 11 that Mr. Lederer, out of the money they would receive, only wanted 5,000, 5,000 out of the 50,000, and he needed that for his spring primary.

Johanson told Cook that Lederer had said that he recognized he would be getting money at the meeting. Johanson and Criden would meet Lederer at LaGuardia Airport and take him to Mayor Errichetti, who, in turn, would take him to the meeting.

The crucial meeting was on September 1, at 5:18 p.m., at the Hilton Inn near the John F. Kennedy Airport. It was videotaped. That videotape is now available to each of you in your offices for viewing.

Present were Mr. DeVito, who was really Mr. Amoroso, an undercover FBI agent, Mr. Weinberg, the con man, Mayor Errichetti, Mr. Lederer and two other FBI agents, one of whom left almost immediately after the meeting began.

The tape begins showing Mr. DeVito alone, showing the $50,000, and showing him putting it in a paper bag, which he then in turn put in a briefcase and put down beside him.

After the Congressman came in, Mr. DeVito explained in regard to his clients, the sheiks, two sheiks, who were from a foreign country which was going to have political turmoil, and they were concerned about getting out, and they were concerned about coming over here and, because of what had happened, it had been in the paper about Mr. Somoza, they were concerned that, after they got here, they would be able to stay here and, therefore, the theory was that they needed Congressmen to be on their side, to be for him and to introduce the necessary immigration bill so that he could be assured that he had friends here and that he could stay in this country once he got here.

I keep using “he” and “they” because that is the way it occurs in the record. Sometimes they refer to one sheik and sometimes they refer to two sheiks, and it seems to be used interchangeably in the record.

Mr. DeVito said to the Congressman, “I understand that you can introduce legislation.” And Mr. Lederer said, “Right. A bill, private bill, sure.”
There was talk of a lot of money in this thing. "That's why he is willing"—this is DeVito—"That's why he is willing to pay for what he gets. He is willing to put up big money to you to put him in this position. That's why he is spreading money around like he does, like even now, to ensure that people are going to be with him."

There were remarks like this about the money throughout.

There was talk about investing, the sheiks investing money in Philadelphia so as to give the Congressman a protection, an excuse, if you will, because if the sheiks were investing in his district, he could stand up and say this is why he was protecting them, because they were helping his district out.

The defendant at the trial, Congressman Lederer, repeatedly committed himself to introduce private legislation. He said, "I am telling you, I am going to the wall for these two guys, for this man." He said, "I am not a Boy Scout. I am loyal to this guy."

And near the end of the meeting he is given the paper bag, and DeVito says, "I hope you spend it well," and he added, "You can take a little piece of that and buy us lunch when we come down."

Cook, whom I referred to before, testified that the next day he met with Mr. Criden. Criden told him that they had met Lederer at LaGuardia, they had taken him to Errichetti—and you have got to remember that at this point, as shown by the evidence, Errichetti himself had already been involved in a number of payoffs. He had received three substantial payoffs himself, including one the night before this meeting.

According to what Cook said that Criden told him, they had left the Congressman with Mayor Errichetti, who took him to the meeting.

Lederer left the meeting, according to Cook, with $50,000, and it was divided up as follows:—this is what Criden told Cook—Errichetti had taken 20,000, 5,000 was supposed to go back to Weinberg and DiVito. We don't know whatever happened to that money. Five thousand was to be put in an envelope marked "RI," and that was to be the Congressman's money. Forty-five hundred dollars was to go to Cook and $15,500 each to Criden and Johnson.

Mr. Cook put his $4500 in his own account and he put Mr. Lederer's $5,000 in a safe deposit box that was in the name of himself, Mr. Criden and Mr. Johanson.

A week later Johanson told him that Mr. Lederer needed five, and both of them apparently assumed that he meant $500. So Mr. Cook went to the safe deposit box and got $500 and gave it to Mr. Johanson, who reported back that no, that isn't what Congressman Lederer meant he meant he needed the whole $5,000, he was going to do some work on his porch or the roof of his house.

So at that point Mr. Cook went back and got the remaining $4500 and gave it to Mr. Johanson to give to Congressman Lederer.

As I mentioned before, in his Ethics in Government Act financial disclosure statement, Mr. Lederer reported $5,000 for that year as a consultant's fee for Mr. Johanson.

Mr. Cook testified that he would have known of any such payment in his firm, that it did not occur, no such consultant fee was paid to the Congressman.
On February 2nd, 1980, two FBI agents called on the Congressman and for a substantial period of time he repeated what admittedly were lies to them. He admitted going to a meeting, but he admitted the talk about—he denied the talk about immigration, about receiving the bag and all the really substantial parts of the meeting he simply denied.

In his defense, Mr. Lederer presented 12 witnesses who testified favorably as to his reputation for honesty, integrity, and good character generally.

It was also stipulated that if four named individuals were called as witnesses, they would testify that prior to his involvement with DeVito and Weinberg, he had introduced private immigration bills on their behalf and he had not sought or even discussed being paid for that work.

Mr. Lederer's counsel, Mr. Binns, attacked Mr. Weinberg, just about everything about him, his past, his previous offenses, monetary payments to him by the government, his failure to file tax returns, inconsistencies in his testimony, et cetera, and he also attacked various other elements of the government's case; however, these attacks became essentially irrelevant when Lederer, through his counsel, asked that really only one issue be submitted to the jury, that is, whether he had been improperly entrapped.

Mr. Binns and I have both referred to the bench conference and he has pressed the point that this was only a bench conference; but I think it was a highly significant bench conference, because Mr. Binns on behalf of his client in order to get just the one issue of entrapment before the jury did not want the other issues before the jury, did not contest the fact that $50,000 was passed to the Congressman and when he took the brown paper bag, he knew it contained money, that he was aware when he did so that it was a violation of law and that he acted voluntarily, intentionally and corruptly.

The District Court took the position that entrapment had two aspects, an inducement by the government and a lack of predisposition on the part of the accused to commit the crime.

The Court refused to submit the issue of inducement to the jury, concluding as a matter of law that an inducement had been proven; the government had, indeed, induced the Congressman, so predisposition was the only issue left.

He charged the jury, as I indicated to you before, at length on that issue and that the government in fact, had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had had a pre-disposition to commit each offense prior to doing so and if he did not, he was to be found not guilty on that particular count.

On January 9, 1981, after a five day trial the jury found him guilty on all four counts.

I would submit to you that he violated not only four laws applicable to his conduct as a member, but at least three House rules relating to such conduct, that is, House Rule XLIII, clause 1, clause 2 and clause 3. As I submit to you in my report, there are other rules that he possibly violated, too, but those would be the primary ones.

Clearly, conspiracy to accept a bribe relating to the Congressman's legislative duties, traveling in interstate commerce with intent to do so and actually accepting such a bribe, those are clearly acts inconsistent
both with conduct reflecting credibility on the House, and also adher-
ence to various rules applicable to the Congress.

Although entrapment was the only issue before the jury, I would
submit to you that the following facts are relevant for your consider-
ation and are revealed by this record:

One. That he was aware in advance of that key September 11 meet-
ing, that one or more immigration bills would be discussed at that
meeting and that he would be offered $50,000.

Two. He indicated to Johanson in advance of the meeting that he
would only need $5,000, intended at that time to be used for his spring
primary.

Three. He met and talked with Mayor Errichetti prior to the meet-
ing; however, briefly, and as I said, Mayor Errichetti had participated
in prior payoffs to others and had himself accepted a number of pay-
offs to the same undercover agents dealing with Congressman Lederer.

Four. The discussion at the meeting with DeVito revealed, and in
my report to you I have particular sections underlined to draw your
attention to them, that while no mention was made of a bribe or even
of a specific amount of money being offered, the Congressman was
aware that a money offer was being made and that he did agree to in-
roduce one or more private immigration bills in order to receive the
money. He made such an agreement at the meeting.

Five. He did, in fact, accept the brown paper bag at the end of the
meeting without any question as to what it contained.

Six. The money was divided up almost immediately following the
meeting among those who were not aware of the government participa-
tion and $5,000 was set aside for the Congressman.

Seven. Soon thereafter, he asked for and received $5,000 for his
personal use.

Eight. When confronted by the FBI agents on February 2nd, he
repeatedly lied about his involvement in the September 11th meeting.

Nine. He lied in his official report to the House about his 1979
income when he accounted for the $5,000 as a consultant’s fee from
Johanson.

I submit to you that it is clear from the evidence as a whole that
Congressman Lederer was not simply derelict in his duties in his
failure to appreciate the niceties of the behavior taking place around
him, but rather that he was an active participant in the type of scheme
that strikes directly at the democratic process. He sold his promise to
vote in a particular way on legislation for a substantial sum of money.
He participated with others in dividing the illegal gains from an
illegal operation.

He was not taken in by friends. He dealt largely with people he had
never seen before.

If there are mitigating circumstances to all this that would preclude
the committee from acting, they are difficult to discern from this
record.

I submit, therefore, that the committee should conclude its prelimi-
ary inquiry by voting that the Congressman has violated one or
more of the House rules and should, therefore, proceed to a sanctions
hearing.

Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Binns, under the rules, Mr. Lederer has the right to present an oral or written statement to the committee during this preliminary inquiry. Does Mr. Lederer care to do so?

Mr. Binns. Mr. Chairman, how long does the preliminary inquiry stage last?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I suppose until—

Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. Prettyman. I will submit my report right at the end of this meeting and then it is up to the chairman as to how long he would like to take to review both the evidence and the report. I would think he would want at least a week before you voted; but that is obviously up to the chair and to the committee as to how to handle that.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that answer your question?

Mr. Binns. Partially. How long would it take to have printed that testimony which has heretofore been referred to as the due process aspect of the trial?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how long it would take to print the due process portion?

Mr. Swanner. Oh, a couple days; if you can get that to us today, we can get it to the printer today.

Mr. Binns. We can get it to you by tomorrow.

On behalf of Congressman Lederer, at this time I would defer making a decision, if it is permissible, as to whether or not to make an oral and/or written presentation, pending the printing of that material, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The chair would certainly grant your request. I suppose you would communicate with Mr. Prettyman if he so desires.

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, would you care to be heard with reference to any closing argument relative to the presentation made by Mr. Prettyman?

Mr. Binns. No, sir. As I understand, at this time this is merely a decision as to whether or not to proceed with the preliminary inquiry. I would not wish at this time to burden the committee with any more verbiage as to why it should not proceed, having had the benefit of the committee's vote that it will proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. Prettyman. Well, I am not sure that is accurate. It is now open to the committee to decide at whatever appropriate day it will decide upon to take a vote as to whether or not he has committed offenses over which the committee has jurisdiction.

I would think, therefore, that any argument that Mr. Binns would like to make on whether such offenses have been committed should be presented now.

Mr. Binns. Well, I would not be in a position and would not burden the committee in any effort to say that which has been presented by Mr. Prettyman is in any way a fabrication or less than a truthful rendering as to what has transpired in print in both the record of the trial that took place in the court in Brooklyn or the findings of the jury with respect to the counts with which the Congressman is
charged; so that I would not be anxious to present any argument at this point.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

The Chairman. Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Bailey. I am not too quick. As a result, I am sort of wondering, is it the gentleman’s intention to get this material before us so that we can make a more informed decision?

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bailey. As to whether or not there has been an offense committed under the House rules, his thinking being that we need a couple days or a day or two, apparently, I do not know, to get this printed up and by then we would have a certain amount of time, which I assume the chairman and ranking committee member, Mr. Spence, would decide to evaluate that material.

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Binns, for clarification, with reference to the question of whether Mr. Lederer wants to submit further statements, either oral or written statements, the next meeting of the committee will be just with the committee. It will not consist of counsel for either side so you are to be apprised of that.

Mr. Binns. When would that take place, sir?

The Chairman. It is my intention to adjourn the committee subject to the call of the Chair, so that the committee will have ample opportunity to go through all the material that both you submitted and counsel for the committee has submitted, so it is not possible for me to say at this time exactly when the next meeting will convene.

Mr. Conable. Mr. Chairman, as I understand, Mr. Binns wishes to reserve the right to make some argument further in response to Mr. Prettyman. It seems to me we ought to, if Mr. Binns wishes to do that, notify you in the very near future, so that it can be appropriately scheduled.

In understand you may also wish to submit written statements. We ought to have some understanding when that is going to be, so there will not be any surprise on any side here as to any further argument.

The Chairman. Well, I think as Mr. Prettyman has already said in the past, the members have had at least a week to study those kinds of materials.

Mr. Conable. Mr. Chairman, when do we review the videotapes?

The Chairman. The Chair intends to make an announcement of that, too.

Mr. Myers. Mr. Chairman, part of the material the committee may wish to review will be a presentation by either—I should not say the defendant—or by calling Mr. Lederer or his attorney. That is part of what we want to review.

I think we have to set a time certain after this has been printed so that we have the opportunity to hear from either Mr. Lederer and/or his attorney to have the opportunity to respond to the committee at a time certain.

The Chairman. We will certainly try to give them ample time to be able to make that decision.

Mr. Myers. What is ample time?
The CHAIRMAN. That is a good question. That is like "what is truly needed."
Mr. MYERS. Would 5 calendar days, not including Saturday and Sunday, be sufficient time?
Mr. BAILEY. Legislative days, legislative days are Monday through Friday.
The CHAIRMAN. I think part of this, Mr. Myers, depends on when Mr. Swanner gets the matter back from the printer.
Mr. Myers. After the material is printed, would 5 days, excluding Saturday and Sunday, be satisfactory?
Mr. BINNS. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Conable asked about the videotapes.
Mr. Swanner, do you want to respond to that?
Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Chairman, we have arranged to rent a portable Betamax that is amenable to being connected to the video in your offices. We have a person on your staff that has been assigned the responsibility. Starting tomorrow, you can call in any time starting the next seven days.
We will schedule at your convenience the man to bring the Betamax and the tape to your office to be viewed by you.
Mr. PRETTYMAN. The tape is about 45 minutes long. For your convenience, a transcript of it that was used at the trial begins at page 427 of the brown volume in front of you, so it may aid you in watching to follow along what was given to the jury. They followed along at the same time they viewed it.
Oh, yes. There is a break in the middle of the tape where only the audio portion is there. That was because of a problem they had in doing it. They will turn it off when you get to that. It will then be turned back on again. The whole thing is about 45 minutes. Is that right, Jim, about 45 minutes?
Mr. BINNS. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Do either counsel have anything further?
Mr. BINNS. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Does any member of the committee have anything further?
Mr. CONABLE. Mr. Chairman, I move that we adjourn.
The CHAIRMAN. Then this meeting is adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.
Mr. PRETTYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am handing the videotape to Mr. Swanner.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m. the committee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
The committee met, pursuant to call, in Executive Session, at 9:30 a.m., in Room B–318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding.


Also present: E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., and William J. Cassidy, Jr., Special Counsel; James J. Binns, Counsel for Representative Lederer and Representative Raymond F. Lederer.

Staff present: John M. Swanner, Staff Director; Jan Loughry, Secretary; Tom Cone, Counsel; and Judi Gatling, Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

At this time we will ask the electronic media to leave the room.

Since there is no business to come before the committee in open session this morning, I will recognize Mr. Spence for the purpose of making a motion.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to Rule XI 2(k) (5) and 2(g) (2) (B), I move we go into executive session, for today and one subsequent day.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the motion. The Clerk will call the roll.

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Stokes.

Mr. Stokes. Aye.

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Spence.

Mr. Spence. Aye.

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Rahall.

[No response.]

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Conable.

[No response.]

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Alexander.

[No response.]

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Myers.

Mr. Myers. Aye.

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Wilson.

[No response.]

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Forsythe.

Mr. Forsythe. Aye.

Mr. SWANNER. Mr. Holland.

[No response.]
Mr. Swanner, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Aye.
Mr. Swanner, Mr. Bailey.
Mr. Bailey. Aye.
Mr. Swanner, Mr. Hansen.
Mr. Hansen. Aye.
Mr. Swanner. Mr. Chairman, seven members vote aye, five members absent.

The Chairman. Accordingly, seven members have voted in the affirmative, this committee meeting is now in Executive Session and the chair will ask all members of the public please to absent themselves from the room.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The Chairman. As you will recall, when we met on March 17th, counsel for Representative Lederer asked that the transcript of the due process hearing before Judge Pratt be made a part of the committee’s record. Without objection from any member of the committee, the staff was instructed to have the due process hearing printed as a committee print and made available to the members for at least five calendar days before the committee would meet again. The four volume committee print was distributed to the committee on March 24th.

At our last meeting we also heard oral argument from Mr. Prettyman on the subject of committee jurisdiction over the offenses. It is my understanding that Mr. Binns, counsel for Representative Lederer, deferred addressing the committee pending the printing of the due process hearing. In addition, Congressman Lederer will still be afforded an opportunity to make any statement he desires, either written or oral, to the committee.

Unless Mr. Prettyman has something he wishes to bring to the committee’s attention at this time, the chair will recognize Mr. Binns.

Mr. Prettyman. I have only a very brief comment, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. Prettyman. Mr. Chairman, the memorandum in support of Congressman Lederer’s claim that he was deprived of his due process right and was the victim of entrapment, which Mr. Binns gave to the committee, I have noted three statements which are simply inaccurate and which I think should be brought to the committee’s attention.

I know Mr. Binns and I know he is a very honorable man and would never misstate anything on purpose, but the fact is that I believe three statements in here are inaccurate. I think to the extent that you are going to consider this material at all, I think they are irrelevant. They appear on page 6 of his memorandum, in which he says, first, that it should be noted there was no evidence of (b) any negotiations leading up to the bribe.

As you will see from the many citations on pages 19 to 21 of my memorandum, there were, in fact, a good deal; there was, in fact, a good deal of evidence.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman. I cannot find where you are at.

Mr. Swanner. I am sorry. We did not bring those. Do you have additional copies of these? You did not say you were going to discuss anything from that report.
Mr. PRETTYMAN. Well, I did not bring additional copies, either. This is what Mr. Binns gave to you last time. I will quote carefully.

Mr. SWANNER. That is the only copy we have.

The CHAIRMAN. We only have one copy.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. If you will look at page 6.

The CHAIRMAN. We only have one copy up here. Other members do not have the advantage of having it.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. Well, I will quote very carefully. Mr. Chairman, if you want to check over my shoulder my quoting, I will be happy to.

He says, as I indicated: "It should be noted that there was no evidence of"—and then under (b): "any negotiations leading up to the bribe."

As I was indicating, if you will note my own memorandum submitted to the committee on pages 19 and 20, there are numerous citations to places in the record where there was evidence by co-conspirators of the negotiations leading up to the bribe.

The second misstatement is (c) under that same page. "It should be noted that there was no evidence of—(c) subsequent events could have shed light on the bribe."

At pages 70 to 73 of my memorandum to you, you will find again numerous citations to the record in this case where there was a good deal of evidence which shed light on the bribe, including precisely how the money was cut after it was brought out of the room and who received what and how Congressman Lederer later got the money from Mr. Cook, his own $5,000 share.

Finally, a little further down on that page, there is the statement, and I am starting in the middle of a sentence: "It should be noted that even Agent Amoroso was not certain as to whether Defendant Lederer would accept the package until he handed it to him."

Mr. Amoroso testified at transcript 521 to 522 that he was satisfied that Congressman Lederer was aware of what he was being offered and had committed himself to the bribe at page 20 of the September 11 transcript.

It was at the precise point where they had a precise conversation on page 20 of that transcript where Mr. Amoroso in answer to a question said, "Yes. I was finally convinced at that point that he had committed himself."

That was 15 pages of transcript prior to the time that the money was actually given; so it is inaccurate to say that Mr. Amoroso was not certain as to whether Lederer would accept the package until he handed it to him. He was certain quite a bit prior to that.

I simply wanted to bring those three statements to your attention.

Of course, my own position has been that this entire entrapment and due process matter is irrelevant, but I do think that to the extent the committee is going to consider it at all, it should take into consideration that merely because statements have been made in these pleadings, they are not necessarily accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes Mr. Binns at this time.

Mr. BINNS. Mr. Chairman, in response to my good and long time friend, Mr. Prettyman's comments, I give him the benefit of the doubt.
of not having been there for testimony that he refers to and perhaps not having read those portions in pari materia with the rest of the transcript. Taking them in reverse order, there is substantial evidence that Agent Amoroso was uncertain as to whether or not Congressman Lederer would accept the bag which he tendered to him both visually and by means of transcript testimony. On at least seven occasions during the cross examination of Agent Amoroso it was admitted by Agent Amoroso that at the outset of the meeting Congressman Lederer had readily agreed to introduce legislation on behalf of the supposed sheiks without any quid pro quo and that his agreement was predicated solely on humanitarian reasons, that is, getting him out of a country in which he feared for his life and reasons having to do with legitimate investments in the congressional district from which Congressman Lederer hails; so that the contentions, if you will, that Mr. Prettyman refers to with respect to Agent Amoroso’s uncertainty are factually supported both in the record and in the videotape which you gentlemen have made—or rather, which has been made available to all of you.

Secondly, with respect to the subsequent events, and all of these I might remind you are in support of the allegation that Congressman Lederer was entrapped and that the government failed miserably in its duty to present corroborative evidence of his predisposition.

The subsequent events that are referred to by counsel to the committee in no way involve Congressman Lederer. At best, what the government introduced by way of Congressman Lederer’s later involvement was a showing that he had a conversation with Councilman Johanson, who took him to the meeting and at whose request he went there in the first place concerning personal moneys which, incidentally, according to the government case, were later accounted for in a Federal form filed by Congressman Lederer; so that there is no evidence of subsequent events surrounding the allegation of bribery that would in any way tend to shed light on whether or not Congressman Lederer was predisposed to commit a crime of bribery or seeking a legal gratuity with respect to the “negotiations”—and I use that term in quotations—leading up to the bribe. There is not a scintilla of evidence that Congressman Lederer was in any way involved.

I refer this committee respectfully to the opinion of Judge Fullam where he overturned the guilty judgments of Messrs. Schwartz and Jannotti, specifically reserving to another time whether or not the co-defendants would be similarly treated, because it was they who had whatever “negotiations” were extant between the government agents and Messrs. Errechetti and Johanson and Criden or any of whom met with the government agents.

Mind you, you will not see, because it never happened, that Raymond Lederer met with any government agent, conspired with any other co-defendant and, as a matter of fact, the best evidence that the government produced was that when the topic of money was even first proffered to Congressman Lederer, he rejected it outright and said the most—the most he would ever accept and not related to any transaction was a campaign contribution. That is the government’s evidence. That is not our evidence.

So that the three contentions that are contained in the material which is filed before Judge Pratt and which Judge Pratt has cogni-
ance of because he presided over the trial are factually supported in every respect by the record and by the videotape which you have viewed.

The Chairman. Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. Prettyman. I will just simply say, with all due respect, that there is evidence, as you will see from the citations, look at the record, that there were negotiations between co-conspirators leading up to the bribe. Cook gave that evidence by way of example.

There was subsequent evidence which could have shed light on the bribe, not only as to how the money was cut and as to how he took it, but I would reminded you that he lied to the FBI agents when he was interviewed on February 2nd.

Finally, while it is quite true that Mr. DeVito expressed repeatedly during his examination that he was uncertain at various points of the videotape as to whether a commitment had been made, there came a point at transcript 521 and 522 as I have pointed out to you where he said that he was finally satisfied that a commitment had been made, and as I pointed out to you, that was a long period of time before the money was actually given; so in all three instances, I reiterate that misstatements are contained here.

The Chairman. Is that the end of your statement?

Mr. Prettyman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Bailey. Just one very quick question, Mr. Prettyman. On page 19, I read that. If I understand that correctly, Cook had testified that Johanson had told him, that is what you are saying the evidence is and, you know, to go back, I do not want to belabor it, but is that the only area in the transcript that indicates that Lederer would have knowledge of a negotiation or participated in the negotiation concerning a bribe because on page 19 it indicates that Cook is testifying, not of his own knowledge, but that Johanson told him, and I do not want to get into hearsay arguments but that Johanson had told him that he had discussed with Lederer—maybe I read that wrong. Maybe I misunderstood it.

Mr. Prettyman. Well, you have the fact, first of all, that Cook—the Judge told the jury that while it was to determine whether there was a conspiracy and who the co-conspirators were, there was sufficient evidence, Cook testified himself that he was a co-conspirator and therefore he was allowing that testimony in.

Mr. Bailey. I do not question that.

Mr. Prettyman. Cook testified that Johanson told him—

Mr. Bailey. I just wanted to bring that out. There is no direct testimony here on a conversation, or at least could you point one out?

Mr. Prettyman. No.

Mr. Bailey. Not that it is relevant here, but it is interesting to me personally.

Mr. Prettyman. That is quite true. You do have the arrangement whereby Mayor Errechetti was to meet, you will recall, with Mr. Lederer just before the meeting and he did, in fact, meet with him and spend a brief time with him where he went in.

Mr. Bailey. Does he testify, did he testify?
Mr. PRETTYMAN. Mayor Erichetti did not testify, but there was testimony, unrefuted testimony, that he did, in fact, meet with him.

Mr. BAILEY. Let me ask you this, not to belabor the point, is this the only area in the record or the transcript that you could refer us to on the issue raised in subsection (b) on page 6 of section 2 of the defendant's memorandum?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. If you will look at various citations on page 19 and 20 of my memo—

Mr. BAILEY. Yes.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. You will see what Johanson had told Cook actually occurred. For example, he told them that arrangements were going to be made for travel and how they were going to take him there.

Mr. BAILEY. Lastly, did Johanson testify directly on these points?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. No, Johanson did not testify.

Mr. BAILEY. He did not testify?

Mr. PRETTYMAN. No.

Mr. BAILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. Johanson, you will recall, was indicted along with Congressman Lederer and then was severed, so that he has a trial still coming up.

Mr. BAILEY. I did not know that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. At this time the Chair further recognizes Mr. Binns for any summation he cares to make with reference to the question of whether the committee has jurisdiction over this matter.

Mr. BINNS. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to belabor what I said at the opening.

I would just urge that the committee not proceed under the rule number that it is proceeding, because there has been no conviction and that the briefs of all defendants have now been submitted to Judge Pratt on the due process hearing and that it is not too late for this committee to stay whatever action I might take because the time is short from now until when a decision will be rendered by the Judge with respect to the due process elements of his trial, and I say of this trial to remind this committee that the trial is not yet over. We are not at an Appellate stage. There has been no conviction and it may very well be that whatever action is taken here will have to be reversed because of a decision by the trial judge, not by an Appellate Court, but by a trial Judge.

I couple that with the reference that I made to the moving papers that were filed on behalf of Congressman Lederer with Judge Pratt and with the testimony that has now been made available to the committee on the due process hearing and urge the committee not to take drastic and precipitous action and, parenthetically, just to note and comment on the last comments of Mr. Prettyman wherein he said well, this Congressman lied to the FBI. That highlights the type of conduct which is being complained of in the due process hearings, because what you have and what has enabled Mr. Prettyman to make that comment is precisely the Machiavellian design of Operation Abscam.

What happened with respect to this Congressman's statements to the FBI is as follows:

Agent Cyril Gamber was given access to the videotape that you have all seen. He then was briefed by the agents and the operatives
in Operation Abscam, with respect to everything that Congressman Lederer did that they knew about; so after having viewed the videotape, read the transcript, talked to Amoroso, Weinberg, and whoever else viewed the transaction, he was then unleashed on Congressman Lederer who was in bed with pneumonia and he sat down with him and said, “Now, first, Congressman, tell me, were you ever at a meeting at a hotel on September 11, 1979, with a sheik?”

He then went through every scenario of the meeting and said, “Did you discuss private bills? Did you accept a bag? Was Mayor Errechetti there?”

Now, that FBI agent was not there to find out the information from the Congressman. He was there to test his morality and that is what he has testified to under oath, that he wanted to give the Congressman a chance to tell the truth.

Now, is that what this country is all about, that an FBI agent armed with all the facts is supposed to be able to go out and test each and everyone of you to see whether or not you will rise to the occasion and tell the truth? Is that the way that this country is founded and that we operate? That is only a small tip of what is in front of Judge Pratt, and that is testimony under oath. Agent Cyril Gamber knew every answer to every question he asked Ray Lederer and he was sicced on him if the Congressman would tell the truth.

Mr. Prettyman. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. Prettyman. I am not here to defend government conduct in any Abscam case. That is not what I am being employed for and that is not what I am being paid for and I do not intend to do it. There may well have been government overreach in some of these cases. I do not know. I do not have any idea; but the last thing that was just said is an example to me of how far afield we have come in this particular hearing, when we are arguing about government conduct on February 2.

The fact of the matter is that what the agents did in this case was standard operating procedure when you go to arrest somebody. You do not go up to them and tell them you have all the goods on them and here is what you have, that you are under arrest, that you are entitled to and it is considered good operating procedure by gathering evidence and asking them about the facts, as was done here.

I think this is a red herring. I think it has nothing to do with the proceedings. I think it shows how far we have come.

I would simply point out to you that the fact-finding proceeding in regard to what Congressman Lederer actually did, what his conduct was, is over. The trial record is closed. Only the post-trial record remains open.

I urge the committee, therefore, to proceed.

The Chairman. Do any members of the committee have questions of either counsel?

Mr. Bailey. Could I bore you with one more question?

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Bailey. I will make it short, if the members do not mind. This is just a curious question, Mr. Prettyman.

The issue of accusatory stage. I do not know if that is still in the law or in the criminal law; but if an agent has reason to believe, very
strong reason to believe that a crime has been committed or there is sufficient evidence that an indictment can be returned, is that still an issue in the law in terms of Fifth Amendment rights? I honestly do not know. It has been many years since I have worked on these matters. If off the top of your head you are not sure, if at some time it is convenient for you, let me know.

Mr. Prettyman. I want to make sure I understand your question. May I have just one second?

Mr. Bailey. Sure.

Mr. Prettyman. If I understand your question, the answer is that—I think you are getting at a Miranda type situation.

Mr. Bailey. Yes, very, very simply, and again, I do not want to belabor it. The law simply was at one point that if an agent had reason to know that there was in fact sufficient evidence existent or extant to make an accusation or to bring a charge, that that information then could not be used as a basis for questioning to get either affirmation or for self-incriminating type information from someone in violation of the Fifth Amendment, armed with the knowledge of what had gone before. That at one time had been the law in Pennsylvania. I do not know what it is today.

Mr. Prettyman. I do not believe that is Federal law.

Mr. Bailey. Okay, it might not be.

Mr. Prettyman. So far as the Miranda type situation is concerned, that applies to custodial questioning. This man was questioned in his own home.

Mr. Bailey. Well, the issue of custodial—

Mr. Prettyman. I think that is a different issue.

Mr. Bailey. It does not necessarily have to be down at headquarters.

Mr. Prettyman. No, no.

Mr. Bailey. It could be knowing you are in the presence of or in a car with or even, you know, “come and meet me at Howard Johnson’s.”

Mr. Prettyman. But it would not be in his own home.

Mr. Bailey. Well, no.

Mr. Prettyman. I think that is a different question.

Mr. Bailey. I do not want to bore the committee. I think it is, too; but I thank you very much for your help.

The Chairman. I think Mr. Binns wants to respond.

Mr. Binns. Let me just shortcircuit that question, and it is a valid one.

The fact of the matter is that the Congressman was given his Miranda rights, but that is not the issue. The issue is, the only reason that FBI agent went there was to prohibit Congressman Lederer from testifying at his trial, because he knew well he was going to get him to make misstatements. That was the reason he went there, to get the guy to lie. He cannot take the stand and that is exactly the way they orchestrated the trial; so that from the time that Operation Abscam was started, was initiated, the cameras were rolling. They knew the scenario they were going to play in the courtroom two years hence and they made every move to block the defendants from their constitutional right to due process from the time Operation Abscam was dreamed up under oath by a convicted felon, Melvin Weinberg, the head of the strike force, who is writing a book, and the FBI agent.
Just so you know what is before Judge Pratt, and that is only one of 27 separate allegations of misconduct and the only reason I pointed it out to you was that Mr. Prettyman brought it up again about the lie, because that is the way the government orchestrated the scenario and the reason that I urge that upon this committee is to ask you not to move ahead precipitously until the issue of due process is decided by the trial judge.

I am not asking for the Appellate review. All I am asking is wait until the trial court says the trial is over, because it is not yet.

Mr. Prettyman. I do not like to try to have the last word, but I just want to say one thing. Congressman Lederer had three choices when the FBI came out to his house. No. 1, he could have thrown them out. No. 2, he could have told the truth. No. 3, he could lie. He chose the third one.

Mr. Binns. Spoken as a true Abscam operative.

The Chairman. Is there anything further, gentlemen?

Mr. Binns, the Chair would inquire of you as to whether or not Mr. Lederer desires to avail himself of the opportunity of making either an oral or a written statement to the committee.

Mr. Binns. No, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. Prettyman. I have a motion to present to the committee. Is it proper for me to give a copy to the Congressman and his attorney?

The Chairman. Certainly, Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. Prettyman. In order to keep the record orderly, I would suggest that this resolution take the next exhibit number, which I am now trying to find.

Mr. Swanner. Have all the other things been admitted for the record?

Mr. Prettyman. Yes. This will be Exhibit H.

The Chairman. Exhibit H, all right.

Without objection, Exhibit H will be made a part of the record.

The Chairman. Mr. Prettyman, do you care to be recognized with respect to the resolution?

Mr. Prettyman. The resolution, I think, speaks for itself, Mr. Chairman. I do not think there is any need for me to read it, unless you would like me to. It is part of the record. It simply recites that in accordance with our rules and he having committed these offenses, that we, the committee, thereby find that he did commit such offenses and that they constitute violations of rules over which the committee is given jurisdiction; that therefore we proceed promptly to hold a disciplinary hearing. That is the same type of resolution we used in prior cases.

The Chairman. Mr. Binns, you have been provided with a copy of the resolution?

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you desire to be heard with reference to it?

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir. We object to the resolution on the basis that there has been no conviction, sir.

The Chairman. At this time the Chair would excuse counsel on both sides while the committee deliberates with reference to the resolution. If you will keep yourselves available, we will get back to you.

[At 10:35 a.m. the meeting was adjourned.]
DISCIPLINARY HEARING REGARDING REPRESENTATIVE RAYMOND F. LEDERER

THURSDAY, APRIL 9, 1981

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m. in Room 2359-A, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding.


Staff present: John Swanner, Staff Director.

Also present: E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Special Counsel, William J. Cassidy, Jr., James J. Binns, Counsel for Representative Lederer, and Representative Raymond F. Lederer.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Chair asks the electronic media if they would please leave the hearing room.

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the committee's rules, the committee on April 2, 1981 determined that offenses were committed by Representative Raymond F. Lederer and constituted violations over which the committee is given jurisdiction under Clause 4(e) of Rule X of the House of Representatives, including House Rule XLIII, Clauses 1-3.

In accordance with a motion by Mr. Spence which was agreed to by a vote of 11 to 1, the committee resolved to hold a disciplinary hearing for the sole purpose of determining what sanction to recommend that the House of Representatives impose on Representative Lederer for these offenses. We are meeting at this time for that purpose.

The committee now affords special counsel for the committee and counsel for Representative Lederer the opportunity to present oral and/or written submissions as to the sanction the committee should recommend to the house.

Testimony by witnesses will not be heard except by a vote of a majority of the committee.

I would like at this time to recognize Mr. Binns, counsel for Mr. Lederer, and inquire as to whether or not it is his intention to request the committee to hear witnesses today.

Mr. BINNS. It is not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

I will now ask both counsel if either of them wishes to make a brief opening statement, or would you prefer to proceed with your presentations?
Mr. PRETTYMAN. Mr. Chairman. I would ask permission to introduce a few additional brief exhibits, letters, into the record. Then I have no further evidence to offer, and would like to reserve my time for oral arguments after Mr. Binns has presented whatever evidence he has.

I would move into evidence as Lederer Hearing Exhibit I a letter to Mr. Binns from me, dated April 4, which as noted on the exhibit is a typographical error—it was actually dated and sent on April 2, 1981—as Lederer Hearing Exhibit J, a letter to Mr. Binns from me, dated March 17, 1981; Lederer Hearing Exhibit K, a letter to Mr. Binns from me, dated March 20, 1981; and as Lederer Hearing Exhibit L, a letter to Mr. Binns from me, dated April 7, 1981.

I believe that completes the various correspondence between Mr. Binns and myself, and completes the record in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are Exhibits I, J, and K?
Mr. PRETTYMAN. I, J, K, and L.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.
If there is no objection, those exhibits will be entered into and made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, Mr. Prettyman?
Mr. PRETTYMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Mr. Binns, the Chair recognizes you at this time.

Mr. BINNS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further evidence to present at this time, and I, too, would like to reserve my time for oral argument.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair at this time will recognize Mr. Prettyman for his closing statement. He will also be recognized further for closing remarks.

Mr. PRETTYMAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would suggest that we begin this part of the hearings in regard to Representative Lederer by listening to the words of the Representative himself as he spoke to what he thought were representatives of a wealthy sheik on the fateful evening of September 11. Just a few quotes.

Mr. LEDERER. We are on the same vibes.
Mr. DeVITO. I understand that you can introduce legislation.
Mr. LEDERER. Right, a bill, a private bill.

As for help for Philadelphia,

Mr. LEDERER. It helps, helps my argument to get him in here.
Mr. LEDERER. I can give you me, though, and I will work.
Mr. LEDERER. All right. Dan, we are not Boy Scouts.
Mr. DeVITO. That is why he is willing to pay for, you know, for what he gets. What he wants to do is to insure that you are going to stand up for him.
Mr. LEDERER. He has got it.
I will introduce a private bill to keep him in the country.
Like I will introduce a private bill which will go over to the subcommittee on the Judiciary.
Mr. Weinberg. Well, once we can go back and tell him that you are on his side.

Mr. Lederer. No, you got that when I walked in the door.

Mr. DeVito. He is willing to put up big money to you, all right, you know, to put him in this position.

Mr. Lederer. I am telling you I am going to the wall for these two guys, for this man.

It is a big ball game, all right. I don’t think you are Boy Scouts. I am not a Boy Scout.

I am loyal to this guy.

And finally, after the payoff,

DeVito. I hope you spend it well.

Mr. Lederer’s attorney conceded for purposes of the trial that his client committed a crime and what the crime was. He has now had full opportunity here to argue that no crime was committed. He has not done so. He has not attacked or disputed the recitation of facts in my Report Upon Completion of the Preliminary Inquiry.

He has argued only two things to this committee. First, governmental misconduct in overreaching, a matter which does not go to guilt or innocence. Secondly, entrapment, or more precisely a lack of predisposition to commit the crime.

The answer to this latter point is twofold. First, this committee can judge for itself whether there was predisposition. In this regard, I would point out to you that Cook’s version of events proved out exactly as he described them.

Mr. Lederer did arrive with Criden and Johanson, whom he left downstairs, an interesting point if this was such an innocent meeting. Mr. Lederer did talk to Mr. Errichetti. Lederer admitted it. The two of them went to the meeting together.

I would remind you that there is evidence here that this is the same Mayor Errichetti who had already accepted bribes, one of them the very night before this payoff. Do you think he would have gone to this meeting with Congressman Lederer without fully informing him as to what he was to expect of him, and what he was to do, what was going to happen?

Poulos, the agent, saw Lederer with the brown paper bag right after the meeting. Let’s go to that meeting.

Did you see Mr. Lederer hesitate to take the money at that meeting? Did you see him beg off? Did you see him act surprised or ask what was in the bag or ask what Mr. De Vito meant by spend it well?

So, he goes downstairs and Mr. Poulos sees him with the bag. Then we have the safety deposit slips supporting Cook’s version of the split. Then we have Mr. Lederer’s own report to the Congress where he attempts to account for that $5,000.

On the whole record you have no alternative but to find the presence of a predisposition to commit this crime.

Secondly, as demonstrated by the California-Nebraska cases which I have cited you in our memo, a reversal of a conviction on the grounds of entrapment acts as a deterrent to governmental misconduct in overreaching. It is akin to a reversal because the police violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting an illegal search.
It does not mean that the defendant was guiltless. On the contrary, a defendant in most jurisdictions has to admit to an offense even before pleading the defense of entrapment.

In any event, the real point insofar as this committee is concerned is that if Representative Lederer has in fact acted in an improper manner and has violated the House rules, the committee has the duty to sanction him regardless of entrapment.

This committee does not sit to pass judgment on governmental investigative or prosecutorial activities. It sits to pass judgment on the conduct of Representative Lederer.

Now, what is the magnitude of what Representative Lederer has done? What sanction does he deserve?

He lied to the FBI. He lied to the Congress. He conspired with others to violate the law. He split his ill-begotten gains with others. He violated the trust of his constituents and even used proposed investments in his district as a ploy, an excuse for supporting the phony sheik.

But, most importantly, overriding everything else, he took a substantial amount of money in return for a promise of his vote in the House of Representatives. He accepted a bribe. He was a willing participant in a scheme to buy a Member of Congress—himself.

There can be only one sanction for such conduct. Any sanction short of expulsion would be an affront to all other Members of this Congress, and to the people of this country.

There are no extenuating circumstances here. There is nothing even to be said on his behalf. He purposely undertook a trust, and he purposely abused it.

Without any malice in my heart whatever, I say to you that this man deserves to be expelled, and I urge the committee to carry out its duty and make that recommendation to the House.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Binns, you are recognized for your closing argument.

Mr. BINNS. Mr. Chairman, I beg leave of the committee to remain seated while I do it because I have numerous reference material which I would like to have handy. Would that be permissible, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. You may proceed in that way.

Mr. BINNS. If the committee please. The conduct or misconduct of a Member of Congress or any other member of society cannot and should not be viewed in a vacuum. Congressman Lederer should receive no less treatment than any other individual citizen of the United States.

Accordingly, his conduct that has resulted in his being present here today should be viewed in its entirety.

Viewing it in its entirety mandates a viewing of the entire Abscam scenario. We can start that journey with the admonition of Federal Judge Fullam that Abscam constitutes as a matter of law entrapment and a violation of due process to which each citizen of the United States is entitled under the Fifth Amendment.

Who are the players that have interacted to bring us to this day? The players are the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its operatives, the Department of Justice and its lawyers, a convicted felon turned author, Melvin Weinberg, and Congressman Lederer.
Viewing his activities on the scale on one side and viewing the activities of the Abscam co-conspirators on the other I submit will result in a compelling finding on your part that perhaps no sanction is due.

Certain references to Congressman Lederer's statements during the meeting of September 11, 1979 have been quoted to you out of context, the first being that Congressman Lederer stated to Mayor Angelo Errichetti, Melvin Weinberg, and FBI agent Anthony Amoroso that, "We are on the same vibes."

Let me refer you to page 3 of the written transcript of the meeting of September 11, 1979, and give you the entire sentence as to why Congressman Lederer thought he was there, and on the same vibes.

In response to a question by Melvin Weinberg that "Angie must have explained to you," Congressman Lederer replied, "He told me some things you are interested in, and we are on the same vibes. I am very interested in the Port of Philadelphia, and I understand you are applying, I just heard big words, interested in the Port of Philadelphia."

So that they are the same vibrations that Congressman Lederer was on, when he entered into that meeting. That is the very first quote by eminent counsel to this committee, enabling you to reflect upon why this Congressman should be censured.

The entire Abscam scenario unfolded back in 1978. That portion of it having to do with the frontal attack on the Congress of the United States did not take form until the summer of 1979.

That is when the so-called asylum scenario was created by the government in an effort to snare Members of Congress. Not that there was any evidence whatsoever of wrongdoing by any Member of Congress, especially this man, but because Melvin Weinberg thought that it would be a good idea, and he suggested the idea to a United States Attorney and to an FBI agent.

Now, the matters that I am recounting for you now are matters of record in the due process hearing notes of testimony that are before you.

Let me briefly go through what has been established with respect to the conduct of Congressman Lederer as opposed to the conduct of the Abscam operatives.

As I mentioned previously, the entire creation of the criminal enterprise falls, and admittedly so, into the lap of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice and the convicted swindler-felon, adopted government agent, Melvin Weinberg. That is a matter of record.

What, then, did the government do in an effort to insure against someone innocent being snared into its trap? Not a lot. It allowed Mr. Weinberg to place his words into the mouths of pre-selected targets, and when I say pre-selected targets, please take judicial notice, if you will, of the make-up of each and every Member of Congress that was targeted—not that was brought in because he was involved in some criminal enterprise, but that was targeted by a middleman of the government.

Look at them. You test for yourself what their political philosophies were, and why they were targeted.

They next allowed their middlemen to coach prospective targets as to how they should act before the television cameras which the Federal Government set in motion.
Now, remember from the inception of Operation Abscam, the sole thought of each of the Abscam operatives was directed towards that day in a courtroom when the target would have to go on trial.

So that every word, every phrase, every scenario was constructed by experienced trial lawyer prosecutor types towards that day when a jury would sit there in judgment of the various targets.

Mr. Weinberg was allowed to suggest illegal schemes to the various marks in an effort to further bring them into the web.

Mr. Weinberg was allowed, through a wink of an eye, to make photographs of the different scenes and the equipment used, probably to insure his successful selling of his book, which we will get to later, which is now on the market as bedtime reading for all of America.

Mr. Weinberg was known to have and expressly allowed to destroy tapes of meetings that he had with individuals involved in the Abscam operation, directly contrary to the mandates of the FBI internal procedures. This is all a matter of record, under oath, in the due process hearings.

Mr. Weinberg engaged in suggesting, along with FBI agents, that drugs, barbituates, alcohol, and other stimulants or depressants be given to the targets, the Members of Congress.

Mr. Weinberg, with the complete approbation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and members of the Department of Justice, was permitted to solicit gifts from various targets in furtherance of his own financial objectives. He solicited and—it has been testified to under oath—received microwave ovens, watches, whiskey, cigars, and cash, all with the complete approval of his superiors, who worked with him on a day-to-day basis.

The government operatives were permitted, by their superiors, to manufacture jurisdiction and venue over their targets, so as to lure them out of their home districts into foreign jurisdictions where certain case law might not apply, which we will comment on later.

That was done with the complete approval and as part of the idea of the strike force attorney in charge of the eastern district of New York.

Mr. Weinberg's interest in the Abscam scenario was fueled by cash payments to him over a two-year period of $3,000 per month, in addition to special bonuses in the neighborhood, in some instances, of $15,000 in lump sum payments, provided that the fish was big enough.

In addition, Mr. Weinberg's compensation was to be based—and this is testified to under oath by two United States Attorneys—was to be based upon the stature and number of targets that he lured into the net and that were indicted—not convicted, mind you, but just indicted.

What was the motivation of the Federal Government in so authorizing a convicted swindler to operate.

Mr. Weinberg has been promised and reflects in his book, and it has been testified to under oath by a senior member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that he is to receive a lump sum payment of some $100,000 at the culmination of the Abscam trials.

This is in addition to a $150,000 sum of payments that he has received thus far, which is in addition to a $30,000 payment which he has received from a private industry, which is in addition to a $60,000
payment which he has received as an advance on his book, with more to come.

You know what the real kicker is? He hasn't paid taxes, and the government knows it. He says in his book only a sap would.

He is an agent of our government whose conduct should be weighed against that of Congressman Lederer, a man with six children, with no prior involvement whatsoever in any crime, and who has gone from being a high school graduate to a probation officer to a member of the state legislature to a Congressman; who when you walk down the halls of these corridors is gladly received by his peers.

If you viewed the tape in this case, and if you read the transcript, you would have seen that the Abscam scenario enabled the government operatives to appeal to the civic duty of Congressman Lederer, in an effort to keep him in the meeting.

Now, when I say that, I would like you to look at the transcript of the meeting and look at the tape of the meeting written on page 4, after the government operatives, Messrs. Weinberg, Errichetti and Amoroso, have gone through the asylum scenario, saying how scared their sheik is, and comparing him to Somoza, and the Shah, and how scared he is, and wants to be able to count on you, Raymond Lederer answers back, and this is on page 4, maybe two-and-a-half minutes into the meeting, "I would do that, and I do it all the time for a lot of people."

No talk of money. No talk of bribery. They asked, and they received his complete assurance that he would introduce a private bill, as he has done on four other occasions during his tenure as a Congressman, and on each of those occasions the individuals and their families for whom he has introduced those bills appeared in court and testified that not one quarter, dime, penny, scintilla of any quid pro quo was asked for, referred to, alluded to, given or received.

Was the FBI satisfied? No, because as I will show you under oath, the FBI agent was only interested in what happened before the cameras and whether or not they could create an indictable offense situation.

So, mind you that on page 4 of the transcript, approximately two minutes into the meeting, what Congressman Lederer thought he was going there for was accomplished, it was over, it was agreed to with absolutely no impropriety whatsoever.

The Federal Government encouraged Angelo Errichetti and Louis Johanson, who are the 'middlemen,' to encourage people in. How did they do that? They told Errichetti and Louis Johanson that they would be wealthy 'beyond all of their expectation or belief because of legitimate business deals that the Sheik was going to make in the United States of America, which is the same exact language and subterfuge that they used on Congressman Lederer throughout the transcript of his meeting.

For example, that the sheik was investing $800 million in the Port of Philadelphia, that he was going to buy into hotels, that he was going to put people to work, because there are repeated instances during the 42-odd minutes of this encounter where Congressman Lederer makes it plain that jobs are what he is about, and if these people have a client who can provide jobs for his constituents, then that is what he is about.
They go further and say he is putting money into our country. “We invest in America all the time. That is how he insures himself in staying here.”

The Federal Government provided a lot of incentive for Melvin Weinberg to keep up the action. $3,000 a month tax free, plus all your meals, is not that bad for a young boy out of Brooklyn, who admits to being a con man since he was six years old.

He is the hero of Abscam. He is the central focus of all the reporters and all of the newspapers, in every trial. Glittering in gold, big cigars, he is a man. It is him against the suckers, the suckers being the Members of Congress.

This is out of his book. Very informative reading on how our government operates and how you should judge this Congressman as opposed to the pristine pure operations of our government that we all pay for.

Not only is Melvin Weinberg an author, but Neal Welch, an executive in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has turned author. That is under oath. He is going to write a book, and Abscam will occupy part of that.

It doesn’t stop there. The chief prosecuting attorney has under oath admitted to already engaging in negotiations for his book on Operation Abscam. That is Mr. Puccio.

There was never one training session of any of the agents involved in Operation Abscam with respect to entrapment. That is an admission under oath by agent Anthony Amoroso, whose picture appears on the photograph portion of Mel Weinberg’s book, inscribed ‘To Mel’. He was never instructed on entrapment, although he was the individual who conducted the entire conversation, with the aid of Melvin Weinberg, with Congressman Lederer.

Mr. Prettyman has again referred to the fact that censure must be here, there must be expulsion because that man lied to the FBI. Let’s go over how he did that.

Special Agent Cyril Gamber was brought into a room where Sony TV perhaps was set up, Betamax plugged in, and shown the entire meeting that Congressman Lederer attended. In addition, there was made available to him, Anthony Amoroso and Melvin Weinberg, to tell him and explain to him each and every detail of what he was seeing.

So that he knew what happened in that meeting better than any of you do or better than I do, because I have never been debriefed by the FBI. Then what did he do? In an effort that would end all to establish a crime busting scenario, he went out to Congressman Lederer and tested his veracity. Not to find anything out, because he already knew it.

Why did he go out, then, and ask him the questions that he did? He went out in an effort to have him lie, because that was a part of the Abscam scenario—prevent any one of these targets from being able to take the witness stand in his own defense.

We will tell you what really happened, then you go out and see whether or not they will lie about it, because if they tell you the truth, we are going to indict them, and if they lie, we are going to indict them anyway, but they will never be able to take the stand.
Curiously, he was never indicted for giving a false statement to the FBI. Now, that is an FBI agent who is funding as part and parcel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Operation Abscam. Weigh his and his superior's conduct against that of Congressman Lederer.

What else did the government do in an effort to continue and foster its practices in Operation Abscam? It made intentional leaks to the press. You are all aware that United States Attorneys have been fired from their jobs, United States Attorneys have flunked lie detector tests when they have been brought down to Washington.

Compare the conduct of those United States Attorneys and their superiors with that of Congressman Lederer in an effort to evaluate who, if anybody, should be sanctioned here. It is very easy, and I have heard it said in several sessions here, that this is not the body, that is another committee.

But the buck has got to stop being passed somewhere. It does no good for this committee to say, "We are not going to get involved in that, they should all go to jail, but we are only going to deal with the man on the other side of the fence who has fallen prey to their conduct," which once again is described by Judge Fullam as outrageous and outrageous as a matter of law.

During the trial, the government intentionally violated the Jencks Act by allowing to be destroyed written and audio tapes of witnesses who testified against Congressman Lederer. Melvin Weinberg's tapes were allowed to be destroyed, as well as the egregious fact that 302s, or reports by Federal Bureau of Investigation operatives, were never kept, and these were done at the behest of and request of the chief Abscam prosecutor.

He requested a special rule to be involved in the conduct of Operation Abscam that would alleviate FBI agents from doing that which their internal rules mandate that they do. I will get to that portion of the due process testimony that gives that to you right under oath.

In addition to violating the Jencks Act, the trial attorneys in Abscam, who incidentally were the very same people who fashioned it from its outset—Mr. Puccio was the individual who was going to try the case in the end, but who also fabricated the asylum scenario in July of 1979, long before Congressman Lederer was brought into the case.

The trial attorneys withheld all along any evidence of coaching by the middlemen, where the middlemen would coach the targets to come on strong in front of the sheik if they wanted the investments in their district.

That particular coaching, incidentally, was severely criticized by the Newark strike force office. What happened with those criticisms? They were shelved. The attorneys who made them were taken out of Operation Abscam. They were the same attorneys who later turned up and testified under oath that this particular individual was entrapped, and that they recommended against his indictment at the prosecution conference.

There were and continue to be so many instances of misconduct on the part of each and every government official involved in Operation Abscam that it has wrought the decision from Judge Fullman, which you have not had the benefit of heretofore in your hearings.
It has wrought the conduct of a due process hearing after the trial by Judge Pratt, which you have not yet the benefit of his decision. I urge you to keep that in mind with respect to whether or not it is appropriate that a sanction order be entered in this case.

Now, let's just cover who the operatives are and what they have said under oath with respect to their role in Operation Abscam.

Melvin Weinberg has admittedly engaged in what is called a "front fee operation." The operation conducted, conceived, and carried out by Melvin Weinberg admittedly was not premised on probably cause or any other similar action. He was allowed to accept gratuities ranging in amounts between $50,000 on up. He was also allowed to arrange for the purveying of gratuities to individual marks from $50,000 to $100,000.

Weinberg's role was to fashion a meeting to assure that the politician was prepared to state before cameras that he would perform certain official acts. If you look in the letter of transcript, you will never see the mention of a quid pro quo. You will never see the mention of the word "bribe." You will not even see the mention of the word "money" with respect to money being paid to this Congressman. Weinberg was paid to "make cases against individuals". That was his role.

After he was observed on certain instances of coaching and leading people into saying things that they really didn't mean, he was admonished by certain of his superiors not to act that way. He was severely criticized in a meeting on August 9, 1979 by United States Attorney Edward Plaza and by United States Attorney Robert Weir. Coincidentally, from that point forward there exists no tapes of any preparatory sessions between Weinberg, Errichetti, and their marks. You have heard it referred to by Mr. Prettyman that before this meeting Angelo Errichetti had a brief meeting with Congressman Lederer. Unfortunately, there is no tape of that to explain to you exactly what transpired.

Because of the destruction of tapes, the selective recording of tapes, and the suppression of exculpatory evidence by the FBI agents, and their failure to adequately supervise Weinberg, and to document his actions with memoranda, we are at a loss to provide you with more factual data concerning those preparatory meetings.

Melvin Weinberg, a convicted felon, accused and convicted of mail fraud, conspiracy, bargained away a three-year jail term before a Federal court by agreeing to engage in Operation Abscam. The deal was that Weinberg was to get four cases. If he did that, he got probation. So that right away the bounty went on the heads of four Congressmen that were as yet unknown, unnamed, but they were the means whereby Melvin Weinberg would hit the streets and not go to jail. He was allowed to solicit $1,500 in cash from one individual, and did it. and got it. He solicited and received watches, a Betamax recorder, $2,000 worth of alcoholic beverages, a microwave oven, dishes, a component stereo unit, and three Sony television sets.

Incidentally, the microwave oven was only incidentally found in his home. He lied about it to the FBI. He eventually had to give it up. When the fact of his lying was revealed. Mr. Puccio said, "Well, that is Mel. Mel lies." He is our government agent. author.
The only significant gifts which Weinberg reported to the government were the gold watches he received. The rest of them he did not report. The only reason he reported the gold watches was because he had to, because there was a tape of his receiving them.

As I mentioned before, Melvin Weinberg has been handsomely compensated for his role in Operation Abscam and awaits the dropping of the big Easter egg, when the cases are over. That is his lump sum payment. He hasn't filed tax returns for the years of 1978 and 1979. That is what he has testified to under oath. What he says in his book is he has never filed them, only suckers do.

He received a $15,000 reward with respect to the setting up of the head of the Casino Gaming Board in New Jersey. He got that money with the express approval of the head of the strike force.

Now, do you think that he had any incentive whatsoever to lead this Congressman into a trap, to have this Congressman do something that he would not have otherwise done, if he was receiving lump sums of $15,000 from our government tax free?

I show you a schedule of payments that was turned over by the government, showing how Mel Weinberg starting out at $1,000 a month quickly jumped to $3,000 a month as soon as he got the Congress of the United States involved; not on the basis of any ongoing criminality of any Congressman, specially not this one, but simply because he created a role that he wanted to play.

As of November 1980, Weinberg admittedly has received $423,000 for which he has not and has no intention of paying taxes on. In addition to that, he is going to be a movie star. He is negotiating for a film contract.

During the course of the due process hearing, it was revealed that Melvin Weinberg, while he was an FBI operative, was engaged in the taking of pictures of the Georgetown townhouse and other scenes where Operation Abscam was taking place.

Was the film confiscated from him? No. Mel lost that. Yet, curiously enough, when you look into his book in the photograph sections, you will see pictures of the yacht, you will see pictures of him with FBI agents posed as sheiks, and with John Goode, the FBI agent who supervised Abscam in its entirety.

Do you think that Mel Weinberg took these pictures with a purpose other than the publication of this book? Do you think that Mel Weinberg and the FBI and the Department of Justice were interested in prosecuting criminals, or were they interested in making a name for themselves, in attacking the Congress of the United States, and in influencing the voting philosophies of certain members thereof?

Melvin Weinberg destroyed certain tapes and alleged that they were stolen. Those tapes that were stolen happened to be in a suitcase with a tape recorder. Curiously enough, the thief never took the tape recorder. He only took the tapes. Will those tapes appear at another day as part of a radio show of Mel Weinberg? Unfortunately, we are only left to conjecture now.

John Goode, the field supervisor for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, admittedly, in conjunction with Melvin Weinberg, conceived Abscam. But he could not handle Mel Weinberg. So he turned him over to Anthony Amoroso.
However, Goode has indicated his desire to recommend that Weinberg be given $100,000 plus in a lump sum payment at the end of Abscam, in addition to the monies that I have told you about, and that appears on page 2,654 of the due process hearing before Judge Pratt.

Although he was his superior, he wasn't even aware of the fact that Weinberg was meeting with Errichetti in efforts to pump up the Congressman.

Anthony Amoroso, on the other hand, was better able to relate to Weinberg. Anthony Amoroso was the gentleman that you see in the tape when you look at the meeting of September 11, 1979. He believed and has so testified that it was perfectly acceptable to pump up the middlemen to coach Congressmen and to have the middlemen tell the Congressmen to come on strong, the stronger the better, if they wanted to get investments in their district.

Amoroso perceived no flaw whatsoever in Weinberg telling a middleman that the Congressman only has to tell the sheik’s representatives that he will do something.

His exclusive interest was the generation of videotape performances, and he has so testified under oath. Although he was the FBI agent who had accompanied Melvin Weinberg on a day-to-day business—and he is the FBI agent who appears in the tape of Congressman Lederer, and in the tape of each of the other Congressmen that has been the subject of these hearings—no one ever informed him that there were problems of entrapment.

Now, I ask you to remember that so you can distinguish it from the testimony of two United States Attorneys who I will refer to later on.

Despite Amoroso’s ignorance of the law of entrapment, he was, according to John Goode, charged with all meetings with Congressmen.

The methodology of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to its middlemen—and in this case it was Angelo Errichetti—was to recruit him because of his reputed respectability, and then heap upon him the potential for riches.

As soon as he was recruited, he received his basic training from Melvin Weinberg, who then deputized him and guaranteed him some interest, some personal gain, in the legitimate business enterprise that the sheik would interview.

The quid pro quo was their agreement to deliver politicians. If you go throughout the due process transcript, you will see time and time again that the only thing that the Abscam operatives were interested in was the delivery of names of politicians.

When you read this book, which I hope you do, you are going to see the names of a lot of your friends because that is what the FBI wanted. A lot of them have never been indicted, a lot of them have never been in any way implicated. But they are in here because of the good graces of Mel Weinberg, with the complete approbation of his superiors.

As I mentioned before, Mr. Puccio specifically requested that the paperwork in Abscam be minimized. He testified to that under oath. He asked the FBI to dispense with their ordinary recordkeeping.

Why would a prosecutor do that? He says he was not concerned about undocumented conversations between FBI agents and targets. Yet, there is a complete set of rules in the FBI manual that dictates just the opposite, that that is what must be done.
Once again, Mr. Puccio is already engaged in preliminary discussions concerning the writing of a book about Abscam.

Mr. Nathan, who is Mr. Puccio's supervisor in the Department of Justice, made no effort whatsoever to ascertain whether there was coaching of public officials prior to going into meetings.

Mr. Nathan, a senior member of the Department of Justice, had no idea of the FBI practice with respect to undercover operations and memorialization of meetings in the course of these undercover operations. He was very unknowledgeable with respect to the Levy guidelines. Yet, he was one of the people in charge of the whole operation, whose memo surfaced during the Lederer trial—not before, but during.

Mr. Nathan never instructed Mr. Puccio to make the purpose of on-camera meetings clear and unambiguous. So that as you see this tape, and you are wondering why they are staying there after there has been an agreement to enter a private bill, for no money, that can be laid directly at the feet of Mr. Nathan.

There were no limits put on inducements, such as investments in a congressional district, or any hotel casino deals.

In September of 1980 Mr. Plaza and Mr. Weir sent a memorandum to Mr. Nathan's superior, Phillip Heymann. That memorandum had to do with their concerns concerning the overall operation of Abscam.

It dated back to their knowledge of experiences that occurred as early as the summer of 1979, two months before Congressman Lederer's meeting. Those experiences on behalf of Messrs. Plaza and Weir gave grave concern to certain members of the Justice Department, not to Mr. Nathan.

David Margolis, chief of the Organized Crime Section of the Department of Justice, is Puccio's superior. He testified under oath that certain tapes made him uncomfortable when he saw them. He didn't even know that Weinberg was rewarded on a monthly basis. He did state that recording conversations that Weinberg had as essential to his credibility.

Now, I would like to spend a little time with Mr. Plaza and Mr. Weir because this is very important. These are two gentlemen who have executive positions with the Newark strike force. As early as August 9, 1979, at a meeting in the home of the special agent in charge of Atlantic City, Mr. Plaza severely chastised Melvin Weinberg for the impropriety of his conduct during meetings with targets. Weinberg's response to Mr. Plaza was that, "If we don't put words in people's mouths, we won't have any cases."

Now, the "we" that Mr. Weinberg is referring to so eloquently are his team, the FBI and the Department of Justice. He is telling a senior Assistant United States Attorney that, "If we don't do this, you won't have any cases."

Weinberg didn't stop there. He admitted that there may have been some improper coaching, but he blamed it on Lawrence Scharf, Mr. Puccio's assistant in the Brooklyn strike force.

Now, this isn't Alice in Wonderland I am giving you. This is testimony under oath in a Federal court in New York.

Puccio's response to the fact that Mel may have been acting improperly was, "Mel is Mel. You can't trust Mel. He lies."
That didn’t stop them. That occurred in July of 1979. That didn’t stop them from having Mel orchestrate the meeting that Congressman Lederer attended two months later.

Mr. Plaza’s original complaints were the lack of 302 forms whereby the FBI is directed to preserve oral evidence. He complained about the misplacement of tapes by FBI agents, and by Melvin Weinberg.

He complained about the partiality of unrecorded conversations. He complained about the failure to record critical conversations at all. He complained about the targeting without a predicate; that is, the administration of a criminality test, if you will, the same criminality test severely criticized by Judge Fullam in overturning the jury verdicts with respect to two Abscam targets.

He complained about the creation of a criminal enterprise. He complained about distortions and enhancements on transcripts of tapes. He complained and he came forward because he could not in good conscience condone the improper conduct of the strike force in Brooklyn.

That is his testimony under oath. This conscience in the opinion of an Agent John Goode made Mr. Plaza ‘the enemy’. That is Mr. Goode’s testimony under oath.

Robert Weir also shared Mr. Plaza’s complaints. He too was attached to the Newark strike force. Weir stated that Puccio’s response concerning the microwave oven is, “I will coach Weinberg as to his excuse for not reporting the microwave oven.” This is the head of the strike force.

Weir has adamantly testified under oath that 90 percent of Nathan’s memorandum to Heymann and a fortiori Nathan’s testimony at the due process hearing is false. Then Nathan knows it is false.

Now, here are two respected, distinguished lawyers talking about a senior official in the Department of Justice and accusing him of giving false testimony in an effort to cover up the misdeeds in Operation Abscam, and knowing it is false at the time he gives it.

That appears at age 2, 173 of the due process hearing before Judge Pratt.

What did the Department of Justice do when they found out about the fact that Plaza and Weir were going to testify? Did they keep their hands off? No. They summoned them to Washington and they grilled them the day before they were going to testify in what has been described by Messrs. Plaza and Weir as an effort to intimidate them.

This is our government. These are the type of people that you are putting on the one side of the scale, some 10 to 15 in number, against Ray Lederer, to determine whether or not he should be sanctioned.

Not only did Mr. Plaza and Mr. Weir complain, but their boss, Robert Deltufo, who was the U.S. Attorney for New Jersey, as early as July of 1979, communicated to Mr. Puccio that proper case management of the Abscam investigation was frustrated by the unavailability of transcripts of the undercover operatives’ conversations and their failure on an ongoing basis to produce 302 reports recording their activities.

That is the United States Attorney, for a state of our Union, criticizing without any hold back whatsoever the entire operation that brings us here today.
Department of Justice officials were repeatedly warned that Weinberg was not being effectively controlled or supervised and was in fact directing the course of the operation.

They were told that Weinberg's conduct constituted entrapment, and that the targets or middlemen were not formulating the criminal enterprise, but that Weinberg and the FBI agents were.

In fact, Mr. Stewart, a Justice Department operative, advised Mr. Margolis, the supervisor in Washington of both himself and Mr. Puccio, that there was nothing unlawful whatsoever arising out of the mere presence of a Congressman at a meeting with a fictitious sheik's representatives, and that a further showing of consciousness of criminality would have to be required before a charge of bribery could be made out.

Now, how did the government do that? They placed lawyers in adjoining rooms who would call into the room just in case there was no crime being committed and say wait a minute, you have got to get the guy to do something, he hasn't admitted that he is going to do anything wrong. You could give him money now and it wouldn't even mean anything. You have got to take him down further.

That is what they did. That was standard operating procedure. In the other room, where the camera was, was an Assistant United States Attorney coaching Weinberg and Amoroso on how best to inveigle the Congressman into a crime.

We talk about sanctions. You talk about who was involved. We lined up the government's team on one side. Now, Ray Lederer was taken in there by Lou Johanson, the tragic, tragic figure. Lou Johanson's son just committed suicide over this three days ago. How much of a sanction is that?

Lou Johanson was never involved in any criminality before this, and Lou Johanson's son worked for Ray Lederer for two years on his staff. Lou Johanson was a ward leader in the Congressman's district. Is that enough of a reason for Ray Lederer to go to the meeting without any hint of impropriety?

Quoting from the United States v. Jannotti, the Opinion written by Judge Fullam, it is clear that "... the techniques employed here went far beyond the necessities of legitimate law enforcement.

"It would undoubtedly be permissible for government agents to set up an undercover business entity, either real or imaginary, as an attractive target for corrupt overtures by city officials, and even to hint that such overtures would be welcome.

"It would also probably be permissible for the undercover agents to initiate bribe proposals at least in connection with suspected ongoing corrupt activities on the part of the targeted officials.

"But it is neither necessary nor appropriate to the task of ferreting out crime for the undercover agents to initiate bribe offers, provide extremely generous financial inducements, and add further incentives virtually amounting to an appeal to civic duty in order to get the Congressmen into conversations."

I don't know that there is much more that can be said to enable you gentlemen to make the weighty decision that you have to make. But I urge upon you that you step back and take a deep breath and not be stampeded because of some vituperative statements that all politicians are dishonest, they all deserve what they get.
Ray Lederer didn’t deserve to be here. In my opinion, when you talk about sanctioning, you don’t do it in a vacuum. You have to weigh the same as you would weigh the administration of a punishment on a child of yours, or on a member of your staff, or any other human being, the totality of the circumstances.

I am not down here on a fool’s errand just to come in and make a statement and leave. I really believe it. You ask yourself who is really to be sanctioned here, and don’t stop there by saying that is not our function, that is the Judiciary Committee.

The buck stops and starts somewhere. You have before you by virtue of these transcripts of the due process hearing, things that you never had before. I am not saying that in an effort to get you to sway away from Ray Lederer, but you judge him in the light of the atmosphere that he operated in.

That is all we ask. I thank you for your time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Prettyman.

Mr. PRETTYM AN. Members of the committee, I might say preliminarily that all references to Judge Fullam’s opinion, of course, are irrelevant. That opinion is on appeal, and it deals with an entirely different case.

I listened very carefully to Mr. Binns, and I did not hear him say that his client did not commit a crime, that he did not take a bribe. Instead, his argument, as I understand it, was that you stack the government people up one one side, and you stack Mr. Lederer up on the other side, and you see who is worse. You view their conduct against his. They did some terrible things, the implication being, even if he did, too. Maybe they did.

I have said before that I am not here to defend the government. I am not here to argue whether the government is right in this case. I have no interest in that, but it is no excuse for what this gentleman did.

If he took a bribe, it is not of any relevance to this committee that some part of the government acted improperly.

Mr. Binns took a statement that I quoted, one out of all of those that I quoted, “I am on the same vibes.” He said that that was taken out of context. It was not taken out of context because it was followed by a statement a little further on that Mr. Lederer had already talked to Mr. Errichetti before he came into the meeting, and he says we are on the same vibes.

Everybody knew what he was talking about. Then Mr. Binns takes the statement out of context when he cites a statement on page 4 without relation to the rest of what went on at that meeting.

He wants you to go through a whole litany here as to government misconduct, that this was, for example, politically motivated. There is no evidence of that. That Mr. Weinberg was motivated by the selling of his book, but Mr. Weinberg did not control Mr. Lederer.

As a matter of fact, he said very little at this meeting, contributed very little to the Lederer case.

Mr. Binns says the tapes were destroyed. There was no evidence that tapes were destroyed in this case. He said that Mr. Weinberg was authorized to stimulate and give drugs to Members of Congress. There is no evidence that that happened in this case.
He said he solicited gifts from targets. There is no evidence that he solicited any gifts from Mr. Lederer. They said he was authorized to pay gratuities to marks, but there was not anything about he paid anything to Mr. Lederer other than the bribe offer that was given.

They said that he manufactured Federal jurisdiction. That issue, of course, is before Judge Pratt, but there is no evidence in this case that Mr. Lederer did not willingly come from D.C. to New York. He was invited to come, and he came. He was not forced to come. He wasn't dragged into a car.

Mr. Binns says that Mr. Weinberg was paid special bonuses, but none of those specifically related to Mr. Lederer, and moreover, that is a common practice, to pay bonuses to undercover agents, informers of this kind. There is nothing improper about that, and even if there was, it would still have nothing to do with Mr. Lederer's conduct. Mr. Binns says there was no training session for agents as to entrapment.

So what? The issue in this case is, was there entrapment, and even if there was, did he commit the crime anyway? He says that there was questioning by the FBI on February 2 in an effort to test his veracity. That is a red herring. That is a perfectly proper investigative technique. It is done all the time.

He says there were intentional leaks to the press. I don't know whether there were or not. It hasn't been proven yet. Even if it is true, it does not go to the guilt of this gentleman.

He says they violated the Jencks Act. That is still to be determined, but it is irrelevant to what Mr. Lederer did, and it is the statement of these two United States Attorneys that related to the Senator Williams' case, not to this case.

He says the Assistant United States Attorneys were in the next room coaching agents what to say. They were in some cases, but not in this case. The one call in this case came from an outsider, and so it goes on and on, but the worst. I think, is this business about jobs are what Congressman Lederer is all about.

I submit to you that that is an affront to the intelligence of this committee. Anyone who is going to look at that tape, read that record, knows that what they were really talking about was putting money into the district and creating jobs, so that this man will have an excuse in case anyone questions him later as to why he is supporting this farm.

Well, we know what was discussed by Mr. Binns, but where was the discussion of promising to introduce private bills? Where was the discussion of taking the brown bag, of "spend it well," about his phony report to Congress, about the request to Cook for Lederer's share so he could help his shore houses, about the evidence of safety deposit box withdrawal slips and all the rest, the things that really go to what he did.

I did not hear anything about that. Mr. Binns' argument seeks to obscure Mr. Lederer's conduct by his recitation of his assertions of government misconduct, but Mr. Lederer was no naive victim. He was no Boy Scout by his own mouth. He knew very well why he was meeting Weinberg and De Vito, and he knew well what he would receive, money which he used later to repair his house for the beach.

This committee's purpose is to judge Mr. Lederer's conduct, not the conduct of the Executive Branch of government. Despite what
Mr. Binns says, the fact is that the Judiciary Committee can undertake that task if it sees fit.

Mr. Weinberg was a con man, an admitted con man, but that is the kind of agent, unfortunately, that the government sought and uses when it investigates and prosecutes crime. Priests and bishops are not usually present when sophisticated crimes are being committed, and certainly Boy Scouts are not invited to such schemes. We know that from his own mouth.

I ask a question of you that I think each of you must ask of yourselves. Can any one of you comfortably cast your votes knowing that you sit in the same house with a member who was willing to sell his vote for $5,000?

I submit to you that Mr. Binns has done today what he did at the trial. He talked about everything except Congressman Lederer. The jury didn’t buy it, and I hope this committee does not, either.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. This concludes the closing arguments to the committee.

In the interest of the committee, all of the information it so desires at such time as we undertake deliberation regarding the question of sanction, the Chair will at this time recognize any members for any questions they may have of either counsel.

Mr. Alexander. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Alexander. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would like to address a question to counsel for Mr. Lederer, Mr. Binns.

Mr. Binns. Yes, sir.

Mr. Alexander. Mr. Binns, assuming that the action of the FBI does constitute entrapment as a matter of law—and it may, we will hear from the courts on that question—assuming further that the actions of the FBI violate the rights of American citizens under the due process clause; assume further, if you will, that the agents and their assistants were themselves unsavory—and many of them are—are you suggesting that accepting money in exchange for a vote is proper conduct for a Member of Congress under any circumstances?

Mr. Binns. No. What I am suggesting is that you are not going to find any evidence in this record that there was any money accepted in exchange for a vote.

Mr. Alexander. Are you suggesting that accepting money in exchange for an action in Congress is a proper conduct for a Member of Congress?

Mr. Binns. No. Perhaps I misspoke in the first instance. You are not going to find any evidence in this case that a dime was accepted for any action whatsoever.

Mr. Alexander. Let’s assume that for the purpose of our discussion that we are not referring to this particular case, and that we are referring to an instance where there is evidence.

In that instance, where there is evidence of a bribe and of a Member of Congress who accepts money in exchange for promised action in the United States Congress, either as a vote or as an action in Congress, are you suggesting that that is proper conduct for a Member of Congress?
Mr. Binns. No, I am not.
Mr. Alexander. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to address my questions to Mr. Prettyman.
Can you point out to me where in the record we have testimony indicating that the Congressman was willing to trade his vote for his willingness to introduce a piece of legislation for money?
Mr. Prettyman. You have to put several facts together in order to get that.
You do not have any statement during the course of the September 11 meeting, or before or after that, where the Congressman specifically said, "I am going to promise to introduce a bill in return for a specific sum of money."
In order to reach that conclusion, however, you do not have to put together too much.
You have his conversation with Errichetti ahead of time. You have immediately, almost as soon as the meeting started, a discussion of private immigration bills which he repeatedly agreed to introduce, and then you have the payoff, and the subsequent acceptance of the $5,000, and prove that he knew precisely what he was getting.
When you put that together, I think you could well understand why Mr. Binns at trial was willing to say that for purposes of this case, he didn't contest that Mr. Lederer took the money.
He did not argue that he took it under duress. He admitted he took it voluntarily, intentionally, and when he took it, he knew it was in violation of law. I think he took that position and raised only the entrapment issue because the record as a whole clearly showed that there could be nothing else here except in return for a promise of introducing private bills, the exchange of money which was in fact exchanged.
Mr. Brown. From looking at the tapes themselves, it seems to me that it is possible to conclude that he was willing to do that in exchange for investment in his district.
Mr. Prettyman. Mr. Congressman, I suppose that each of us will just have to read the evidence and look at those tapes with his own best conscience and his own eye.
I frankly cannot possibly come to that conclusion. The talk about getting money into the district, it seems clearly to me in the context of the way it was spoken, it was always spoken of as an excuse.
Time and again references were made to that, it is "* * * a good excuse. It gives you something to talk about in case somebody asks you."
It seems to me the clear import of that is, you know, that is a great idea because, after all, somebody is going to come along and say this guy is in error, and what are you going to back him for. I can say, "Well, he has put all this money into my district, and that is what he is all about."
That is the way I read it. If you read it differently, I respect that point of view.
Mr. Brown. I assume part of the thrust of the evidence that is available to us, his plea in this case itself, the plea of entrapment which admits the other elements.
Mr. PRETTYMAN. Well, he didn't have to. The judge—an interesting part of this was to exchange with the judge where the judge said that he would not force him to admit the crime in this case.

He did not agree with that rule, which is present in many jurisdictions, that you have to admit the offense. But Mr. Binns wanted the instructions to the jury only to go to the issue of entrapment and, therefore, he purposely took that position at trial.

I would point out to you that if you view that videotape as meaning only that he was interested in his district, how do you account for the fact that he left the meeting with $50,000?

The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman finished?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, I am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. Binns, let me ask you this. Part of the purpose of the closing or concluding arguments here this afternoon has been for the purpose of both counsel addressing themselves to the question of sanction.

Under the rules of the House, the provisions are for the following sanctions: (a) expulsion from the House; (b) censure; (c) reprimand; (d) fine; (e) denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege or immunity of the Member, if under the Constitution the House may impose such denial or limitation; and (f) any other sanction determined by the committee to be appropriate.

My question to you would be this. Are you saying that none of these sanctions should apply in this case?

Mr. BINNS. I am saying that the sanction of expulsion should not apply, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you go further in that and say what sanction should apply?

Mr. BINNS. No, sir. I don't take it upon myself to advise this committee as to its inherent prerogatives, but I do say that the conduct of this Congressman in this case under the circumstances is not such that should amount to an expulsion, especially in view of the fact to do so would disenfranchise the voters of his congressional district because, if you will remember, he has been elected in spite of the indictment.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one further question. I think to some degree this ties into the question posed by Mr. Alexander.

I can understand that a court of law where the conviction has occurred has the right and privilege under the law of being able to set aside that conviction, if it finds that in fact the government has overreached, finds in fact the conduct of the government or other agents has been reprehensible or in any manner the due process rights of the accused have been violated.

This being a disciplinary body, one in which no conviction as such has taken place before this committee and, therefore, not having the powers of setting aside a conviction, how does a disciplinary body such as this ignore the actions of the Congressperson, notwithstanding the reprehensibility of all other circumstances?

Mr. BINNS. The conduct of this Congressperson as shown by the government are that sometime after the meeting that he went to, he accepted an unrelated $5,000 payment from his long-time friend and political associate, Louis Johanson, which he reported. That is the best of the government's agents.
Now, I have listened to all this persiflage about how you should view the tape, and you can’t come to any but one conclusion. There is a Congressman, Congressman Brown, who came to the opposite conclusion, evidently.

Once again, Mr. Prettyman has seen fit to cite a side bar conference having to do with a technical point of law wherein I said to Judge Pratt, “Judge, I don’t care what you consider for the purpose of this instruction request. Consider he did everything that the government charged him for, but I am still entitled to the request.”

That was a discussion that is taken completely out of context having to do only with the academic matter of what the proper entrapment instruction was, so that I did not for the purpose of his trial, and he most certainly did not admit to anything.

The case of the United States versus Valencia in the Second Circuit states that in that circuit, one does not have to admit anything in order to plead entrapment. So, the judgment was not giving any grandiose gesture.

We were discussing case law, and I said to him in that context for the purpose of it, I assume he knew, assume he took it voluntarily, but that was not the fact, and it was never admitted and, as a matter of fact, the judge did not charge that way.

The judge charged that that was not what was being done here.

Mr. Prettyman. May I respond very briefly just on the two points. On the disenfranchisement of the voters in his district, I would point out for the record that the primary election was held April 22, 1980. The indictment returned May 28, 1980. The general election was held November 4, 1980, and the jury verdict was January 9, 1981.

As a result, those who voted for him in the primary were not aware he was going to be indicted, and those who voted for him in the general election were not aware that he was going to be found guilty.

As to one of the statements just made that he, Congressman Lederer, accepted a voluntary contribution from his long-time friend, I challenge Mr. Binns to find in this record evidence of that. That is a gratuitous statement on his part which is not supported by this record, but which in fact is disputed by evidence in this record.

Mr. Binns. May I respond to that, sir?

The Chairman. Certainly.

Mr. Binns. I didn’t say he accepted a contribution. I said he accepted a payment, and not only is it part of the record, Mr. Prettyman has quoted it as part of a submission by Congressman Lederer to the Congress in his yearly accounting, and that is what the government introduced.

Mr. Prettyman. The problem with that is that he submitted that as a payment for a consultant’s fee from Mr. Johanson or his law firm when Mr. Cook testified that (a) he would have known about any such consultant’s fee, and (b) there never was one and, moreover, no evidence was offered by Congressman Lederer as to any consulting services that he ever did for that law firm or for Mr. Johanson.

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Bailey. Mr. Chairman, since we are finished with counsel, I assume that members have no other questions for counsel.

The Chairman. Just a minute.

Mr. Bailey. I would like to defer.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Spence.

Mr. Spence. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Binns. I would like for you to run that by me one more time.

Mr. Binns. Which part?

Mr. Spence. That part about taking that money, and what he took it for.

Mr. Binns. Did you view the tape?

Mr. Spence. Yes.

Mr. Binns. Did you see anywhere in the tape where there was a predicate to his accepting any money whatsoever?

Mr. Spence. Well, I saw the tape and I heard the discussion, and all of that, but I wanted you to give me your view of what he was doing and why he was accepting the money.

Mr. Binns. If you view the tape carefurlly and read the transcript, you will see that from the outset, the FBI agents secreted the money. They then entered into a completely innocuous conversation concerning (a) the issuance of green cards, and (b) the introduction of a private bill to which the Congressman immediately responded, "I do it all the time, and I will do it for your guy."

Then the talk drifted into discussions of investments into his congressional district and on repeated occasions, Anthony Amoroso tried to infuse into the conversation a discussion of money which the Congressman consistently said, "I am not interested, I am not interested in."

After they had spent 40 some minutes with him telling how they were going to come in, how they had to be trusted, how they were going to be the link between the sheik and Philadelphia, how their word had to be good with the sheik, how they couldn't go back and tell the sheik that they failed in their mission, without the mention of any money, without the mention of any bribe, Anthony Amoroso reached into his valise and gave a package to the Congressman.

I don't know how Congressmen receive (a) contributions, I don't know how Congressmen receive gifts because just prior to this, there was a recitation of how they had made a gift of a ceremonial knife to the Mayor of Camden.

I don't know how Congressmen receive whatever they receive during the course of their term as a Congressman, but I do know this, that you would have to be prescient to know that (a) there was money in the bag or that (b) it represented a bribe because nothing like that was ever discussed.

As a matter of fact, the FBI took pains to skirt the issues, never to say it, I guess under the apprehension that if she said it, he would have gotten up and walked out because if you will take judicial notice, if you will, of the instances where they did discuss with certain Congressmen money, the Congressman got up and left.

Mr. Spence. I was interested, because if he is going to be handed a package, and he does not know what is in it, it seems like he would say it was a birthday present or something?

Mr. Binns. I don't know if that is what Congressmen do.

Mr. Spence. I don't take things people hand me without asking what it is. It might jump out and hit me.

Mr. Binns. It might.
Mr. Prettyman. The one little problem with what Mr. Binns just said is that Mr. Lederer did not report that $5,000 as a gift or as a campaign contribution or any of the other things that he hypothesized about. He reported it as a consultant's fee, and that was struck down by the evidence.

Mr. Spence. That is all.

The Chairman. Any other members seeking recognition for the purpose of questions?

If not, the Chair then recognizes Mr. Bailey, who I understand has a statement.

The Chair recognizes you for whatever purpose.

Mr. Bailey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to, for the sake of the record, present what amounts to some additional views, and they go to a matter which very well might be collateral, but I think it is more fundamental than what we are discussing here, and they have to do with my personal attachment, at least to the Constitution and Rules of Procedure that are far more important than the guilt or innocence of any one individual.

As a point of departure, the questions asked by Congressman Alexander and asked by our chairman here, I think, would serve my purposes very well.

There is no political, ethical or moral excuse for the conduct as alleged. That is a very important word, alleged.

We have laid some dangerous precedents in this case, in my opinion, because of the history of our views of Rule 14. I will, Mr. Chairman, after these proceedings are over, at some time in the future endeavor to try and make public the proceedings that were involved on September 3 of last year, very competently addressed by Mr. Prettyman, incidentally, so that the public can view that process.

I very strongly feel that what we should have done was proceed under Rule 16. We would not have been tied, as I believe we are inextricably tied, to what may involve an intellectual hypocrisy in the utilization of certain court proceedings in this matter; i.e., what does or does not constitute a conviction, whether or not after the choice of a particular procedure we can then define what that word means and proceed because we do not have to suffer any fear of the interference of the courts in interpreting our procedures and/or the definitions that we give them.

I have a difficulty with that because in any conflict between Article I, Section 3 of our Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, what is meant by the Fifth Amendment and what the substantive and procedural due process meaning is attributed to the Fourteenth Amendment, what concept like selective incorporation of those amendments in court cases have brought to us and conflict between those respective sections of our Constitution could mean in this case.

What all those perhaps complicated, those technicalities boil down to is everything that the United States of America is about.

We could have taken Rule 16. We could have conducted our own hearings irrespective of what the courts did and then, I suppose, I would not have to be explaining to a press, incidentally, the vast majority of whom have been very responsive and very decent in their handling of my interpretation of these matters, although I have suf-
ferred some mistreatment in a few quarters, I suppose; but we are not talking about waiting until an appeal process is completed. That is not the issue.

We are really talking about whether or not a trial process, because of a decision made by a district judge, Federal district judge, is completed. That is really what we are talking about.

We are also talking about tying what should be our independence to what occurs in a Federal district court, or what occurs in the judicial system, and perhaps to some extent at least in terms of our argument and justifications for behavior, tied to those decisions.

That, in my opinion, is an error. It is the wrong way to proceed, well-intentioned because of the pressures of an election in the Myers case, but not necessary with these other cases at all, if indeed you can disregard politically the impact of maybe an extra month or perhaps two in the handling of one of these Abscam cases.

Such things may appear to be illusive, but they are really at the heart of what is involved in these cases because hypothetically we face the possibility, the possibility of these cases, these jury verdicts, no matter how, with all due respect, Mr. Prettyman, we may wish to, with all the energy that advocacy can muster, argue the definition of conviction or what a jury verdict means.

We face the possibility that those two things can be overturned or changed within the judicial system.

We are then going to have to argue and justify the type of hearing that we have held, the degree to which we have investigated these matters, and the justifications for the decisions that we have reached.

In summary, there is no excuse for conduct of this type if, as alleged, it can be investigated properly and shown, but that is precisely the issue going back to what our very capable and able chairman has said and referred to as this disciplinary proceeding.

No, we do not have to depend upon what happens in a Federal district court. We do not have to depend upon their definitions. I am sure if we did overly great violence to what due process means, at some point some court would find the leverage to step in.

We could wake up in a month or two with every single one of these convictions being thrown out and overturned, and I am not talking about two years in an appeal process, but under Rule 14, we have chosen to proceed on the basis of a court action where things happened a little differently than they normally have in the past.

A little thing called a due process hearing, that is no big thing, is it? Due process of law. It is not a big thing, Mr. Chairman.

It means very little. Due process of law, so that a little hearing pending—pending is a key word—pending due process hearing. Mr. Chairman, pending due process hearing, not on an appeal based upon a certified conviction, but a pending due process hearing that goes to the very issue of whether or not that jury verdict was reached, because all evidence was fairly considered and placed before those people, so that they could make a judgment based thereon.

I get accused of making technical arguments. I guess every little piece of slur and innuendo, although I have nothing to gain by it, can be useful in attacking those arguments, but they are at the heart of everything that we try to do.
I realize that the time for that point of view has perhaps passed and the route the Congressman crossed—and it is moot right now—but I hope that in the future—and I want to take this opportunity to at a public, open hearing clarify my point of view—that we will be able to correct these deficiencies, or at least, regardless of what opinion may be, at least remove the ambiguities which make it difficult for us to reach more credible judgments concerning the lives, the reputations of, although they may be politicians, American citizens.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for my opportunity to present these additional views and comments on the procedure under which we have conducted these cases.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. At this time the Chair would, in the absence of anything further from any members of the committee, thank both counsel for the committee and counsel for Mr. Lederer for your presentations you have made here this afternoon.

This officially concludes this hearing today, and the Chair desires to make this statement.

The matter before us this afternoon is one of grave importance, and one that is not to be treated lightly. Unavoidably, for various reasons, a number of the committee members have not been able to attend this hearing. The Chair personally feels that all members of the committee should participate in the decision of what sanction to recommend to the House.

Therefore, without objection, it is my instruction to the staff that a copy of today's transcript be made available to all members of the committee, those who are present and those absent, and state the committee next meets in executive session on Tuesday, April 28 at 10:00 to continue our consideration of this matter.

Is there objection?
There being no objection, this meeting is adjourned to Tuesday, April 28 at 10:00 a.m.

[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, April 28, 1981.]

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT

IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE RAYMOND F. LEDERER

Investigation Pursuant to House Resolution 67, Report of Special Counsel Upon Completion of Preliminary Inquiry.

On March 11, 1981, pursuant to House Resolution 67 (Ex. A hereto) and Rules 11(a) and 14. Rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (hereinafter "Committee Rules"), the Committee voted to commence a preliminary inquiry (Ex. C) into whether any of the offenses for which Representative Raymond F. Lederer was convicted on January 9, 1981, constitutes a violation over which the Committee has jurisdiction.

Attached hereto are copies of the documentary evidence received in the preliminary inquiry: a copy of those portions of the transcript of Representative Lederer's trial on charges of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 201
(c), 201(g), 371 and 1952 which counsel for Lederer and/or Special Counsel to the Committee deemed relevant to the Committee's inquiry,² copies of the relevant exhibits from the trial;² and a transcript of the Committee proceedings on March 17, 1981. Also attached is a letter from counsel for Congressman Lederer, dated March 3, 1981, which was treated by the Committee as a motion to defer the disciplinary hearing and which was denied by Committee vote on March 11, 1981. (The motion was renewed at the Committee's hearing on March 17, 1981, and was again denied.)

1. The Indictment


The first count of the indictment charged that from on or about July 26, 1979, until on or about November 1, 1979, Lederer, Erichetti, Johanson and Criden conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) by defrauding the United States as alleged in the second and third counts. It was charged that as part of the conspiracy, the co-conspirators corruptly agreed to seek and receive a sum of money for Lederer in return for his being influenced in his performance of official acts and his being influenced to commit fraud upon the United States. The Grand Jury further charged that as part of the conspiracy, Lederer agreed, inter alia, to assist foreign businessmen to enter and remain in the United States in return for the cash payment of $50,000 and that Lederer did receive that payment in return for his assurances that he would introduce private immigration bills to enable the foreign businessmen to remain in the United States. It was charged that as a further part of the conspiracy, Lederer shared in the proceeds of the $50,000 payment. Twelve overt acts were alleged to have occurred pursuant to this conspiracy.

The court charged the jury that in order to convict under this conspiracy count, the Government had to have established beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) a conspiracy as described in the indictment was willfully formed; (b) Lederer willfully became a member of the conspiracy; (c) at least one of the overt acts alleged in the indictment was committed by one of the conspirators while Lederer was a member of the conspiracy; (d) the overt act was knowingly done in fur-

² Relevancy was determined as follows: Special Counsel designated those portions of the trial transcript, and those trial exhibits, which he thought were relevant to the Committee's consideration. By letter dated March 11, 1981, the Congressman's counsel was given an opportunity to counter-designate, or to suggest deletions from, portions of the trial record. Special Counsel and the Congressman's counsel thereafter entered into a stipulation, a copy of which is attached hereto, which provides in part: "5. Those portions of the trial transcript, and the exhibits recited above, which have been designated by Special Counsel and cross-designated by counsel for Congressman Lederer shall be deemed the only portions of the trial record which will be considered relevant and material to the Committee's investigation. Provided, however, that by so stipulating neither Special Counsel nor counsel for Congressman Lederer concedes that all such portions are necessarily relevant and material to such investigation.

² See footnote 1, supra.
therance of the conspiracy; and (e) Lederer was not the victim of entrapment (see Tr. 1139-58).

Count Two of the indictment alleged that between on or about July 26, 1979, and on or about November 1, 1979, Lederer—aided and abetted by Errichetti, Johanson and Criden—corruptly sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive for himself and others a sum of money from FBI Special Agent Amoroso in return for Lederer being influenced in the performance of official acts as a Member of Congress—to wit, his decisions and actions in a matter involving the immigration, residency and citizenship of foreign nationals which might be brought before the House of Representatives. This was alleged to be a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 (c) and 2.  

The court charged the jury that in order to convict under this bribery count, the Government had to have established beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) on September 11, 1979, Lederer received a sum of money; (b) when he did so, he was a public official; (c) he received the money in return for being influenced in his performance of an official act; (d) he acted knowingly, willfully, and corruptly; and (e) he was not the victim of entrapment (see Tr. 1158-77).

The third count of the indictment charged that from on or about July 26, 1979, until on or about November 1, 1979, Lederer, again aided and abetted by Errichetti, Johanson and Criden, unlawfully and knowingly asked, demanded, exacted, solicited, sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive a sum of money for himself for and because of official acts to be performed by him as a Member of Congress in a matter involving the immigration, residency and citizenship of foreign nationals which might be brought before the House of Representatives and departments of the United States Government, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 (g) and 2.  

The court charged the jury that under this unlawful gratuity count, the Government must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) on September 11, 1979, Lederer received a sum of money for himself; (b) at the time he did so, he was a public official; (c) he received the money otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of his official duty; (d) he received the money for or because of an official act performed by him; (e) he so acted knowingly and willfully; and (f) he was not the victim of entrapment (see Tr. 1177-83).

The fourth and final count of the indictment alleged that on or about September 10 and 11, 1979, Lederer, Errichetti, Johanson and Criden unlawfully and knowingly traveled in interstate commerce from the District of Columbia and the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania into the Eastern District of New York and used the facilities of interstate commerce with the intent to promote and carry on unlawful activity—namely, bribery—and thereafter promoted and carried on said unlawful activity and distributed the proceeds from it. The Grand Jury alleged that part of that activity was Lederer’s receipt of a sum of money for himself and others in return for his being influenced in his performance of official acts as a Member of Con-
gress. It was charged that this constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 2.5

The court charged the jury that in order to convict under this count charging a violation of the Travel Act, the Government must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) on September 11, 1979, Lederer traveled in interstate commerce; (b) he did so with intent to promote or carry on an unlawful activity; (c) thereafter, he performed an act either to promote or carry on the unlawful activity or to distribute its proceeds; (d) he acted knowingly and willfully; and (e) he was not the victim of entrapment (see Tr. 1183-90).

On their own motions, and with the consent of the Congressman, the charges against Errichetti, Johanson and Criden were severed from the Lederer trial, so that the Congressman was the sole defendant tried before the jury (Tr. 34–35).

2. Summary of evidence at trial

In mid-1978, Melvin Weinberg, an FBI informant and "professional con man," began working on the so-called ABSCAM operation (Tr. 701, 720, 738).6 ABSCAM was a code name derived from that of a fictitious company named Abdul Enterprises, Ltd., with offices in Holbrook, New York (Tr. 392–393, 569, 704, 737). The company, operated by the FBI, was ostensibly in the business of investing money and was purportedly owned by two sheiks,7 who were in fact fictitious (Tr. 395). Anthony Amoroso was an FBI agent, assigned to the Miami area, who during 1979 acted in an undercover capacity using the name "Tony DeVito" (Tr. 392). He held himself out as the President of Abdul Enterprises, while Weinberg pretended to be a consultant or financial advisor to the company (Tr. 392–394, 704). In early 1979, the focus of the undercover investigation was upon gambling casinos in Atlantic City, but beginning in July of that year, the focus shifted to political corruption (Tr. 394–397, 518, 754).

On July 26, 1979, DeVito, Weinberg and several undercover FBI agents met on a yacht in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, with Errichetti, Criden, Johanson, and James Meiler, a businessman associated with Criden and Johanson (Tr. 395–397, 647–648, 704–705). At the meeting, Criden, Errichetti, Johanson and Meiler presented a legitimate proposal to DeVito and Weinberg, purportedly representing the wealthy Arab sheiks, for funding a casino in Atlantic City (Tr. 397–399, 811–813). During the latter part of the discussions, DeVito stated that his employers—the sheiks—were deeply concerned over what had appeared recently in the news media concerning President Somoza of Nicaragua. The news reports indicated that the United States was thinking about returning Somoza to his native country, and this concerned the sheiks because they anticipated coming to the United States at some future time to reside here as a result of political turmoil in their own country (Tr. 403–403A, 440, 585–586, 651, 739–741). Errichetti stated that there would be no problem, that he had connections with the right political figures, and that he "could handle it" (Tr. 403–403A). Errichetti indicated that the Arabs had enough money to take

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5 See footnote 3, supra, in regard to section 2.
6 "Tr." references are to the trial transcript, attached as an appendix hereto.
7 The sheiks are sometimes referred to in the record as "sheik," meaning one person, and sometimes as "sheiks," meaning two persons. These terms are used interchangeably throughout this Report.
care of all expenses, and DeVito directed him to go ahead and see what he could do "along those lines" (Tr. 403A). DeVito also asked Errichetti to find out "how much it would cost" (Tr. 404). According to Weinberg, Errichetti told him he had "congressmen to bring in that were willing to take bribes," and Weinberg encouraged him (Tr. 740-741).

One Ellis Cook testified for the Government (Tr. 641). Since December 1968, and during all of 1979, Cook had been a partner in the Philadelphia law firm in which Criden and Johanson were also partners (Tr. 643). Cook testified that after the July 26, 1979, meeting in Florida (which he did not attend), Criden told him that Errichetti had in turn told Criden that if Criden's law firm "knew any politicians there was money to be made in introducing the politicians to the sheiks" (Tr. 650; see also Tr. 648). It was understood, Cook testified, that the politicians would also receive money—Criden and Johanson both originally spoke of $100,000—in order to be "holden" to the sheiks (Tr. 650-652). In one of these conversations, Criden brought up the names of Congressmen Lederer and Michael J. Myers, reminded Johanson that the Councilman knew them, and asked, "Why don't you see if they will meet with the * * * sheik * * *" (Tr. 652-653). Johanson said he would talk to them (Tr. 653).

On July 29, 1979, three days after the meeting on the yacht in Florida, Weinberg in Florida called Errichetti in New Jersey at approximately 12:13 PM and recorded the call (Govt. Ex. 1, 1A, 1B: Tr. 706. 742-745). After discussing the name of one Congressman from Philadelphia, the following conversation took place (Govt. Ex. 1A at p. 1):

ERRICHEITI. Well, there's a couple of other ones, too.

WEINBERG. Who else?

ERRICHEITI. Well, there's * * * there's a possibility * * * I * * * chatted with him just briefly on it and I have to meet with, you know, personally.

WEINBERG. Who's that?

ERRICHEITI. Congressman Lederer.

WEINBERG. Congressman Lederer?

ERRICHEITI. Lederer * * * L-E-D-E-R * * * let's see L-E-D-R * * * Lederer.

WEINBERG. Alrighty.

ERRICHEITI. He's also from * * * ah * * * Pennsylvania.

WEINBERG. O.K.9

The next day, July 30, 1979, at approximately 4:25 PM, Weinberg in Florida again made a recorded call to Errichetti in New Jersey (Govt. Ex. 2, 2A and 2B; Tr. 706-708). Although Lederer's name

8 All of this otherwise-inadmissible hearsay testimony by Cook was allowed into evidence because the District Court ruled that for purposes of admissibility, a conspiracy had sufficiently been proven to exist between, among others, Lederer, Errichetti, Criden, Johanson and Cook (Tr. 882-859), thus making the testimony admissible under the "co-conspirator" exception to the hearsay rule. The ultimate fact question of whether a conspiracy existed, and if so, who belonged to it, was left to the jury to decide under the court's instructions (Tr. 1134-577). As noted hereafter, the jury found Lederer guilty on the conspiracy count (Tr. 1228).

9 There are numerous misspellings, awkward or incomprehensible phrases, etc., in the recorded conversations quoted throughout this Report. In each instance, the word or phrase is quoted precisely as it appeared in the exhibits introduced at trial and shown to the jury.
was not specifically mentioned, the conversation apparently concerned "the same subject" as the prior one (see Tr. 707). Errichetti asked when he should "schedule those people that we talked about," and Weinberg said he needed a week's time in order to raise the cash. They agreed that the meeting should take place in New York, and Weinberg expressed concern about walking around "with all that cash" (Govt. Ex. 2A at pp. 1-2).

The following day, July 31, 1979 at approximately 5:00 PM, Weinberg again telephoned from Florida to Errichetti in New Jersey and recorded the call (Govt. Ex. 3, 3A and 3B; Tr. 708-713). Errichetti said that he was getting "those guys lined up," and Weinberg said that everything was ready. After a mention of the "the two from Pennsylvania," Weinberg and Errichetti talked about "what price we using." Errichetti initially indicated "one"—meaning $100,000 (Tr. 709)—but there was an agreement that this price should be cut to "50"—meaning $50,000 (id.).

Errichetti said: "* * * I thought I was explaining to them what the deal was. How it was gonna be done. And they said fine." (Govt. Ex. 3A at pp. 1-2). Weinberg took this latter statement to mean that Errichetti was explaining to the Congressmen what "they have to do for us, for the money" (Tr. 711). Weinberg called Errichetti back one hour later (Govt. Ex. 4, 4A and 4B; Tr. 713-714). In this recorded conversation, Weinberg told Errichetti to obtain for him the names of "these Congressmen" and discussed the possibility of going from the proposed meeting to another meeting in Cherry Hill, New Jersey (Govt. Evt. 4A at pp. 1-2).

Five days later, on August 5, 1979, DeVito, Weinberg and Errichetti met at 4:00 PM in the Northwest Airlines lounge of the John F. Kennedy International Airport (Govt. Ex. 5, 5A, and 5B; Tr. 404-411, 715, 945-946). During the ensuing audio-recorded conversation, Errichetti referred to Congressman Myers and then added: "Congressman Lederer, he's from Philadelphia also." DeVito asked: "Leder?", and Errichetti replied "Lederer * * *" (Govt. Ex. 5A at p. 2).

The next day, August 6, 1979, at 9:30 AM in Room 1028 of the Hyatt House Hotel in Cherry Hill, DeVito met again with Weinberg and Errichetti (Govt. Ex. 6, 6A, and 6B; Tr. 411-413, 715, 945-946). That meeting was audio-taped. Weinberg, after referring to the fact that the money was arranged for Congressman Myers the next week, went on to say, "* * * and then on the rest we'll go one right after another." Errichetti rejoined: "They're there." (Govt. Ex. 6A at p. 1).

The following day, August 7, 1979, there was an audiorecorded meeting at 10:30 AM in the same room of the same hotel between DeVito, Weinberg, Errichetti and Criden (Govt. Ex. 7, 7A and 7B; Tr. 413-416, 715). After a discussion of other Congressmen, Criden said: "And you know there's a third guy." Errichetti added: "Lederer." Criden said "Heh," and Errichetti went on, "Lederer from Pennsylvania." (Govt. Ex. 7A at p. 1). A little further in the conversation, Criden stated: "Besides another guy by the name of Lederer. Congressman from Philadelphia, and the guy you know, first mentioned," To which Weinberg replied. "That will be in touch er, er if not next week, week after next we'll move on that—that's that's the easiest part. That that's no problem, that can be handled. We give you
the O.K. on that now, its no problem with that. * * *" (id. at p. 2). The group then discussed where the next meeting would take place (id. at pp. 2-3).

The next day, August 8, 1979, DeVito, Weinberg and Errichietti met in the same hotel room at 4:30 PM—a meeting which was audio-recorded (Govt. Ex. 8, 8A, 8B; Tr. 416-418, 439, 443-444, 715). After a discussion of Congressman Myers, Weinberg asked, "Alright, then who would be the next one after him," and Errichetti replied, "I guess it would be Lederer." Weinberg asked, "Lederer?", and Errichetti replied, "Congressman Lederer, O.K. * * *" (Govt. Ex. 8A at p. 2).

Almost a month later, on September 2 or 3, 1979, after DeVito had met with Congressman Myers on August 22 (Tr. 631), there was an audio-taped telephone conversation between Errichetti and Weinberg (Govt. Ex. 9, 9A and 9B; Tr. 715-716). During the course of that conversation, the following colloquy occurred (Govt. Ex. 9A at pp. 1-2):

**WEINBERG.** * * * Now, the other thing is did you find out who the next one is?

**ERRICHETTI.** Yes.

**WEINBERG.** Good.

**ERRICHETTI.** Congressman Lederer, as I told you before.

**WEINBERG.** Right.

**ERRICHETTI.** He's all set.

**WEINBERG.** All set?

**ERRICHETTI.** The only problem he's got is he said he has to make it early because he has to be in Washington for an important vote in the afternoon.

**WEINBERG.** All right.

**ERRICHETTI.** So, whatever time you could make it, as early as possible. He said, please, you know. So, I go, all right, when I get a hold of him, I'll set the thing up as far as time.

**WEINBERG.** All right.

**ERRICHETTI.** So you talk to Tony and get the time set up, like say 10 o'clock, 10:30, you know, whatever.

**WEINBERG.** Okay.

**ERRICHETTI.** On Tuesday. On the 11th.

**WEINBERG.** All right.

**ERRICHETTI.** It's all set.

**WEINBERG.** Okay.

Three days later, on September 6, 1979, a telephone conversation was recorded again between Errichetti and Weinberg (Govt. Ex. 10, 10A and 10B; Tr. 716-718). During this conversation, the following occurred (Govt. Ex. 10A at p. 1):

**ERRICHETTI.** Right. Everything's set for Tuesday morning [September 11] with the candidate.

**WEINBERG.** Right.

**ERRICHETTI.** All set ready to go.

**WEINBERG.** OK.

**ERRICHETTI.** 10 o'clock.

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10The transcript of the tape itself indicates that the meeting was held on September 3 (Govt. Ex. 9A at p. 1), whereas Weinberg's attention was directed to the date of September 2 (Tr. 715). The two references, however, would appear to have been to the same conversation.
According to Weinberg, the “candidate” referred to in this conversation was Congressman Lederer (Tr. 718).

Three days later, on September 9, 1979, a further audio-recorded conversation took place between Weinberg and Errichetti (Govt. Ex. 11, 11A and 11B; Tr. 718-719). Included in this conversation was the following (Govt. Ex. 11A at pp. 1-2):

Errichetti. Alright now listen, Number Two. The candidate. Congressman.
Weinberg. Yeh.
Errichetti. OK. He called like an hour or two ago and said please Mayor I can be in New York, at five, five thirty [thirty].
Weinberg. Alright.
Errichetti. Cause I have to fly up from Washington, I got to vote on a very important bill and I can’t get out of Washington before then. What I’ll do is I’ll go pick him up at LaGuardia.
Weinberg. Alright.
Errichetti. And, then meet you, you know, at the Hilton.
Weinberg. OK.
Errichetti. The regular thing.
Weinberg. Alright. **
Errichetti. What I intend to do is spend you know some time in, to spend Tuesday in New York, rather than coming back Monday night.
Weinberg. Right. ** Alright so we’ll make the meeting be around five-thirty.
Errichetti. Yes.
Weinberg. OK.
Errichetti. I’d say about, er, how longs it take to go from LaGuardia to er **?
Weinberg. From Kennedy to LaGuardia?
Errichetti. Well, well LaGuardia to Kennedy.
Weinberg. Er, about 15, 20 minutes. maybe in a little traffic may take a little longer.
Errichetti. OK. So I’ll, I’ll have to go to LaGuardia, pick him up, and bring him over to the Hilton.
Weinberg. Oh, OK.
Errichetti. That’s all I got to do. Alright?
Weinberg. Alright **.

Cook testified that sometime after the August 22 meeting with Congressman Myers but before September 11, Johanson told Cook in Criden’s presence that he, Johanson, had spoken with Lederer and set up a meeting with the sheik’s representatives (Tr. 656-675). According to Cook, Johanson had told Lederer that the Criden firm could make a fee for introducing Lederer to the sheik’s representatives and that Lederer would receive $50,000 for going to the meeting (Tr. 657). Lederer reportedly responded that “he would be glad to do it for Lou [Johanson] and all he wanted was a $5,000 contribution for the spring primary” (Tr. 657, 683, 686). Johanson indicated that he had told Lederer that Lederer would receive the money at the meeting, and
that just prior to the meeting Lederer would meet with Errichetti (Tr. 657-658)." Criden told Cook that Lederer would be flying up from Washington for the meeting; that Criden and Johanson would go to LaGuardia Airport from Philadelphia and meet Lederer; that they would take Lederer to meet Errichetti, who in turn would take him to the sheik's representatives; and that Criden and Johanson would not themselves attend the meeting (Tr. 658-660). Cook further testified that on September 11, 1979, Criden and Johanson did in fact leave their office in Philadelphia, and they told him they were driving to LaGuardia Airport to pick up Lederer for the meeting (Tr. 660).

On that day, Tuesday, September 11, 1979, there was a meeting at 5:18 PM in Room 717-718 of the Hilton Inn at the John F. Kennedy Airport in Queens, New York, between DeVito, Weinberg, Errichetti,12 Congressman Lederer, "Ernie Poulos"—an undercover FBI agent whose real name was Ernest Haridopolos (Tr. 424, 433, 825-826)—and another agent named Byrd (Tr. 433). The meeting was videotapped (Govt. Ex. 12A, 12B-1, 12B-2, 12C, 12D; Tr. 416, 418-428, 607, 745-761, 815-817, 820, 826-830). The videotape opened with a scene showing DeVito sitting alone, stating that he was anticipating a meeting with Errichetti and Lederer and that in front of him was $50,000 in five packages, each containing $10,000. He placed this money in a brown paper bag, wrapped the bag, and put it in a briefcase to his immediate right (Ex. 12A at p. 1; Tr. 826-827). After a brief break in the scene, Errichetti and Lederer entered the room together and began talking (Ex. 12A at pp. 1-2; Tr. 432-433, 827). Errichetti introduced Lederer to DeVito (Ex. 12A at p. 2).

Poulos, who had been in the room for the introductions, then left and joined another special agent in the bar downstairs (Tr. 424, 433, 827-828). Sitting nearby, at the entrance to the lounge area, were Criden, Johanson, and Errichetti's nephew (Tr. 828-829), who had driven Errichetti to the hotel the night before (Tr. 433). Poulos spoke to the nephew, who said that one of the men with him was "Howard," but he did not know the other one (Tr. 829).

Meantime, at the meeting upstairs, the following pertinent parts of the conversation were taking place (Ex. 12A at pp. 3-39; emphasis added throughout):

**WEINBERG.** * * * Ah, Angie must have explained to you.**

**LEDERER.** He told me some things you're interested in and ah we're on the same vibes. Ah I'm very interested in the port of Philadelphia and I understand you're applying (IA) I just heard, big words, interested in the port of Philadelphia.

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11 Cook was also told that Errichetti either would prepare, or had prepared, Lederer to speak with the sheik's representatives "about immigration matters, finance in the district * * *" but it is not clear whether Cook was told this before or after the September 11 meeting with Lederer (Tr. 657).

12 DeVito testified that by this time he had had contact with Errichetti from a dozen to two dozen times (Tr 446), that Errichetti had been present when payoffs had been made to others (Tr. 446, 462), and that Errichetti himself had been paid off on three occasions—one of them the evening before the September 11 meeting—in connection with licenses and gambling in Atlantic City (Tr. 624-626, 630-632).

13 DeVito assumed this meant that Errichetti had explained to Lederer that the sheik's representatives wanted Lederer "to introduce a bill and that he was going to be paid for it" (see Tr. 436-437). Weinberg confirmed that the explanation must have been that Lederer "was to receive the money to do us a favor" (Tr. 748). He based this on his 5 PM July 31, 1979, recorded conversation with Errichetti (Tr. 748-751).
DEVITO. Right.
LEDERER. You guys do any background on me?
ERRICHETTI. Yeah, tell them what you want.
DEVITO. Yeah, why don’t you, why don’t you.
LEDERER. Well, I’m a Member, of course, but I’m on the Ways and Means Committee. I’m on the Subcommittee on Trade. That’s the whole gammit. I’m the ranking member of the Miscellaneous Subcommittee which is race tracks, casinos, Vegas interests, anything else that falls under the cover of Ways and Means. Do you know anything about Ways and Means?
WEINBERG. Yeah.
LEDERER. Alright, it’s under the Constitution, the tax committee, and ah that’s my story. He tells me that your fella is, outside some considerations of family that he’s concerned about, humanitarian, I would do that anyway. I’m not gonna jerk you off there.
WEINBERG. Yeah.
LEDERER. But if he’s interested in the port of Philadelphia then I can do the fuckin’ ballpark. Cause that’s jobs and that’s what I’m about. My people are working.
DEVITO. OK, but ah * * *
ERRICHETTI. Mention the green cards to him.
LEDERER. Oh well, that’s what I said humanitarian.
WEINBERG. The main thing is what he’s scared of is what happened to Somoza and the Shah. They’re all scared that when they know there country is going to be overthrown eventually, there’s no. You know that as well as I do. The new ones gonna take over and all these sheiks are going to be thrown out, that you can sponsor him, whatever help he needs, that he can count on you.
LEDERER. I would do that and I do that all the time, for a lot of people. * * * If you wanna spell it out, tell me now what your fears are, (IA).
DEVITO. Well, okay. What I want to make sure of is now I, here again, I understand, that one of the ways, uh, we’re mainly interested in, we have one sheik and another sheik, okay we have two different fellows here, who want to insure that when the time comes, okay, they have to get out of where they are, okay.
LEDERER. They’re not going to be standing with their dick in their hands.
DEVITO. Yeah, exactly, alright. And when I talked with Angelo about this thing, at the particular time was the fact that they were talking about sending Somoza back. You know, the newspapers had it that this country was thinking of sending him back. Well, this scarces the shit out of anybody that’s * * * uh * * *
LEDERER. Did you read today’s Newsweek on Somoza by any chance?
DEVITO. No, I didn’t.
LEDERER. Well one of the agreements, yesterday I cut it out. They made a * * * Somoza wants to come back to the United
States. He's in South America somewhere and he got a commitment from our government that he wanted to go back. He is just afraid of the next administration.

**Weinberg.** Is that what is it?

**Lederer.** Now, what I don't understand and I'm going (IA) on you.

**Weinberg.** Yeah.

**Lederer.** Somoza went to school with Jack Murphy. You fellows from here, you gotta know who Jack Murphy is?

**DeVito.** I know the name.

**Lederer.** Well Jack Murphy is Chairman of the Merchant Marine Committee, he's a New Yorker, and I don't know where his loyalties are, he went to school and ah Murphy got up on the floor of Congress and talked for him. I just hope, you know, Murphy is not gonna go south on him.

**DeVito.** Well this is what, this is why we're here to insure that * * * uh. I understand that you can introduce legislation.

**Lederer.** Right, a bill. Private bill. Sure.

**DeVito.** Alright. well.

**Lederer.** I want to meet him though, I mean, what's your thoughts on that?

**Weinberg.** No, no problem.

**DeVito.** Well yeah, at some time, yeah.

**Lederer.** You don't want down the line somebody to say * * *

**Errichetti.** I'm gonna invite him down to the party.

**Weinberg.** Definitely.

**Errichetti.** Cocktail party, we'll have Ray there. You're gonna see him face to face and you can chat with him.

**Lederer.** See, you want to protect him too, you know. Why all at once does a Philadelphia Congressman want to help somebody to * * *

**DeVito.** Well that's what we came up with.

**Lederer.** That's doing your homework.

**DeVito.** Alright. What we came up with, okay, our position in this thing is we want to get him into the position where you're going to stand up for him, okay, if need be, the legislation to get him into the country, okay? I understand possibly we can work something out through contacts with the State Department and what not to bring him in to start with. Then introduce the legislation or I understand that you can introduce the legislation, you know, prior to him being brought, not prior to him coming from over there, but him all of a sudden appearing here, maybe on a visa of some sort.

**Lederer.** See that's gonna be experience here, that's why I'm talkin about doing your homework. Just get him here.

**DeVito.** Okay, well, what we came up with was the fact that, through the Mayor's ingenuity, is that if we can show that he's involved in some type of enterprise here and he's putting dollars into the country, this would sort of help you. In other words * * *
LEDERER. It helps him. That’s what’s more important.

DeVITO. Well, it help him but it gives you something * * * to protect yourself. In other words, if you’re going to stand up, somebody may say, well, why is this guy standing up for him? Well now you’ve got. * * * If we do that and we invest some money in Philadelphia and in that area, what that does is that it not only protects us, okay.

ERRICHETTI. It protects you.

DeVITO. It protects you.

LEDERER. Sure.

DeVITO. And that’s what * * *

WEINBERG. He just don’t want you to use our matches there.

[Laughter.]

DeVITO. And that’s what it does. It will, you know, protect you from, you know, from sort of standing out and saying why the hell is this guy so interested in ah helping these people.

LEDERER. You see I have a track record already on private bills. I’ve introduced a couple. I’m working on one right out of New York City now. Somebody I met down in Wildwood went back to Czechoslovakia. I got Charley Vanik working on it. So I have a track record. But it’s so much nicer if, you know, if a guy’s got a legitimate interest in the port of Philadelphia.

DeVITO. That helps you.

LEDERER. Oh certainly. Helps him. It helps, helps my argument to get him in here. You know, Christ, this guy’s like one of us. He’s one of the family. He’s got our people working. He took a chance on us. Let’s take a chance. I’ll get all Philadelphia Congressmen on, then I’ll get Pennsylvania Congressmen, you know, to support the bill.

WEINBERG. That’s no problem for him to do. We can take care of that. But the main thing is he wants sure that he’s buying friendship. 4

LEDERER. Sure. Let me ask you this. How many members of his family do you want to bring in?

WEINBERG. We don’t know. We’re only talking about him and the other one. That comes down the line later on.

DeVITO. Right now, what we’re concerned of, concerned with, is the two, the two sheiks, okay? And if this thing works right, there could be a lot of money in this thing, as I told Angelo before, in that we may wind up with, the way those guys talk, they may want to spread it around that, you know, this can be done, therefore, these other guys may come forward to get-themselves the same type of insurance and, hey, they’re looking to pay.

LEDERER. I’m not worried about that. He’s my friend. He wants to help this guy, that’s where I’m at, you know. If you

4 DeVito interpreted this as meaning that “We were buying Mr. Lederer to help us with our problem” (Tr. 451; see also Tr. 453).
want to do it down the road and it helps somebody I'll do it. First get a track record with me.\textsuperscript{15}
\begin{quote}
\textbf{WEINBERG.} Alright, you'll meet him at the cocktail party.
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textbf{LEDERER.} OK.
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textbf{ERRICHETTI.} I'll plan the party for next month, whatever it may be, at your place, when we have it down the shore.
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textbf{LEDERER.} Do it after November. What's your time table?
\textbf{DEVITO.} What, with bringing him in or the party?
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textbf{LEDERER.} When is he coming here?
\textbf{DEVITO.} Well he comes in and out all the time.
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textbf{LEDERER.} Oh okay.
\textbf{DEVITO.} Okay.
\textbf{WEINBERG.} That's no problem.
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textbf{DEVITO.} That's no problem. What we're doing here is ** ** we're sort of hedging a bet, is what we're doing. Ah somehow I don't seem to think that you understand, you know, exactly what the position is. What we're doing is we're hedging the bet. He may never have to ah ** **
\textbf{LEDERER.} Okay.
\textbf{DEVITO.} He may never have to leave there.
\textbf{WEINBERG.} He wants to ** **
\textbf{LEDERER.} Hopefully he won't. That's the best of all worlds.
\textbf{DEVITO.} Exactly.
\textbf{WEINBERG.} He wants to sleep good at night.
\textbf{LEDERER.} A little insurance.
\textbf{DEVITO.} That's all he's doing. He's, you know ** **
\textbf{LEDERER.} I understand.
\textbf{DEVITO.} It's like at the table, he's got blackjack and he wants to insure the bet and ** **
\textbf{LEDERER.} But Tony, I know I'm stopping you. If he wants to buy insurance you have to sit down and do the policy. Part of the policy is he gets to know me. Hopefully my main thing is the port of Philadelphia, he'll have some interests there. We've got Levino Shipping, you know. Imagine if you tried to send Levino back to Greece. The fuckin city of Philadelphia would go off the wall.
\textbf{WEINBERG.} I think what most of these Arabs are scared of is Carter and this goddamn human rights bullshit. That's what they're all scared of, that he comes out with his human rights, Somoza the thing and the Shah.
\textbf{LEDERER.} See I don't know nothing about his country to give you that and I can't talk for Carter. I just can't give you that. No, I can give you me though and I'll work ** **
\textbf{WEINBERG.} That's what we want.
\textbf{DEVITO.} That's what we're here for.
\textbf{LEDERER.} You got that when I, Mario \textsuperscript{16} got ** **
\textbf{WEINBERG.} That's what we want, you've got to say that you're with him that's what we're saying.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}
\textsuperscript{15} DeVito interpreted this statement to mean that "** ** we'll do this one and if anybody else, just establish your track record with the first payoff and then we'll go on to something else" (Tr. 454-455).
\textsuperscript{16} DeVito thought Lederer was referring to Errichetti (Tr. 458).
\textsuperscript{17} DeVito interpreted this to mean that "the Congressman is with the Arab" (Tr. 459), that "the Congressman has got to say that he's with the Arab and he's going to introduce the private bill and help him" (Tr. 460).
LEDERER. If I'm going to be the captain of a football team, I'm gonna have to, you know, call some plays.

WEINBERG. No, no you got a free hand, you'll meet him.

DEVITO. That's why we want to, like I said, that's why when we talk to Angelo, Angelo says, hey, one of the best ways to do it is if we get this guy to invest money alright. He says, we're going to, you know, we're going to put money in the right people's hands, you know, to insure things but what we're going to do also is, he's always looking to develop areas, he's always looking to invest his money because on top of everything else if he leaves there he's go to have his money spread out so that he's got something.

WEINBERG. He's got to get it out of the country.18

DEVITO. If he leaves there with all the money there, hey, let's face it, nobody's going to want to help him, so what he's doing is he's investing his money around the world, both of them are, and Angelo's suggestion was something that we were looking for any saying, hey, I've go this guy, meaning you, who will do it for him, okay, but what the key is, is, if we can even invest money in Philadelphia in the Congressman's area where it gives him a lot of protection on his own position say, "This is why I'm standing up for the guy, not only you know not because ***".19

LEDERER. Well that helps, that helps.

DEVITO. Well it helps an awful lot, I mean ***

LEDERER. Yeah. But the thing is, you know, like so much with this guy. If he's got that kind of money and I think if certain things are happening in Philly, he'll make bucks, you know he don't just put it there he might have enough, but the name of the game is to make more of it I think.

WEINBERG. Well we're moving down near there now, we're going to take an apartment down there to work out of.

LEDERER. But you know and I, I—this might not be things you want to hear, but do you guys, businessmen, did you know to make sure that the guy ***

DEVITO. Oh yeah.

WEINBERG. That's our job. Well that's my job and Tony's job.

DEVITO. That's what we're getting paid for.

LEDERER. Alright then we're not boy scouts.

DEVITO. No.

LEDERER. OK.

DEVITO. That's what we're getting paid for.

WEINBERG. That we know, and we'll make ***.

LEDERER. See. I'm high on the city, alright, and ah okay I (TA).

WEINBERG. We'll make that move but if you ever worked for Arabs they're very slow in movin. They want to be very sure

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18 DeVito said he meant: that the sheik would have to get his money "out of the country so that when he left the country he would have money for himself" (Tr. 470).

19 This was interpreted by Weinberg to mean: "*, *, *, in case people ask why he'd bring up a Bill to bring the Arabs in, well, he can say, he's investing money in Philadelphia" (Tr. 757.)
and we don’t like to lie to them. We tell them that we’re coming into a town and we got this, we got that, he takes our word, Angie could tell you.

Errichetti. Sure.

Weinberg. And then we make the move.

Lederer. OK.

Weinberg. He’s not the type of guy you can rush, “Look we want to go into Philly.”

Lederer. Well, I like the idea that if you have the political climate, you have a man who’s got a lot of bucks I guess, who can conceive to become an American citizen. You know because the political climate says, Gees, the Arabs are buying the farms, the Arabs are buying this, and they’ll take it all back, they’re not here, the guy gonna leave the paper here. He’s going to stay here to enjoy it.

Weinberg. That’s the whole idea. They realize the end is coming soon. They want to keep their money in this country.

DeVito. That’s why he’s willing to pay for, you know, for what he gets. He, you know, he figures with people like you on his side, okay, introduce legislation, from there stand up for him, you know, in case it comes to you know I’m trying to envision like the worst situation, you know.

Lederer. I want you to give me the worst. I’ll tell you how far I can get.

DeVito. Well, that’s what I’m saying. Like it’s, it’s not like a Somozo, okay, where this guy has been involved in, they’re saying atrocities and different things like that. I mean this is what you see in the newspapers, before the public.

Errichetti. He’s a clean businessman.

DeVito. This guy is not like that but what he wants us to do is to insure that, you know, if like these Arab students that revolt because they don’t like what’s going on. What he wants to do is to insure that you’re going to stand up for him.

Lederer. He’s got it.

DeVito. And then, you know.

Lederer. Sure. We just attracted a French bakery to Philly. Are you familiar with that bakery?

Errichetti. Sure.

Lederer. The hottest number in American legislation today, next to oil, is sugar and I ripped that there thing right through the Congress, to give them every break in the world.

Weinberg. Let me tell ya.

Lederer. Put my people to work I’ll show you what I can do.

Weinberg. The worst thing that they can say about them is, they stole the money out of the country.

Lederer. Was it American money?

Errichetti. Like everybody’s doing.

Weinberg. Alright. That’s the worst thing you can say about them. As far as the people, they all get taken care of over there. I don’t think the guy’s into anything that killed

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20 DeVito testified that he was here referring to bribe money (Tr. 482).
anyone. I never heard anything bad about him. The only thing I can tell you he’s doing wrong is taking the people’s money which is his money, (IA) and stealing it out of the country. And that’s the worst they can say about him.

LEDERER. Pop with me some more things.

DEVITO. Well, that’s what we’re here, you know. I’m explaining to you what his position is, okay, and what I’d like you to tell me is how you could work around, you know, just getting him to stay, you know, to stay here. What do we do, bring him in here first?

LEDERER. Bring him in on a visa right, sooner or later he’s gonna invest, gonna have through whoever his accountants, and his underlings, business people doing things. If he can’t go through the regular naturalization right, when the time comes, then I’ll introduce a private bill to keep him in the country. Well it’ll take time, it’s not gonna happen overnight, there’s a law on that. We’ll get him to be a naturalized citizen. Now with that his family will come in, his immediate family, but I’m a little scared he wants his cousins, nieces.

WEINBERG. No, no. He wants that, that’s extra.21

LEDERER. I don’t know if I can do that, I don’t know if I can do that.

ERRICCHETTI. Him he can do.

LEDERER. Him we can do, we’ll get his wife.**

DEVITO. Alright, we’re not worried about relatives at this point. Ange has brought up another way of getting relatives in by, you know, putting them on the rolls.**

ERRICCHETTI. Jobs.

DEVITO. ** of different places. But what we’re mainly concerned about is him. OK this goes for both of these fellows when I say him, okay, him, his immediate family, okay to come in. So what you’re telling me then is he comes in like on a visa.

LEDERER. Right.

DEVITO. A visa has so many days for expiration, okay.

LEDERER. Yeah, we get an extension.

DEVITO. Okay but within that time frame though.

LEDERER. Then he applies for American citizenship at the right time.

DEVITO. Yeah but what I’m saying that within that time frame then you would introduce some kind of legislation to keep him in here.

LEDERER. Yeah. That’s an extension.

DEVITO. Okay. now there’s ** Do you conceive of there being any kind of opposition to something like this?

LEDERER. Well not with what you guys are telling me, you know, at this time. You know, if he’s a guy, see I don’t know enough about him, if he’s a guy, who lost his sheik-

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21 DeVito interpreted this to be a recognition by Weinberg that if additional members of the sheik’s family were to be brought in, this would involve a payment “far beyond” the figure being offered Lederer (Tr. 491).

22 DeVito testified that he had previously discussed this matter with Errichetti, but not in connection with the Lederer matter (Tr. 492).
dom, you know, fiefdom, he’s been doing business in this country, has established, ah, a history in the American business community, you know, then, that’s less of a problem. Now if he’s lining people up against the wall, I’m not gonna jerk you off. you know, that’s converse for him.

DEViTO. Well, no.

LERDERER. No, he’s not.

DEViTO. You telling me there’s not. Now I’m telling you again to reinforce it. But if he’s just a normal businessman he is no different than my grandfather who came here and opened up a grocery store, you know. Those things are given.

DEViTO. Well, I grant you that but there’s going to have to be, I would imagine, some kind of opposition to letting a guy like this into the country anyway. I mean just because of the fact that, you know, they’re liable to, they’re gonna come up with, he’s a big thief, he’s depleted his country, he’s stealing everybody blind, and how come the Americans are taking him. That’s why we’re coming to you, is to make sure he gets in.

LERDERER. Okay, how, how can, we do that? Get into some of the mechanics, right?

DEViTO. Alright, that’s what I want you to tell me. How we do it.

LERDERER. Well some of the mechanics. Like I’ll introduce a private bill which will go over to the subcommittee on judiciary. The woman over there who’s the chairman of it is named Liz Holtzman, I don’t know her that well. Alright, but we got like Austin Murphy from Pennsylvania, he’s one of my asshole buddies. I say Austin I got a private bill I want to put through the subcommittee, get it out to the full committee, talk to him he’s a friend of yours Pete Rodino. Now I get it out of the subcommittee and then Mario does his trick with Rodino. We pass the legislation. Now there are other mechanics and we do this from time to time. I don’t necessarily take an active role in it, never had reason to, you know, outside of giving it over to my staff and say look here’s my private bill. I want somebody to get an extension on a visa ah want somebody you know, paper work, to become a naturalized citizen. I’ve never got into, I’ll have to read these things. But the political clout that all Congressmen have is the thing, you know, to introduce some private bill for Mario Archetti to have his visa extended, you know, ah, he’s a political undesirable, ah political desirable, things like that. But I, I can’t dot the I’s for you right now, if you want I’ll dot them for you later. I’ll do it soon.

DEViTO. Okay.

LERDERER. I don’t want to fuckin bargain with you but it’s very important to me that Philadelphia’s gonna, I don’t care if he goes into scrap metal or what but I want him to do something in my city.

\footnote{Here again, DeVito assumed Lederer was referring to Errichetti (Tr. 499).}
WINBERG. Well once we can go back and tell him that you're on his side.

LEDERER. No. You got that when I walked in the door.

ERRICHETTI. That's all.

DEVITO. OK. That, backing up and I'm getting repetitive in this but * * * going back to the fact that, that, by us having him invest in Philadelphia gives you a lot more credibility in backing this guy and protecting yourself in the fact that somebody may not, you know, come down the line and say, well, why would this guy back him? You know, there's got to be a reason he's not doing anything for them. And when he come up with the fact that if we put money into Philadelphia, into some kind of business enterprise.

ERRICHETTI. Ray Lederer, Ray gets the fuck up and screams bloody murder. This is my constituent I'm fuckin putting a bill in and that's the case.

LEDERER. Well. The thing is I guess Tony you just don't know enough about me. These hands are clean. Now nobody challenges my integrity, you know. I can do that. The reason that I suggest, I don't care if he goes to California, invests in California, I don't give a fuck Miami buys a hotel.

DEVITO. Yeah.

LEDERER. For his sake, not for mine, I'm not going to be deported, you know. Nothing's going to happen to me but it's a valuable tool when I go to bat for him. If anybody wants to challenge my perogatives as a United States Congressman, that's on them, that's out on the street, let them do what they want, you know. I'm clean I'm trying to tell you that. They can't, there's no reason for anybody to challenge me, you know.

ERRICHETTI. He puts the bill in and that's it.

LEDERER. The thing is. He's his attorney, whoever his attorney is, comes to me and says, Congressman, and this happens all the time with Congressmen. An attorney will come and say I want to bring somebody from Italy, I want to bring somebody from Ireland, they're clients of mine. The family has come to me. They want me to get somebody into the country and keep him here. He can't do it as an attorney. You need a private bill from the Congressman. Well I do it. Well, what I'm trying to overemphasize is when he goes before the naturalization board or whatever, the hell it is, you know immigration board. "Why Sheik, do you want to be an American citizen?" "Well in the city of Philadelphia I have five million dollars invested and I have people working for me you know. I want to watch it. I like the country", the whole, the gamit you know. That's, that's the strength he gets. For instance if he's going to put his whole operation in Washington County, Pennsylvania. alright. I'd still introduce the bill for him. Right.

DEVITO. Right.

LEDERER. But it would be better to go to A. J. Murphy who is a Congressman from western Pennsylvania. Do you know
what I mean? Because that's where the man's strength is. Not the Congressman, but that's where the client's strength is, that's where his investments are. But I won't be too worried about clearing me. I'm serious, you know.

DEVITO. Okay.

LEDERER. He. Him. He's the guy from Philadelphia.

DEVITO. Well I know.

LEDERER. Put him into some charity, you know.

DEVITO. That's what Angelo suggested and that's why, like I say. He's willing to put up big money to you, alright, you know, to put him in this position. There's going to be others that I'm sure are going to want to do the same thing. That's something down the line. I'm not really worried about them. I work for ** **

LEDERER. You wanna help, yeah, right’

DEVITO. I work for the two guys but what I'm trying to say ** **

LEDERER. You want to help the other guy okay but you don't want to start bouncing the ball. I'm not gonna jerk you off.

DEVITO. No no ** **

LEDERER. You didn't want me to do that, did you?

DEVITO. What I'm mainly interested in is these two guys, okay, and handling these two guys in the best way we can and that's why we went to Angelo because we've known him for a long time. We've done you know, business together with him and he say that he's very friendly with you, that you'll be able to introduce legislation to get these guys in.

ERRICHETTI. I say, I say,

LEDERER. We can do that.

ERRICHETTI. He's a stand-up guy. He's got balls like Ange Errichetti's.

LEDERER. Well you want to tell the truth too Tony. Now when you get down to the 6th or 7th guy. I'm gonna say "hey fellas."

WEINBERG. No, no.

LEDERER. I want you to know that now.

DEVITO. Forget about the 6th or 7th guy.

LEDERER. You're worried about these two guys.

DEVITO. I'm just worried about these two guys.

LEDERER. That all I'm getting at.

DEVITO. I'm just telling you something that might be, you know, something down the line. [Phone rings.]

ERRICHETTI. Hear what he said. Hear what he said. He's giving you a commitment on those two guys. A commitment. [Phone rings again. MW answers it.] 24


24 The caller was identified at trial as Alex Feinberg, with whom DeVito was to meet later in the evening (Tr. 520).
LEDERER. Well, what I'm trying to say is, down the line. You might want me to introduce a third guy, I might go for it, then a fourth guy, I might have to say (IA) * * *

ERRICHE. [Laughter.]

DEVITO. Maybe by that time, listen to me. Maybe by that time you know somebody else in another state that we can * * *

LEDERER. Right.

DEVITO. In other words we can do.

LEDERER. And maybe I don't, though, Tony.

WEINBERG. We're only interested * * *

DEVITO. I'm not asking * * * You've gotta commit yourself in that respect too.

WEINBERG. We only got two that we worried about.

LEDERER. I'm telling you I'm going to the wall for these two guys for this man.

DEVITO. I'm only asking you to commit yourself is what I'm saying.

LEDERER. Yeah.25

DEVITO. To me, I'm just throwing this out, as far as, if this comes about, which may never come about, maybe they'll be somebody, a Representative from another state that we can do a similar thing, you know, and have one of these other guys invest money there and have those people come forward.

LEDERER. Okay, I understand that.

WEINBERG. But right now we're just worried about these two, they're the ones we work for."

DEVITO. We're just worried about these two.

LEDERER. What kind of shape are they in now about coming?

WEINBERG. No problem.

DEVITO. There's no problem. Absolutely no problem.

WEINBERG. No problem whatsoever. But they know that the end * * *

LEDERER. Because I'm giving a commitment you know and I want to know a timetable.

WEINBERG. No, no * * * is the end. We don't know. The end may come five years, ten years, it may never come. But they are scared.

LEDERER. I'm prepared if it's this next week. That's what I am saying.

WEINBERG. No.

DEVITO. No. You see what happens with these guys. Uh. I tell you, if I had probably the kind of money that they have and the political situation in the way, in other countries the way it is. Uh, these things start all of a sudden and uh. two, three, four, five months, six months, then all of a sudden, you know, the guy's, he's in the jackpot and he's, you know, he's got to go someplace. So what he's doing is he's

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25 DeVito testified that at least by this point he was satisfied that Lederer was aware of what he was being offered and had committed himself to the bribe. DeVito, however, wanted to continue the conversation until the money was paid (Tr. 521-522; see also Tr. 570, 593, 609).
being smart, he's taking his money, you know, and he's spreading it around to the right people so that when the time comes, if the time comes, that they have to move for him, then they're gonna be there.

LEDERER. Okay let me ask you this. What's he got in investments here now?

WEINBERG. Oh quite a bit.

LEDERER. What kind?

WEINBERG. Well we're gonna be in uh. He's got a lot of loans out right now. Quite a few loans, we just bought a big corporation down in Georgia. It's a loan, a hundred million dollar loan we put in. Uh he owns ***

ERRICHETTI. (IA) [Laughter.]

LEDERER. Yeah.

ERRICHETTI. That's the kind of big we're talking about.

WEINBERG. He owns quite a bit of real estate.

ERRICHETTI. I could vouch for that too by the way.

LEDERER. Alright (IA).

WEINBERG. He owns quite a few hotels and most of it so far we've been putting it out as mortgages.

LEDERER. Okay.

WEINBERG. Alright.

LEDERER. Does he own any shipping or anything?

WEINBERG. He's in shipping. He has a shipping company now over in England.

DEVITO. But we're not into, it's not into this country.

WEINBERG. But we are gonna. We're working on that now.

ERRICHETTI. That's why we are talking about the port of Philadelphia.²⁶ ** *

LEDERER. Which one of you guys was CIA?

DEVITO. Me.

LEDERER. You in Vietnam?

DEVITO. Huh.

LEDERER. You in Vietnam?

DEVITO. No.

LEDERER. You ever run across a guy named Connie McAnn?

DEVITO. Connie McAnn?

LEDERER. About forty?

DEVITO. No.

LEDERER. Tight friend of mine. Talked to Mario on the way over²⁷ and he wanted to check me out, just chance you might have known him and you could check me out.

DEVITO. Okay.

WEINBERG. We depend upon this ** *

LEDERER. He'll tell you what kind of (IA) I have.

WEINBERG. Congressman we depend on this man here.

DEVITO. I'll tell you what. You just said it. We depend on Angelo to ** *

²⁶ DeVito testified that the purpose of the preceding line of conversation was to show Lederer that the sheik was able and prepared to invest money in Philadelphia as a way of protecting Lederer if the Congressman was challenged as to why he was introducing a bill on the sheik's behalf (Tr. 562-656).

²⁷ DeVito took this as an indication that Lederer and Errichetti had had a conversation prior to the beginning of this meeting (Tr. 633-634).
Errichetti. To bring the right people.
Devito. To bring the right people to us, okay.
Errichetti. Period.
Lederer. I don't think what you're asking is impossible because if it was I'd walk through the door. It's a big ball-game, alright, I don't think you're Boy Scouts. I'm not a Boy Scout.
Devito. No, I know we're not Boy Scouts, we're talking money investing.
Lederer. But I don't wanta go down the road, you know
Devito. Yeah.
Lederer. Things I can't deliver. I believe I can deliver this, how important it is to you, alright.
Weinberg. That's good enough.
Devito. Well. Let me, let me.
Lederer. No, go ahead I want you to be satisfied (IA).
Devito. Yeah, yeah. I mean you say you believe you can deliver.
Errichetti. [Laughter] (IA) Jesus Christ.
Lederer. I know. Any talents I have they're yours. I won't slack off."
Devito. All right.
Lederer. But I can't tell you that the umpteenth person, that's one of the things I wanna set out right away.
Weinberg. No, no there is no umpteenth person.
Lederer. That's where I'm hedging. I want that clear.
Devito. I'm just hedging. I'm just taking. All I'm doing is I'm taking you as being on our team. In other words you're being loyal to us.
Lederer. It's gonna be a two way street.
Devito. Yeah.
Weinberg. Congressman.
Devito. Hey. That's why we're gonna come into Philadelphia.28
Lederer. Call me Ray.
Errichetti. [Laughter.]
Weinberg. Ray, Ray, when it comes, if there's a third or fourth or fifth person, even a third, we'll come to you, and tell ya it's a third, and we'll make our deal then.
Lederer. Okay.
Weinberg. We're just talkin' about two people, no third.
Lederer. Okay.
Weinberg. Alright, so that you understand that.
Devito. We don't wanta push. Like I say ***
Weinberg. We're not gonna put the whole team on this here, okay.
Devito. The team protects itself. We don't want to put any burden on your back that's***
Lederer. I'm wanna deliver on this one, deliver it clean.

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28 DeVito testified that he wanted it clear to Lederer in the foregoing conversation that the Congressman would have to commit himself to, and be loyal to, the sheik before the sheik would invest money in Lederer's district (Tr. 576–578).
(IA) Can I tell you I can do it (IA). I know I’ll bust em. Ah, I’m sure you’ll be satisfied.

DeVito. That’s a guarantee for me.
Errichetti. [Laughter.]
DeVito. That’s a guarantee for me.
Lederer. Ah you give me just these tools that I talked about. What I would like to do, with the guy, even if he never comes to Philadelphia, at the right time. If you guys, you’re hooking your star to him, right, is what you’re doing.

DeVito. Oh yeah.
Lederer. We’ll get him around, he gets into business, we’ll throw him in front of a couple, you guys do it for tax purposes anyway, let him pop for Catholic Charities here. I don’t suppose he would want to do the United Jewish Appeal. So we’ll stay away from that. You might want him to do the United Fund or something like that.

Weinberg. Not the UJA [laughter].
Lederer. Well I understand that, that’s his thing, you know. I’m not gonna tell the guy where he’s got to put his money but they’re the kind of things I can see doing you know. If I’m going to be the quarterback, at that end of it.

DeVito. Right.
Lederer. I’m telling you those are the things you’re going to have to do, you’re gonna have to get him on the society page. Whether it’s in the Camden Carrier or the Philadelphia Inquirer.

DeVito. I realize that probably the pressure might come from just such groups as the Jewish people, to not let this guy in.
Errichetti. Let the Catholics fight for him.
DeVito. And what not.
Errichetti. Let the Catholics fight for him.
Weinberg. He would probably even give a donation to the Jewish people.
Lederer. There are, Tony, there are things that make the job a lot easier. If you don’t want to do them, make the job tougher, we’ll still try to do the job, but there, and if he’s gonna start putting investments in, you guys know what income taxes are in this country. He’s not giving anything he’s just trading it off somewhere else. He gives to the government or he gives it as goodwill that’s what he does.

DeVito. Sure I realize that and ah * * *
Lederer. Well, I want him to realize it.
Weinberg. No, he, that’s what I handle for him.
DeVito. That’s the position he takes and that’s why he’s spreading money around like he does, ah like even now to insure that people are going to be with him.
Lederer. Well, that scares me too, well not scares me, I’m concerned, I have nothing to be scared of. You know, you don’t want to overdo spreading money.
DeVito. We’re not, we’re not * * *
Lederer. Like I'm a one time, oncer, you know, you can
go to sleep on that, but you don't wanna have too many hands
in the fire, too many hands in the soup.29
DeVito. No, no, we're not, we're not going to. We're * * *
Errichetti. We understand.
Weinberg. We understand that.
Lederer. Maybe you've got this all worked out and I'm
just popping. You want to pop your concerns. You want me
to pop mine.
DeVito. Hey, I'll you what. Anybody, that thinks he
knows everything is a guy I don't want to be around, because
that's the guy that gets you in trouble, that's the guy who
says he knows everything. And when you discuss things with
people and you get other input into ideas, and what should be
done and what shouldn't be done. That's where you * * *
Errichetti. Don't slough off that Ways and Means Com-
mittee.
DeVito. Yeah.
Errichetti. That's the most valuable fuckin' committee in
the whole Congress.
Lederer. If you know anything about it.
Weinberg. That the most important committee in Congress.
Errichetti. That's the most important committee. Ull-
man is the Chairman. This guy and Ullman are like two
(IA).
DeVito. I'm not * * *
Lederer. I want you to * * *
DeVito. I don't, I don't.
Lederer. I want you to be satisfied.
DeVito. Okay, I think I am satisfied in that you're gonna,
you're gonna get this guy in the country, that's all, that's
where I'm concerned.
Errichetti. Two guys.
DeVito. Well, two guys, I say, when I say one I mean
the two.
Errichetti. He wants to hear two, wants to hear two,
that's what he wants to hear.
DeVito. Okay when I say one I mean both.
Errichetti. He committed to two guys.
Weinberg. That's all, as long as he handles the two guys.
Lederer. And he'll at least give Mario a running account
of how things are coming.
Weinberg. Oh yeah * * *
Lederer. But he does have a ton of dough invested in this
country though?
DeVito. Oh yeah, yeah.
Weinberg. I say he has * * *
DeVito. And he's invested.
Errichetti. I know one of them 100 million dollars. I
know one of them (IA).

29 DeVito said he interpreted the preceding statements by Lederer to mean that "he is
scared that if we go too far with this thing we will have too many people involved, and that
creates concern" (Tr. 583).
LEDERER. I don't know the details. Just as long as, that gives us (IA).
WEINBERG. He has quite a bit * * *
LEDERER. Here's a guy who took a chance on America. America can't take a chance on him, okay. But that's to his benefit not mine, it makes my job easier.
DEVITO. Yeah. Well that's what I say he's investing and wisely so in other countries so that he can go anywhere. You know he doesn't want to put everything into, as ah, all the eggs in one basket.
LEDERER. I understand.
WEINBERG. Well let me put it this way. An eight hundred million dollar deal wouldn't bother him one bit.
LEDERER. Jesus Christ, that's staggering.
ERRICCHETTI. Staggering isn't it, my fuckin' head * * *
LEDERER. He could buy his own fuckin country.
WEINBERG. Huh.
LEDERER. He could buy his own country.
WEINBERG. That's what they're trying to do. They tried to buy England.
ERRICCHETTI. [Laughter.]
WEINBERG. I think they own half. They've got in already.
LEDERER. That's a ten, if you have anything else.
DEVITO. No, I just. Like I said, my only concern is, is being here and getting loyalty toward him. Them. Okay and you * * *
LEDERER. I'm loyal to this guy.
DEVITO. Well. That means you're loyal to us and him. That's uh * * * what you know what I'm getting at.
LEDERER. But I think it's important, (IA).
DEVITO. No, no.
LEDERER. I, I just think it is important that I meet the guy.
DEVITO. Oh, yeah, eventually we'll get, you know, we'll get it all together.
LEDERER. Because, let's not make it, you know, I'm asking you to back it up a little. You said a month, back it up. But I don't wanna say hey this June or something like that.
ERRICCHETTI. November.
DEVITO. No, we'll work it out within the near future.
ERRICCHETTI. I want Ray and his wife there and I want some other people, you know, from Philly.
WEINBERG. We'll handle that. We threw him a party down on the yacht, presented him with a ceremonial knife.\footnote{DEVITO explained that this was a reference to presenting Mayor Errichetti with a gift of a ceremonial knife (Tr. 597-598). It was an effort to show that the sheik did exist and that Errichetti had met him (Tr. 598).}
LEDERER. You'll never get me there.
WEINBERG. Huh?
LEDERER. You guys (IA), you'll never get me down there.
WEINBERG. What Florida?
LEDERER. Yeah.
WEINBERG. Don't like it?
Lederer. Ah, I like it, it's just not my bag, I go down the shore.

Errichetti. I get him down Longport.

Lederer. I'll go to Longport on the way to Wildwood or something like that.

Weinberg. It's too cold in the winter time.

Lederer. Well I'm a city kid, I'm a hot dogger.

DeVito. Well. Like. Somebody said that we both know, how is the, what was the expression he used, uh, he says money talks and bullshit walks.¹¹

Lederer. And bullshit walks. Ozzie Myers' favorite saying.²²

DeVito. What's that?

Lederer. Another Congressman from Philly. He's a friend of mine. He says money talks and bullshit walks.

Errichetti. That's right, that him.²²

Weinberg. Alright, I guess that's it then.

DeVito. Well let me * * *

Errichetti. Okay. Now if you're going to go back, I'll see you, Ray. I'll chat with you next week or a couple of weeks or whatever it may be.

Lederer. How about you two. Do you ever get to Washington?

DeVito. Yes. We stop in there all the time.

Lederer. Someday we'll have lunch.

Weinberg. We definitely will.

Errichetti. Go to lunch you three * * *

DeVito. Have you got a card, or something or is there way I can get a hold of you in Washington?

Lederer. Sure.

Weinberg. We'll give you our card.

Lederer. Do you have cards?

DeVito. Yeah.

Errichetti. I got one in my pocket if you want to give him yours. Tony! Do you want me to give it to him? I'll give him one of your cards.


Lederer. You do get down there, heh?

DeVito. Yeah.

Errichetti. You go to lunch you three guys, you'll get to know each other.

Lederer. Overnight some night according to my schedule if we can go to the Democratic Club and uh uh.

DeVito. Yeah, sure, sure. I hope, I hope you don't mind a brown paper bag with this in.

Errichetti. This is Tony's card, Ray. You wanna back of it (IA).

Lederer. That's a heavy card. That's (IA) Where's yours?

¹¹ DeVito said that he was here addressing Errichetti rather than Lederer (Tr. 608).
²² Defense counsel contended that Weinberg, not Errichetti, said this: this portion of the tape was replayed. DeVito could not be certain who had said it; and the matter was left to the Jury (Tr. 602-609).
ERRICHTETTI. [Laughter.] Did anybody call me? 33
WEINBERG. I just gave you mine.
DEVITO. I hope you spend it well.
ERRICHTETTI. Okay, Ray.
DEVITO. You can take a little piece of that and buy us lunch when you come down.
LEDERER. You’ve got that anyway. I can’t, are you registered under foreign nationals?
[Laughter.]
ERRICHTETTI. Okay, Buddy.
DEVITO. Take care, Ray.
LEDERER. Ah any idea when you might be down?
WEINBERG. Ah. Well we’re gonna leave tomorrow to go down to Cherry Hill and then from there to look at apartments down there to take.
ERRICHTETTI. Cherry Hill, New Jersey. They’ll be at the Hyatt House. I’ll, I’ll be with them Ray, tomorrow and Thursday. So if you want to call them for anything, you know whatever * * *
LEDERER. Okay, but no, I just like the idea that maybe sometime when he’s down there * * *
DEVITO. Yeah.
LEDERER. When Tony comes in, you bring him down, you know. It’ll be, tell you what it’ll be, it’ll be something like, he may even get upset, this guy’s evidently got a lot of paper. I’ll introduce him to a couple of the chairman and all say how you doin.
DEVITO. Yeah.
LEDERER. A couple of minutes, they’re gonna get their hat, they’re not gonna stay around.
DEVITO. Uh uh.
LEDERER. But he’ll know you’re not jerkin’ him either.
DEVITO. Yeah, oh yeah. Well I tell you what. He trusts us.
ERRICHTETTI. Okay buddy [laughter].
DEVITO. He trusts us to any extent.
LEDERER. You’re the main guys.
ERRICHTETTI. Yeah that’s true, he trusts these guys. These two fuckin’ guys here * * *
LEDERER. He takes your judgment.
DEVITO. Once, once he feels that our judgment has been misplaced, you know, then we’re in a, in a bad light. That’s why I, you know, when I talk to you or if I talk to anybody, I just want to insure that, you know, * * * you know, that’s where you’re coming from. As long as, you know, you’re going, you’re going to be in our corner and you’re going with us to do the, to do the deal.
LEDERER. Well, what I’m trying to say to you is, I’m not going to live in your backyard, you’re not gonna live in my backyard. You, you came down, go out to the house, have a few pops.

33 The videotape reveals that it was at this point that DeVito handed Lederer the brown paper bag (see Tr. 609). The bag contained $50,000 (Tr. 815).
DeVito. Yeah, no, no. What I don’t want to do is, like I said before, I don’t want to put you in, a position that people are going to look and wonder, that’s and I agree with you about living in my backyard and living in your backyard. It’s **  
Lederer. You want people **  
DeVito. It’s nice to meet once in a while on, on a casual basis.  
Weinberg. We like to keep a low profile.  
Lederer. I know you, that says something (IA).  
DeVito. Yeah and you know **  
Weinberg. Anything that you get that’s a good investment, give us a call.  
Lederer. Well I’m not a businessman. I’m not in business. You know a hell of a lot more about it than I do. (IA)  
Weinberg. We’re in trouble if we don’t.

Errichetti. Well, what I intend to do though, Ray, is so, you know, I intend to bring them to Tom Kelly, our friend, okay.  
Lederer. Have them sit down with you. Take them down to the Downtown Club. He’s the port guy **  
Errichetti. He’s the port guy, Tom Kelly and I are fuckin asshole buddies.  
DeVito. Okay.  
Errichetti. Have a nice trip back buddy.  
Lederer. Tony take care.  
Errichetti. See you in Fishtown, kid. [Laughter.]  
DeVito. This way, over here.  
Errichetti. That way.  
Lederer. Listen, see you in Washington, at least down in Longport.  
[RL exits the room.]

* * * * * * *

Errichetti. Okay ** I talked to Ray. Okay. Now Ray’s gonna try to line up ** Between Ozzie and Ray I’m try to line up guys that’s gonna try to lock the whole fuckin’ state up to be honest with you.  
DeVito. Yeah.  
[End.]

In the meantime, Poulos had remained downstairs in the lounge during most of the meeting (Tr. 829). Eventually, he saw a man whom he identified as Lederer come into the lounge area with a brown paper bag tucked under his right arm—a bag that looked similar to the one he had seen with DeVito containing $50,000 (Tr. 829-830). Lederer engaged in a brief conversation with Criden and Johanson and almost immediately thereafter left the area, without having a drink with them (Tr. 830).

According to Cook, he met at 8:30 AM on the following day, September 12, 1979, with his law partner, Criden, at the Fairmont Hotel in Philadelphia (Tr. 661). Criden said that “they”—presumably meaning Criden and Johanson—had met Lederer at the airport in New York the evening before and had taken him to see Errichetti, who
had gone with Lederer to a meeting (Tr. 662–663). Criden told Cook that Lederer had left the meeting with $50,000, that Lederer had given the money bag to someone, and that Errichetti handed the bag to Criden with only $30,000 left (having taken $20,000 as his own share) (Tr. 663–664, 690, 694). The remaining $30,000, according to what Cook said Criden told him, had been divided as follows: $5000 to be put in an envelope with the initials “RL” for a “political contribution for Congressman Lederer,” $4500 to go to Cook, and $15,500 to be split between Criden and Johanson (Tr. 664).

At the meeting between Criden and Cook, Criden actually produced $5000 in an envelope marked “RL” in Criden’s handwriting and told Cook to put it in a safety deposit box to hold until spring for Lederer’s primary (Tr. 665). Cook and Johanson, on September 12, 1979, placed this envelope in a safety deposit box which had previously been opened in the names of Cook, Criden and Johanson (Tr. 665–667; Govt. Ex. 17). Criden also gave Cook $4500 in an envelope for himself, which Cook put first in his safety deposit box on September 14, 1979, and later in his savings account (Tr. 665, 667–668; Govt. Ext. 15).

On September 20, about a week after Cook’s conversation with Criden, Johanson told Cook that he had met with Lederer, that the Congressman needed $500, that Cook should withdraw that amount in $20 bills from Lederer’s $5000 (Tr. 668–670). Cook at first forgot to make the withdrawal and then, on September 25, 1979, went to the bank and made the withdrawal, converting the $100 bills in the envelope to $20 bills (Tr. 668–672; Govt. Ex. 18). Within a day or two after he had given the money to Johanson, Johanson told Cook that he had seen Lederer, and had given him the $500, but that when Lederer had previously said he needed “five,” he had meant $5000 and not $500; therefore, Cook was instructed to return to the bank and obtain the remaining amount in the envelope (Tr. 672–673). Cook did so on September 27, 1979, and gave the $4500 to Johanson (Tr. 673; Govt. Ex. 18). Johanson thereafter told Cook that he had given the money to Lederer, who needed it to repair a roof or a porch at his house on the shore (Tr. 673).

Cook testified that he was not aware of any payment by his law firm to Lederer as a “consultant.” and that he would have been aware of any such payment (Tr. 674). However, Lederer reported in his Ethics and Government Act Financial Disclosure Statement, filed with the House of Representatives on June 2, 1980, that he had received $5000 during 1979 from Johanson at his law firm’s address as a “consultant’s fee” (Tr. 852–857; Govt. Ex. 20).

On February 2, 1980, two FBI agents (one of whom, Cyril Gamber, testified at the trial) interviewed Lederer at his residence in Philadelphia (Tr. 831–833). According to Gamber, the Congressman was advised of his rights, and he executed a waiver of his right to remain

[24] DeVito testified that it was his understanding that prior to the September 11 meeting, Errichetti had agreed with Lederer that Lederer would be paid $50,000 if he made a commitment to the sheik’s representatives (Tr. 632–633, 639–640). However, DeVito was not clear as to who had given him this information or when.

[25] Cook was given immunity from prosecution by the Government in return for his testimony (Tr. 674–675). He had to return to the Government all the ABSCAM money he had received (Tr. 675, 698)

[26] A motion to suppress this testimony was denied at Tr. 45–50, 326–331.
silent and to have his attorney present (Tr. 833-834). Lederer related that he had been approached by Johanson on behalf of individuals interested in investing large sums of money in the Port of Philadelphia (Tr. 834). Using an airline ticket provided by Johanson’s law firm, Lederer flew to New York as a favor to Johanson (Tr. 834). He said he was picked up by Johanson and a man who he thought was Johanson’s law partner and taken to a hotel suite, which he entered alone (Tr. 835). He said he encountered three men, one of whom almost immediately left (id.). Lederer identified the others as “Tony” and “Mel,” and said they told him they represented an Arab sheik interested in investing $100 million in the City of Philadelphia (Tr. 836). They wanted Lederer to put them in touch with the right people in Philadelphia to handle their investments (id.). There ensued, said Lederer, a general discussion that included possible immigration problems, and then the meeting broke up, with Lederer under the impression that he might meet the sheik sometime in the future (Tr. 836-838). Lederer said he joined Johanson and his partner for a drink in the lounge and then drove with them back to Philadelphia (Tr. 838). He said he learned during this ride that their law firm had a great deal of money to gain from legal fees connected with the proposed Philadelphia investments (id.).

Lederer denied to the agents that his help had been solicited on immigration problems, that there had been any mention of private bills, 3 that he had been offered, or had solicited, money, that Errichetti had been present, or that he recalled leaving the room with a paper bag (Tr. 838-842). After this, Lederer declined to be interviewed further (Tr. 843).

3. Lederer’s defense

Lederer presented twelve witnesses who testified favorably as to his reputation for honesty, integrity, and good character generally (Tr. 868, 870, 872, 874, 884, 890, 892, 893, 896, 903, 914, 915). It was also stipulated that if four named individuals were called as witnesses, they would testify that prior to his involvement with DeVito and Weinberg, Lederer had introduced private immigration bills on their behalves and that he had not sought or even discussed being paid for his work (Tr. 1016-17; see also Tr. 444, 915-917). DeVito conceded that he was not aware of these bills (Tr. 443-447, 450).

Lederer’s counsel also attacked Weinberg—his past, previous offenses, monetary payments to him by the Government, his failure to file tax returns, inconsistencies in his testimony, etc. —as well as various other aspects of the Government’s case. However, these attacks became essentially irrelevant when Lederer, through his counsel, asked that only one issue be submitted to the jury: whether the Congressman

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37 Cook confirmed that his firm had paid for Lederer’s flight from Washington to New York (Tr. 674, 686, 695).
38 Lederer said that if any such discussion had occurred, he would have ended it on ethical grounds (Tr. 839-840).
39 Lederer apparently admitted in pleadings filed with the District Court that he had told “blatant falsehoods” to the agents who interviewed him on February 2 (see Tr. 46).
40 Lederer showed, by way of example, that two Assistant United States Attorneys had been critical of Weinberg’s over-zealous efforts in a case involving another Member of Congress (Tr. 917-920, 922-930, 931-942).
had been improperly entrapped.\textsuperscript{41} In effect, Lederer admitted having committed the crime but claimed that he did not have the requisite predisposition at the time he embarked on this course of conduct. Specifically, for purposes of the trial, he did not contest the facts that $50,000 was passed to him; that when he took the brown paper bag, he knew it contained money; that he was aware when he did so that it was a violation of law; and that he acted voluntarily, intentionally and corruptly (Tr. 982–984).

The District Court took the position that entrapment had two aspects—an inducement by the Government, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the accused to commit the crime. The court refused to submit the issue of inducement to the jury, concluding as a matter of law that inducement had been proven, so that predisposition was the only issue left (\textit{e.g.}, Tr. 859–865). He charged the jury at length on this issue (Tr. 1134, 1167–73, 1221–27). He instructed, in fact, that unless the Government had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Lederer had had a predisposition to commit each offense prior to doing so, he was to be found “not guilty” of each such offense (\textit{id.}).

4. The Verdict

On January 9, 1981, after a five-day trial, the jury found Lederer “guilty” on all four counts of the indictment (Tr. 1228–30).\textsuperscript{42}

5. Special Counsel’s Recommendations

On the basis of this Preliminary Inquiry, the Committee is required to determine whether one or more offenses were committed by Congressman Lederer over which the Committee has jurisdiction (Committee Rule 14). The Rules of the House of Representatives provide that the jurisdiction of the Committee extends to any alleged violation by a House Member “of the Code of Official Conduct or any law, rule regulation, or other standard of conduct applicable to the conduct of such Member * * * in the performance of his duties or discharge of his responsibilities” (Rule X, Cl. 4(e), Rules of the House of Representatives—hereinafter “House Rule”).

Special Counsel submits that a review of the evidence in the Congressman’s trial reveals that he violated four laws applicable to his conduct as a Member and at least three House Rules relating to such conduct.\textsuperscript{43}

The statutes which Congressman Lederer was convicted of violating, 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 (c), 201 (g), 371 and 1952, establish a minimum standard of conduct for House Members by making it illegal for any public official to accept a bribe or unlawful gratuity, to conspire to accept a bribe or unlawful gratuity, or to travel in interstate commerce with an intent to accept a bribe or unlawful gratuity. The offenses carry pos-

\textsuperscript{41} Lederer asserted the entrapment defense throughout the trial (\textit{e.g.}, Tr. 36–37, 377–382, 466–468, 722–725, 774–775, 784–791, 797–804, 859–865, 948–998).

\textsuperscript{42} Receiving an unlawful gratuity is a lesser-included offense within the crime of bribery. The jury was instructed on both crimes at the request of defense counsel, and found Lederer guilty of both the primary and lesser-included offenses. However, he could not receive additional punishment as a result of his conviction under Section 201 (g).

\textsuperscript{43} This submission and subsequent comments by Special Counsel are made pursuant to Committee Rule 11(a)(1), which authorizes the staff of the Committee to make “a recommendation for action by the Committee respecting the alleged violation which was the subject of the inquiry.”
sible penalties—in addition to substantial fines ranging from two to fifteen years' imprisonment.45

House Rule XLIII, Clause 1, provides in pertinent part: "[a] Member * * * of the House of Representatives shall conduct himself at all times in a manner which shall reflect creditably on the House of Representatives." The pertinent portion of House Rule XLIII, Clause 2, provides that "[a] Member * * * shall adhere to the spirit and the letter of the Rules of the House of Representatives and to the rules of the duly constituted committees thereof." And House Rule XLIII, Clause 3, provides in pertinent part: "A Member * * * of the House of Representatives shall receive no compensation nor shall he permit any compensation to accrue to his beneficial interest from any source, the receipt of which would occur by virtue of influence improperly exerted from his position in the Congress."46 The evidence in Congressman Lederer's case reveals that all three of these Clauses were violated. Clearly, conspiracy to accept a bribe relating to a Congressman's legislative duties, traveling in interstate commerce with intent to do the same, and actually accepting such a bribe, are acts inconsistent both with conduct reflecting creditably on the House and also with adherence to the various rules applicable to Congressman Lederer. They thus are acts which violate Clauses 1 and 2. They are also acts consistent with the receipt of money by virtue of improper influence exerted because of Mr. Lederer's position in Congress, and therefore violate clause 3.47

In view of the evidence adduced in this case and the nature of Congressman Lederer's transgressions, Special Counsel recommends that the Committee conclude that offenses were committed over which the Committee has jurisdiction. Special Counsel further recommends that the Committee hold a disciplinary hearing for the purpose of determining what sanction to recommend to the House respecting Congressman Lederer (Committee Rule 14).

Because of Mr. Lederer's failure to contest the most basic aspects of the Government's burden of proof, his trial had an awful simplicity. Once he told the court he would not contest that he had been given $50,000, that he knew he was receiving money, and that he did so cor-

44 Sections 371 and 1952 carry possible fines of $10,000. Section 201(c) carries a possible fine of $20,000, or three times the monetary equivalent of "the thing of value" given in exchange for the performance of official acts, whichever amount is greater.

45 Sections 371 and 1952 carry possible prison terms of up to five years, and Section 201(g) carries a possible prison term of up to two years, and a possible fine of $10,000, or both, but since this is a lesser-included offense within bribery (see footnote 42, supra), Lederer could not receive punishment under Section 201(g) in addition to that which he may receive for his conviction under Section 201(c).

46 Clause 3 is comparable in many respects to Rule 5 of the Code of Ethics for Government Service, House Concurrent Resolution 175, 72 Stat. pt. 2, p. 812 (July 11, 1958), which by tradition, precedent and subsequent statute carries the force of law. See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 1394, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 et seq.; H. Rep. No. 1742, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 et seq.; Pub. L. No. 96-306, 94 Stat. 855 (July 5, 1980). Rule 5 provides in pertinent part that "Any person in Government service should * * * never accept, for himself or his family, favors or benefits under circumstances which enable persons as influencing the performance of his government duties." See also Rules 6 and 9 of the same Code of Ethics for Government Service.

47 It could be persuasively argued that Congressman Lederer also violated House Rule XLIII, Clause 4. This Clause prohibits a Member from receiving more than $100 per year, directly or indirectly, from any foreign national or agent of a foreign national or from any person having a direct interest in legislation before the Congress. Although the sheik's backer—DeVito and Poulos were not truly agents of a foreign nation, and no one involved actually had a direct interest in legislation—Congressman Lederer did not know this and in fact thought he was dealing with people having precisely those interests. Clause 4 obviously was intended to address a Member's state of mind rather than the facts he believed to be true by him. The situation is thus analogous to that before the District Judge, who instructed the jury in effect that Lederer could be corruptly influenced in his performance of an official act even though the sheik was a fictitious person, so long as Lederer believed that the sheik existed and that he accepted money in return for being influenced in his future official acts in regard to the sheik's immigration, residency or citizenship status (see Tr. 1165).

Special Counsel nevertheless does not press this argument because he submits that there are clear violations of Clauses 1 through 3.
ruptly, the question for the jury was resolved into one of entrapment, which in turn condensed itself into the issue of predisposition to commit the crime. Nevertheless, Mr. Lederer made his concessions “for the purpose of the trial.” Therefore, Special Counsel would call the Committee’s attention to certain facts that relate both to predisposition and to basic elements of the offenses themselves.

As revealed by the foregoing recitation of facts developed at trial, there was evidence, inter alia, that:

- Lederer was aware in advance of the key September 11, 1979, videotaped meeting with undercover FBI agents that one or more immigration bills would be discussed at that meeting and that he would be offered $50,000.
- He indicated to Johanson in advance of the meeting that he would only need $5,000, intended at that time to be used for his spring primary.
- He met and talked with Mayor Errichetti prior to the meeting, however briefly. Errichetti had participated in prior payoffs to others and had himself accepted a number of payoffs from the same undercover agents dealing with Lederer.
- The discussion at the meeting with DeVito revealed (see, in particular, the underscored portions quoted above) that while no mention was made of a “bribe” or even of a specific amount of money being offered, Lederer was aware that a money offer was being made and that he had to agree to introduce one or more private immigration bills in order to receive the money. He made such an agreement at the meeting.
- Lederer did, in fact, accept the brown paper bag at the end of the meeting without any question as to what it contained.
- The money was divided up almost immediately following the meeting among those who were not aware of the Government’s participation, and $5,000 was set aside for Lederer.
- Lederer soon thereafter asked for and received $5,000 for his personal use.
- When confronted by FBI agents on February 2, 1980, Lederer repeatedly lied about his involvement in the September 11, 1979, meeting.
- Lederer lied in his official report to the House about his 1979 income when he accounted for the $5,000 as a “consultant’s fee” from Johanson.

It is clear from the evidence as a whole that Congressman Lederer was not simply derelict in his duties—in his failure to appreciate the niceties of the behavior taking place around him—but rather that he was an active participant in the type of scheme that strikes directly at the democratic process. He sold his promise to vote in a particular way on legislation for a substantial sum of money. He participated with others in dividing the illegal gains from an illegal operation. He was not taken in by friends; he dealt largely with people he had never seen before. If there are mitigating circumstances to all this that would preclude the Committee from acting, they are difficult to discern from this record.

Special Counsel recommends that the Committee conclude that Congressman Lederer has committed violations of law and House Rules, that the Committee has jurisdiction over such violations and that the Committee should proceed promptly to hold a hearing for the
purpose of determining what sanction to recommend to the House in this case.

**Lederer Hearing Exhibit A**

[H. Res. 67, 97th Cong., 1st sess.]

Resolution authorizing an investigation and inquiry by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct

Whereas rule XLIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives sets forth the Code of Official Conduct for Members, officers, and employees of the House of Representatives and, among other things, prohibits the acceptance of gifts, directly or indirectly, from foreign nationals or their agents or from any person having a direct interest in legislation before the Congress or the acceptance of compensation from any source for the exertion of improper influence, and provides that all such Members, officers, and employees shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner which shall reflect creditably on the House of Representatives; and

Whereas Federal law prohibits the receipt of anything of value by any Member of Congress to influence his performance of his official duties or to reward or compensate him, other than as provided for by law, for the performance of those duties (18 U.S.C. 201, 203); prohibits the receipt of unauthorized fees relating to naturalization or citizenship (18 U.S.C. 1422); and prohibits conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States (18 U.S.C. 371); and

Whereas information has come to the attention of the House of Representatives alleging that certain Members of the House of Representatives have improperly accepted or agreed to accept money from undercover Federal agents and others in the course of an investigation initiated and/or conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

Whereas clause 4(e) (1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives entrusts the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct with the authority (1) to recommend to the House of Representatives from time to time such administrative actions as it may deem appropriate to establish or enforce standards of official conduct for Members, officers, and employees of the House of Representatives, (2) to investigate any alleged violation, by a Member, officer, or employee of the House of Representatives, of the Code of Official Conduct or of any law, rule, regulation, or other standard of conduct applicable to the conduct of such Member, officer, or employee in the performance of his duties or the discharge of his responsibilities and, after notice and hearing, to recommend to the House of Representatives, by resolution or otherwise, such action as the committee may deem appropriate in the circumstances, and (3) to report to the appropriate Federal or State authorities, with the approval of the House of Representatives, any substantial evidence of a violation by a Member, officer, or employee of the House of Representatives of any law applicable to the performance of his duties or the discharge of his responsibilities, which may have been disclosed in a committee investigation: Now, therefore, be it

**Resolved.** That the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct be and it is hereby authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete inquiry and investigation of alleged improper conduct which has been the subject of recent investigations (commonly referred to as
ABSCAM) by the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine whether Members, officers, or employees of the House of Representatives have violated the Code of Official Conduct or any law, rule, regulation or other applicable standard of conduct. The scope of the inquiry and investigation may be expanded by the committee to extend to any matters relevant to discharging its responsibilities pursuant to this resolution or the Rules of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 2. The committee may report to the House of Representatives any findings, conclusions, and recommendations it deems proper with respect to the adequacy of the present Code of Official Conduct or the Federal laws, rules, regulations, and other standards of conduct applicable to the conduct of Members of the House of Representatives in the performance of their duties and the discharge of their responsibilities.

Sec. 3. The committee, after appropriate notice and hearing, shall report to the House of Representatives its recommendations as to such disciplinary action, if any, that the committee deems appropriate by the House of Representatives and may provide such other reports of the results of its inquiry and investigation as the committee deems appropriate.

Sec. 4. (a) For the purpose of conducting any inquiry or investigation pursuant to this resolution, the committee is authorized to request or compel—

(1) by subpoena or otherwise—

(A) the attendance and testimony of any person—

(i) at a hearing; or

(ii) at the taking of a deposition by one or more members of the committee; and

(B) the production of things of any kind, including, but not limited to, books, records, correspondence, logs, journals, memorandums, papers, documents, writings, graphs, charts, photographs, reproductions, recordings, tapes (including audiotapes and videotapes), transcripts, printouts, data compilations from which information can be obtained (translated, if necessary, into reasonably usable form), and other tangible objects; and

(2) by interrogatory, the furnishing under oath of such information as it deems necessary to such inquiry or investigation.

(b) A subpoena for the taking of a deposition or the production of things may be returnable at such places and times as the committee may direct.

(c) The authority conferred on the committee by subsections (a) and (b) of this section may be exercised—

(1) by the chairman and the ranking minority member acting jointly, or, if either declines to or is unable to act, by the other acting alone, except that in the event either so declines or is unable to act, either shall have the right to refer to the committee for decision the question whether such authority shall be so exercised, and the committee shall be convened as soon as practicable to render that decision; or

(2) by the committee acting as a whole.

(d) Subpoenas and interrogatories authorized under this section may be issued over the signature of the chairman, or ranking minority member, or any member designated by either of them. A subpoena may
be served by any person designated by either of them and may be served either within or without the United States on any national or resident of the United States or any other person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(e) In connection with any inquiry or investigation pursuant to this resolution, the committee may request the Secretary of State to transmit a letter rogatory or request to a foreign tribunal, officer, or agency.

(f) Any member of the committee or any other person authorized by law to administer oaths may administer oaths pursuant to this resolution.

(g) All testimony taken by deposition or things produced by deposition or otherwise, or information furnished by interrogatory pursuant to this section, other than at a hearing, shall be deemed to have been taken, produced, or furnished in executive session.

Sec. 5. For the purpose of conducting any inquiry or investigation pursuant to this resolution, the committee is authorized to sit and act, without regard to clause 2(m) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, at such times and places within or without the United States, whether the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, and to hold such hearings as it deems necessary.

Sec. 6. The committee is authorized to coordinate its investigation with the Department of Justice and to enter into any agreement with that Department which the committee determines to be essential for the prompt and orderly performance of its duties: Provided, That such agreements shall not be inconsistent with applicable law or with any Rule of the House of Representatives unless otherwise provided herein for the purpose of this investigation. Without regard to clause 2(e) (2) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee may restrict access to information received from the Department of Justice to such members of the committee or other persons as the committee may designate.

Sec. 7. The committee is authorized to seek to participate and to participate, by special counsel appointed by the committee, on behalf of the committee and the House of Representatives in any judicial proceeding concerning or relating in any way to any inquiry or investigation conducted pursuant to this resolution, including proceedings to enforce a subpoena.

Sec. 8. The authority conferred by this resolution is in addition to, and not in lieu of, the authority conferred upon the committee by the Rules of the House of Representatives. In conducting any inquiry or investigation pursuant to this resolution, the committee is authorized to adopt special rules of procedure as may be appropriate.

Sec. 9. Any funds made available to the committee after the adoption of this resolution may be expended for the purpose of carrying out the inquiry and investigation authorized and directed by this resolution.

Lederer Hearing Exhibit B


Hon. Louis Stokes,  
Chairman, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I represent Congressman Raymond F. Lederer. I have been contacted by E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct with respect to scheduling a date for a hearing in connection with Congressman Lederer's status.

We are currently engaged in a Due Process Hearing before the Hon. George C. Pratt, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The testimony phase of that hearing has terminated, and the Judge has ordered submission of briefs by defense counsel and the government.

I propose that no Congressional hearing take place pending the outcome of the Due Process Hearing before Judge Pratt. In the event that the Due Process Hearing does not result in favor of Congressman Lederer, you have his assurance that his resignation will be tendered forthwith. In the event that the Due Process Hearing is resolved favorably to Congressman Lederer, we would then request a hearing before the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.

I submit the above proposal in an effort to spare your Committee an unnecessary hearing. Would you be good enough to advise me as to whether or not this proposal is acceptable to you and the members of the Committee.

Respectfully,

JAMES J. BINNS, PA.

Lederer Hearing Exhibit C

Resolution

Whereas, on January 9, 1981, Representative Raymond F. Lederer was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of criminal violations of the following sections of the United States Code:

(Count I)—Title 18, United States Code, section 371 [conspiracy].
(Count II)—Title 18, United States Code, section 201(c) [bribery].
(Count III)—Title 18, United States Code, section 201(g) [illegal gratuity].
(Count IV)—Title 18, United States Code, section 1952 [“Travel Act”].

And Whereas, under federal law, each of the foregoing criminal offenses is punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least one year;

Now therefore be it Resolved, in accordance with Rule 14 of the Rules of this Committee, that this Committee conduct a preliminary inquiry pursuant to Rule 11(a) to review the evidence of the foregoing offenses and to determine whether they constitute violations over which the Committee is given jurisdiction under clause 4(e) of Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives;

And be it further Resolved, that Representative Lederer and his counsel be immediately notified of this action and informed of the Member's rights pursuant to the Rules of this Committee.
LEDERER HEARING EXHIBIT D

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT,

HON. RAYMOND F. LEDERER,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Representative Lederer: This is to inform you that on March 11, 1981, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct ("the Committee") decided to treat Mr. Binns's letter of March 3, 1981, as a formal motion to defer a preliminary inquiry in your case until Judge Pratt decides whether your due process rights have been violated. The Committee then voted to deny Mr. Binns' motion. The Committee also passed the attached Resolution authorizing a preliminary inquiry into the matters for which you were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on January 9, 1981.

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Committee's Rules, you have the right to present an oral or written statement to the Committee during its preliminary inquiry. A complete set of the Committee's Rules is attached for your information.

If you wish to present a written statement, it must be received by the undersigned by 5:00 PM, March 16, 1981. If you wish to appear before the Committee to present oral testimony under oath, you must so inform the undersigned within three days of the date of this letter, and a Committee hearing will be scheduled for 10:00 AM on March 17, 1981, for the purpose of receiving that testimony. As you know, the Committee originally had considered scheduling such a meeting for March 18, 1981, but it was rescheduled for March 17, 1981, at your counsel's request. Failure to respond within these time limits will be deemed a waiver of your rights to present a statement during the preliminary inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, JR.,
Special Counsel.

LEDERER HEARING EXHIBIT E

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT,

Re Congressman Raymond F. Lederer.

JAMES J. BINNS, Esq.,

Dear Jim: I understand that you will be representing Congressman Raymond F. Lederer in connection with the proceedings initiated today by the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. I am enclosing for your information a letter which has just been sent to Congressman Lederer concerning this matter.

In connection with the report of Special Counsel at the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry, as provided for by Rule 11(a) of the Committee's Rules, we are currently planning to attach to that re-
port, and to make part of the record in these proceedings, substantial portions of the record of the trial of Congressman Lederer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Available in my office for immediate inspection is a copy of the transcript of that trial, in the event you do not have a copy. We intend to delete from the transcript of the trial those portions which we believe irrelevant for the Committee's purposes (e.g., bench conferences concerning peripheral legal arguments). Those portions of the transcript which we intend to delete from the version submitted to the Committee are as follows:

- Pages 1 through 391, Line 5;
- Pages 399, Line 18 through Page 403, Line 11;
- Pages 762 through 778;
- Page 907, Line 14 through Page 911, Line 10;
- Page 1004, Line 3 through Page 1015;
- Page 1095, Line 1 through Page 1097, Line 11;
- Pages 1105 through 1227.

Finally, we intend to introduce the following trial exhibits: 1, 1A, 2, 2A, 3, 3A, 4, 4A, 5, 5A, 6, 6A, 7, 7A, 8, 8A, 9, 9A, 10, 10A, 11, 11A, 12, 12A, 12D, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20.

If you wish to suggest any additions or deletions to the excerpts of the transcripts and exhibits which we are proposing to submit to the Committee, please inform us specifically of your proposals by Noon, March 16, 1981, so that your suggestions may be appropriately considered. In the event that we are able to agree on the appropriate portions of the trial record for inclusion in the Committee record, I would propose that we enter into a Stipulation, a draft of which is enclosed, providing that those portions of the trial record we have agreed upon are the only parts of the trial record which need be considered by the Committee. The Stipulation would further provide that the copies of trial transcripts and exhibits in the possession of Special Counsel will be deemed true and accurate copies of the original transcript and exhibits. Such a Stipulation would, of course, explicitly state that neither party necessarily concedes that all such trial materials are relevant or material to the Committee's deliberations. If the enclosed draft is acceptable to you and your client, I would appreciate your signing it and returning it to me by Monday, March 16, 1981.

Sincerely yours,

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.,
Special Counsel.

Enclosure.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT

In re Representative Raymond F. Lederer—Investigation Pursuant To House Resolution 67.

STIPULATION

It is hereby stipulated by and between Special Counsel for the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House of Representa-
tives ("the Committee") and counsel for Representative Raymond F. Lederer that for purposes of the above-entitled investigation:

1. The transcript of the trial docketed as Number 80 Cr. 00253 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ("the trial"), now in the possession of Special Counsel, shall be deemed a true and accurate copy of the original trial transcript, so that a certified copy of the original trial transcript need not be made a part of the Committee records.

2. The videotapes and audiotapes which are now in the possession of Special Counsel, the originals of which were introduced at the trial as Exhibits 1 through 12D, shall be deemed true and accurate copies of the original tapes, so that a witness need not authenticate the tapes now in the possession of Special Counsel for purposes of admission into the Committee records.

3. The transcripts of videotapes and audiotapes which are now in the possession of Special Counsel, the originals of which were introduced at the trial as Exhibits 1A through 12A, shall be deemed true and accurate copies of the original trial transcripts, so that certified copies of the original trial transcripts need not be made a part of the Committee records.

4. The copies of trial Exhibits 15 through 20, which are now in the possession of Special Counsel, shall be deemed true and accurate copies of the originals of such exhibits, so that certified copies of the original exhibits need not be made a part of the Committee's records.

5. Those portions of the trial transcript, and the exhibits recited above, which have been designated by Special Counsel and cross-designated by counsel for Congressman Lederer, shall be deemed the only portions of the trial record which will be considered relevant and material to the Committee's investigation, provided, however, that by so stipulating, neither Special Counsel nor counsel for Congressman Lederer concedes that all such portions are necessarily relevant and material to such investigation.

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.,
Special Counsel to the Committee.

March 11, 1981.

Lederer Hearing Exhibit F

Philadelphia, Pa., March 12, 1981

Re Congressman Raymond F. Lederer.

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Barrett: Enclosed please find the Stipulation in connection with the above-captioned matter, which I have executed as per your request.

Sincerely,

James J. Binns, Pa.

Enclosure.
It is hereby stipulated by and between Special Counsel for the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House of Representatives ("the Committee") and counsel for Representative Raymond F. Lederer that for purposes of the above-entitled investigation:

1. The transcript of the trial docketed as Number 80 Cr. 00253 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ("the trial"), now in the possession of Special Counsel, shall be deemed a true and accurate copy of the original trial transcript, so that a certified copy of the original trial transcript need not be made a part of the Committee records.

2. The videotapes and audiotapes which are now in the possession of Special Counsel, the originals of which were introduced at the trial as Exhibits 1 through 12D, shall be deemed true and accurate copies of the original tapes, so that a witness need not authenticate the tapes now in the possession of Special Counsel for purposes of admission into the Committee records.

3. The transcripts of videotapes and audiotapes which are now in the possession of Special Counsel, the originals of which were introduced at the trial as Exhibits 1A through 12A, shall be deemed true and accurate copies of the original trial transcripts, so that certified copies of the original trial transcripts need not be made a part of the Committee's records.

4. The copies of trial Exhibits 15 through 20, which are now in the possession of Special Counsel, shall be deemed true and accurate copies of the originals of such exhibits, so that certified copies of the original exhibits need not be made a part of the Committee's records.

5. Those portions of the trial transcript, and the exhibits recited above, which have been designated by Special Counsel and cross-designated by counsel for Congressman Lederer, shall be deemed the only portions of the trial record which will be considered relevant and material to the Committee’s investigation, provided, however, that by so stipulating, neither Special Counsel nor counsel for Congressman Lederer concedes that all such portions are necessarily relevant and material to such investigation.

JAMES J. BINNS,
Counsel for Representative Lederer.

E. BARRETT PRETYMAN, JR.,
Special Counsel to the Committee.

MARCH 11, 1981.
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT

In the matter of Representative Raymond F. Lederer—Investigation of House Resolution 67.

RESOLUTION

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Committee's Rules, the Committee, having reviewed the evidence relating to the conviction of Representative Raymond F. Lederer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for the offenses of violating Sections 371, 201(c), 201(g) and 1952 of Title 18 of the United States Code; and upon consideration of the Report of Special Counsel Upon Completion of Preliminary Inquiry filed on March 17, 1981, in the above-captioned matter, and of all relevant evidence, including the exhibits and record herein, now determines that such offenses were committed and constitute violations over which the Committee is given jurisdiction under Clause 4(e) of Rule X of The Rules of the House of Representatives, including House Rule XLIII, Clauses 1-3, and it is hereby:

Resolved, that the Committee shall proceed promptly to hold a disciplinary hearing for the sole purpose of determining what sanction to recommend that the House of Representatives impose on Representative Lederer for these offenses;

And Be It Further Resolved, that Representative Lederer and his counsel shall be promptly advised of this action and informed of the Member's rights pursuant to the Rules of this Committee.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT,

202/331-4685.

Re Representative Raymond F. Lederer—Investigation Pursuant to House Resolution 67.

JAMES J. BINNS, Esq.,

Dear Jim: This will confirm and supplement our telephone conversation of early this afternoon.

Enclosed is a Resolution which the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct adopted at its meeting this morning by a vote of eleven to one. (The votes are available for inspection at the Committee's offices.)

The Resolution provides that the Committee shall proceed promptly to hold a disciplinary hearing for the sole purpose of determining what sanction to recommend that the House of Representatives impose

* [Date is typographical error—letter was actually sent on April 2, 1981.]
on Representative Lederer for the offenses referred to in the Resolution, and further provides that you and Representative Lederer shall promptly be advised of this action and informed of the Representative’s rights pursuant to the Rules of this Committee.

You have already been given a copy of the Committee’s Rules. Rules 14, 16, 17 and 18 are particularly relevant to the second phase of the disciplinary hearing that is now beginning. As reflected in the Resolution, the scope and purpose of the second phase of the disciplinary hearing are solely to determine what sanction, if any, to recommend that the House of Representatives adopt in regard to Representative Lederer.

The Chairman has instructed me to tell you that the Committee will hold a second-phase hearing next Thursday, April 9, 1981, at 9:30 AM in Room 2359 of the Rayburn House Office Building. If you intend to call any witnesses to appear and testify on behalf of Representative Lederer, you are required to submit a list of those witnesses to me by next Tuesday, April 7. If the list contains numerous witnesses, the Committee has the option of declining to hear some or all of them (see Rule 16(f)), or of hearing some or all of them prior to next Thursday’s hearing. If the list is short, the witnesses will probably all be heard on April 9. If you intend to submit any evidence in writing, this submission must be made by noon, Tuesday, April 7. I have been instructed to tell you that barring extraordinary circumstances, the Committee intends to complete the second phase of its disciplinary hearing next Thursday, April 9. At the end of the hearing, you and I will each be given thirty minutes to state our respective positions in regard to what sanction, if any, is appropriate under the circumstances.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call or write me.

Sincerely yours,

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.,
Special Counsel.

Lederer Hearing Exhibit J

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct,

202/331-4685.
James J. Binns, Esq.,

Dear Jim: Enclosed, as I promised at the hearing today, are two copies of my Report, one of which you may wish to send along to Representative Lederer. I am not certain exactly when this will be distributed to the Committee—perhaps when your own material is circulated—but I thought you would want a copy of it.

Sincerely yours,

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.,
Special Counsel.
LEDERER HEARING EXHIBIT K

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT,

JAMES J. BINNS, Esq.,

DEAR JIMMY: Enclosed is a copy of the Executive Session held on Tuesday, March 17, 1981.
Sincerely yours,

E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, Jr.,
Special Counsel.

LEDERER HEARING EXHIBIT L

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT,
Washington, D.C., April 7, 1981.

JAMES J. BINNS, Esq.,

DEAR JIM: Enclosed is a copy of the Executive Session held on Thursday, April 2, 1981.
Sincerely yours,

E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, Jr.,
Special Counsel.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RAYMOND F. LEDERER, ANGELO J. ERRICHETTI, LOUIS C. JOHANSON, HOWARD L. CRIDEN, DEFENDANTS


Memorandum in Support of Defendant Raymond F. Lederer's Claim That He Was Deprived of Due Process and That He Was the Victim of Entrapment as a Matter of Law

I. Operation ABSCAM Constitutes Outrageous Conduct on the Part of Government Agents

As early as July 5, 1980 defendant Lederer set forth certain suspected due process violations upon which he based his original Motion to Dismiss the indictment. That Motion was supplemented by a letter to the Honorable George C. Pratt on January 28, 1981, which letter directed the Court to the manner in which defendant Lederer was actually prejudiced by the governmental misconduct. Each of those documents is attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively. The contents thereof are incorporated by reference.

The Court is in possession of the "Blumenthal Report", the "Del Tufo memorandum", the "pre-prosecution memorandum" prepared by the government, as well as numerous F.B.I. and Justice Department files which have not been made available to the defendant. The Court is also in possession of certain F.B.I. and Justice Department files
and memoranda, copies of which have been made available to the defendant. It is the defendant's position that those materials, along with documents produced at the pre-trial, trial and post-trial stages, show that government agents involved in Operation ABSCAM acted in an outrageous manner, well beyond the proper scope of their authority.

In support of this Argument, the Court is respectfully referred to the cases of U.S. v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (19th Cir. 1972), rev'd 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed. 2d 366 (1973); U.S. v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2nd Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Twigg, 588, F.2d 373 (1978). The instances of governmental misconduct that place the instant factual situation within the parameters of the above cited cases are:

b. Allowing agents Weinberg and Amoroso to act in an uncontrolled fashion with respect to:
   1. Placing words into targets mouths;
   2. Coaching prospective targets as to how they should act before the television cameras;
   3. Suggesting illegal schemes to "middleman"; "pumping-up" middlemen;
   4. Engaging in illegal enterprises of their own;
   5. Lying to United States attorneys when questioned concerning their tactics;
   6. Making photographs and tapes in furtherance of their own financial objectives;
   7. Destroying audiotapes so as to conceal their impropriety;
   8. Destroying camera films so as to conceal their impropriety;
   9. Suggesting that drugs, barbiturates, alcohol and/or other stimulants or depressants be administered to targets;
   10. Solicitation of gifts in furtherance of their own financial objectives;
   11. Testifying under oath in such a manner as to withhold the truth of their actions from their superiors, from the jury which tried the case, from the Judge who supervised both the pre-trial, trial and post-trial stages of Operation ABSCAM;
c. Manufacturing jurisdiction over the targets;
d. Selecting a venue which would obviate the necessity to explaining away violations of U.S. v. Twigg (supra);
e. Providing incentives for agent Weinberg to continue the scam and the asylum scenario which he created by means of:
   1. Providing him with monthly payments;
   2. Offering him bonuses based upon the number and stature of the targets which he lured into the net;
   3. Promising him lump sum payments;
   4. Providing him with tax free income;
   5. Allowing him to negotiate for books and movie rights with respect to his role in Operation ABSCAM;
   6. Allowing him to curry favor with the F.B.I. and certain federal judges who held the power of sentencing over him.
f. Appealing to the civic duty of the targets in an effort to involve them in operation ABSCAM:
g. Engaging middlemen to lure unsuspecting targets into meetings wherein they would be enticed into criminal conversations;

h. Attempting to mislead the trial judge and the jury as to how, when, where and by whom the "asylum scenario" was created;

i. Providing the incentive for federal agents and prosecutors to continue Operation ABSCAM in an effort to secure their own financial objectives by:
   1. Allowing F.B.I. agent Neal Welch to contract for the writing of a book;
   2. Allowing Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas Puccio to contract for the writing of a book; and
   3. Allowing Agent Melvin Weinberg to contract for the writing of a book;

j. Failing to adequately safeguard against the possibility of entrapment and intentionally failing to instruct the various operatives on the law of entrapment, and by intentionally failing to institute proper methods of supervision over the agents and operatives, and failing to follow customary F.B.I. and Justice Department directives with respect to record keeping;

k. Trapping defendant Lederer into giving a false statement to an F.B.I. agent who had knowledge of all the essential details of defendant Lederer's activities in connection with Operation ABSCAM but still asked him questions in an effort to "test his morality", thereby prohibiting him from testifying at his trial.

l. Intentionally withholding the entire criminal record of agent Melvin Weinberg from counsel for the defendant;

m. Intentionally leaking untruthful stories to the Press in an effort to confuse, harass and prevent the various co-defendants from collaborating in the preparation of their defense;

n. Intentionally violating the Jenks Act by destroying audio-tapes and written memoranda of government witnesses so as not to make them available at trial for use by defense counsel;

o. Violating the Jenks Act by intentionally withholding prior written and recorded statements of witnesses Amoroso and Weinberg.

   1. Withholding the fact of government criticism of the "coaching" incidents;
   2. Withholding the overall criticisms of Operation ABSCAM by the Newark U.S. Attorney's office;
   3. Withholding the Naythan, Heymann and Puccio memoranda which were created prior to the trial of defendant Lederer;
   4. "Springing" the Heymann letter on defendant's counsel during the course of the trial, and objecting to the full use of it by trial counsel;
   5. Resisting defense counsel's requests that all audio and visual tapes be made available to the defendant;
   6. Failing to advice that certain tapes had been eradicated by government agents;
   7. Failing to reveal that a policy of "not taping pre-meeting talks" was in effect;
8. Intentionally failing to reveal the existence of the “coaching incidents” prior to trial;
q. Instructing agents to “pepper” their testimony throughout the trial and due process hearings with the answer, “I don’t know” and “I don’t recall.”

In addition to the cases cited above, the Court is respectfully directed to the Opinion of the Honorable John P. Fullam in U.S. v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

II. The Defendant Lederer was Entrapped As a Matter of Law


At his trial defendant Lederer raised the entrapment defense. The issue of inducements was decided in favor of the defendant, thereby leaving only the question of “actual predisposition” on the part of defendant Lederer. Evidence concerning the nature of the inducements is relevant only with respect to whether or not the defendant was in fact predisposed. For the record, it should be noted that there was no evidence of:

a. Previous engagements in criminal activity of the nature charged;

b. Any negotiations leading up to the bribe;

c. Subsequent evidence which could have shed light on the bribe;

d. Proof as to past allegations of crimes;

e. Defendant Lederer’s reputation for criminality;

f. Prior convictions of the defendant.

In addition to affirmative character witness testimony concerning the lack of “predisposition” on the part of defendant Lederer it should be noted that even agent Amoroso was not certain as to whether defendant Lederer would accept the package until he handed it to him. The fact that Amoroso secreted the money in a briefcase, spoke in terms of legitimate investments in America, provided the idea of “cover investments” and appealed to the “civic duty” of defendant Lederer are all relevant in ascertaining the lack of defendant Lederer’s predisposition.

The fact that Lederer may have had a personal weakness is not indicative of predisposition. The issue of predisposition must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The government fell short of its burden. The only evidence presented in this case was the fact that defendant Lederer accepted a bag during a forty-five minute meeting on September 11, 1979. To say that such conduct constituted evidence of predisposition flagrantly “begs the question.”

The touchstone cases decided by the Supreme Court on the issue of entrapment are instructive with respect to a general guideline of what does and does not constitute entrapment. Judge Fullam’s Opinion in U.S. v. Jannotti (supra) interprets those guidelines with respect to the factual setting uncovered at the pre-trial, trial and post-trial stages of Operation ABSCAM. He decided that entrapment exists in Operation ABSCAM as a matter of law. By focusing upon the question as to defendant Lederer’s predisposition, it is readily apparent that entrapment existed as a matter of law.
What the government succeeded in proving was ... not that the defendants were corrupt ... but that, exposed to strong temptation, they could be rendered corrupt. In short, the evidence establishes entrapment as a matter of law.” U.S. v. Jannotti (supra).

Lack of predisposition on the part of defendant Lederer was proven through the testimony of substantial character witnesses called by him. In not one instance was their testimony challenged, nor was there any evidence to the contrary introduced on the part of the government. The proper role of the F.B.I. and the Justice Department should have been the detection of persons who were already involved in criminality. If they properly focused their attention on individuals actually engaged in the selling of their office, there may not have been an entrapment claim available to the defendant. However, from the sum total of the evidence in this case, it is apparent that no such limitation was placed on the agents’ conduct. Here, the crime and the intent to commit the crime originated with the government agents and not defendant Lederer. Therefore, even if the defendant Lederer engaged in the conduct prescribed by the statutes in question, he is entitled to an acquittal. Absent the temptation offered by the government agents, Lederer might not have committed the crime.

There is no evidence whatsoever that defendant Lederer was, prior to the intervention of government agents, ready and willing to commit the type of crimes for which he was indicted. The very factual setting with which we are now presented is that which caused the federal courts to recognize the defense of entrapment. It was a recognition of the impropriety of inducing the commission of a crime by persons not already engaged in a criminal enterprise that led to the formulation of the doctrine of entrapment.

Neither U.S. v. Payner, 48 Law Week 4829 (1980); nor U.S. v. Morrison, 49 Law Week 4087 (1981) in any way diminishes the position of defendant Lederer with regard to the due process and/or entrapment arguments. Here, unlike Payner and/or Morrison, there was a direct cause and effect relationship between the conduct of the government agents and the resulting harm to defendant Lederer. He has “standing” and the conduct of the government agents did impact upon him directly.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES J. BINNS.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. RAYMOND F. LEDERER, ANGELO J. ERRICHETTI, LOUIS C. JOHANSON, HOWARD L. CRIDEN, DEFENDANTS


Motion to dismiss indictment for violations of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and under the supervisory power of federal courts to regulate outrageous misconduct by agents of the Federal Government

Defendant, Raymond F. Lederer, respectfully requests an evidenti-
ary hearing prior to trial and moves for an Order dismissing the indictment against him on the following grounds:

1. The alleged criminal activities described in the above-captioned indictments were the result of a scheme which was conceived, contrived and perpetrated by agents of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in conspiracy with at least one convicted felon.

2. As a part of the scheme, the conspirators contrived to lie and involve themselves in criminal acts in order to lure government officials and others into meetings and conversations during which attempts were made to bribe such persons. The intent of such outrageous conduct was to cause new crimes to be committed for the purpose of obtaining criminal indictments.

3. The scheme consisted of, but was not limited to, the following outrageous conduct on the part of the conspirators:
   (a) Manufacturing a criminal enterprise;
   (b) The arbitrary and capricious selection of targets;
   (c) Fraudulently manufacturing jurisdiction over said targets;
   (d) Luring said targets to meetings by virtue of lies and promises of legitimate transactions;
   (e) Intentionally misleading said targets as to the nature and purpose of said meetings;
   (f) Encouraging said targets to remain at the meetings and participate in conversations the government agents knew might tend to incriminate them;
   (g) Engaging in invidious and slanderous comments concerning public officials, public persons and acquaintances of the targets;
   (h) Causing the bribery of certain public officials;
   (i) Encouraging the targets to lure other unwitting individuals into like situations;
   (j) Engaging in meetings and telephonic communications which were surreptitiously recorded, during the course of which, the targets were invited to incriminate themselves by virtue of statements made in response to carefully calculated questions and fabricated situations, all of which were conceived by the conspirators;
   (k) Improper counseling and coaching during the course of such meetings by Federal attorneys and agents to undercover agents as to ways and means of eliciting incriminating statements from the targets;
   (l) Illegally recording the conversations and meetings aforesaid;
   (m) Creating fraudulent bank accounts;
   (n) Portraying themselves as agents of non-existent persons and entities;
   (o) Violating state and federal laws;
   (p) Violating internal regulations and policies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
   (q) Violating internal policies and regulations of the United States Department of Justice;
   (r) Intentionally divulging the existence of the scheme with the specific purpose of, but not limited to, severely prejudicing
the defendant, abruptly halting the investigation, and for other illegal purposes;

(s) Selecting as targets those political figures who were predisposed to vote against the President of the United States;

(t) Engaging in ongoing conduct to cover up the behavior previously alleged;

(u) Encouraging the targets to make misstatements to federal officials;

(v) Improperly manipulating the grand jury which was impaneled to investigate the allegations of impropriety, so as to obtain a predetermined result;

(w) Vindictively prosecuting said individuals; and,

(x) Engaging in other illegal conduct, the purpose and nature of which will be shown at the hearing to be held in connection with this Motion.

WHEREFORE, defendant moves that the Court schedule a hearing on the instant Motion after which an Order dismissing the indictment should be entered.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES J. BINNS.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. RAYMOND F. LEDERER, ANGELO J. ERRICHETTI, LOUIS C. JOHANSON, HOWARD L. CRIDEN, DEFENDANTS


Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Under the Supervisory Power of Federal Courts to Regulate Outrageous Misconduct by Agents of the Federal Government

The defendant moves for an Order dismissing the indictment. This Motion is made pursuant to F.R.Crim. P. 12(b). A hearing is requested so that evidence may be adduced which will establish defendant's entitlement to such an Order. Such Motion is timely and should be heard prior to trial inasmuch as the merits thereof are capable of determination prior to the trial of the general issue. U.S. v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319, (5th Cir. 1977).

On a date as yet unknown to defendant, certain individuals employed by the Federal Government of the United States of America, the identity of whom is as yet unknown to defendant, conspired to embark upon a scheme/scam so thoroughly outrageous that it violated the defendant's right to fundamental fairness. In addition, it made a mockery of the integrity of the United States governmental system as a whole.

As a first step in the above-mentioned scheme/scam, agents of the United States Department of Justice and Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation enlisted the aid of an individual whom they knew to be corrupt. The extent of the moral depravity of that individual is as yet unknown to the defendant. However, suffice it to say that
his name is Mel Weinberg and that he is an admitted “con-man” with alleged ties to organized crime. He has been convicted of at least one felony.48

In conspiracy with Mel Weinberg, the agents of the United States Department of Justice and the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation created a criminal enterprise which they, by their own admission, facetiously labelled “Operation Abscam”. At times and places known only to the government agents and the felon (the conspirators), a complete scenario of proposed conduct was designed, authorized and approved by persons in the highest levels of the United States Government! The blueprint for this illegal scheme/scam appears to have taken its earliest shape sometime in 1978. At that time Mel Weinberg (whose actions from that time forward bore the imprimatur of the Chief Executive of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as the Attorney General of the United States) arranged for a meeting between himself and Camden, New Jersey Mayor Angelo Errichetti (the “mark”). The purpose of that meeting was to solicit the commission of a crimes(s), which crime(s) was to take the form (according to the government’s blueprint) of the purchasing of legislative influence from individuals who occupied positions of prominence in the executive and legislative branches of local, State and Federal government.

Initially, the United States Government authorized its agent, the convicted con man, to enlist additional agents, be they witting or otherwise, as his accomplices. Sometime in 1979, the government agent, Mel Weinberg, made his first “pitch”.49 That “pitch” triggered a course of action which erupted into a mindless, juggernaut like dragnet, eventually sweeping into it hapless, innocent victims of the government’s illegal and outrageous conduct.

Weinberg, at the direction of and in conspiracy with agents of the United States Government, suggested to Mayor Angelo Errichetti that if he followed the suggestion of the conspirators, he could legally reap vast profits. At the outset, they disarmed Errichetti and others by talking in terms of investment, profit motive, jobs for constituents, commissions, economic incentives and legitimate fees to be earned (the “bait”). It was not until the interest of Errichetti had been piqued by discussions of enormous wealth and the existence of a supposed “sheik”, that the conversations took a turn toward unlawful activity. Once having excited the interests of Errichetti and others with the discussions of money, jobs, investments in titanium mines, coal mines, hotels, gambling casinos, land, ships, shipbuilding companies, and untold wealth, Weinberg commenced to reel in “the fish” by means of conversation that shifted from legitimate topics to unethical topics and finally to unlawful activity. It was conceived that once Weinberg obtained the confidence of Errichetti, that Errichetti would lure additional political targets. It was hoped that some evidence of corruption would surface. Through the use of interstate facilities (which the

44 Attached hereto and marked Exhibit “A” is the criminal record of Mel Weinberg.

45 This recital of events is in large measure hampered by the refusal of the government to divulge audio and/or visual tapes and written transcripts which are in their possession and that contain the chronological history of events. This, coupled with the government claim of “grand jury secrecy” in the context of an ongoing investigation, has severely hampered the defendant in his ability to verbalize the chronology of events. The defendant is severely prejudiced in his ability to collect information and to piece together the entire government scheme in order to elaborate on the many events of overreaching and outrageous conduct.
government would see to the use of), these hoped for incidents of corruption would be transformed into federal crimes. Toward that end, the use of telephones, interstate travel, as well as federal and state bribery statutes were mandated. In addition, the targets were lured out of their home districts so as to deprive them of any * * * with their home jurisdictions.

No checking was to be done into the target’s background nor was there to be any reasonable cause to believe that the target was disposed to committing a crime. Knowledge of illegal predisposition or the lack of it would especially be lacking with respect to the political targets.

Once having solicited the services of Errichetti, the conspirators facilitated the recruitment by him of additional “marks”. Errichetti was directed to solicit political figures to assist him in securing entry into the United States for the fictitious “sheik”. In addition, he was directed to advise the hapless political figures that the “sheik” would invest fabulous sums of money in the United States of America, especially in their legislative districts.50 The figure which the conspirators bandied about as being available for investment amounted to over $400,000,000.00. It was made to appear that the sheik maintained such a sum in the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City.

Shortly after the first encounter with Errichetti, undercover conspirators commenced targeting certain local and state legislators and members of Congress. Interestingly, there existed no reliable or specific criminal allegations against said targets as of the time of their selection. Once having established contact through Errichetti and/or other witting or unwitting undercover agents, the “marks” were requested to provide possible legislative help on a variety of matters. In return for said “help”, both the legislators and middlemen were promised extraordinary investment incentives in their districts designed to motivate them to involve themselves in matters that they might not otherwise be disposed to engage in.

In furtherance of the scheme/scam, the government conspirators couched their proposals in such felicitous terms so as not to make it immediately apparent that * * * Howard Criden as their attorney with directions to him to contact selected targets or their agents in an effort to arrange a meeting at which legitimate topics of conversation such as investments, political contributions, etc., were to be discussed.51 Once having entered into the conversation, be it by telephone or in person, the government conspirators directed that the conversation be invidiously shifted from talk of legal matters to matters quasi-legal until finally, in some cases, downright illegal. If, during the course of any conversations with a “mark” it seemed that the government conspirators were falling short of ensnaring the “mark” in a criminal conversation, a government lawyer and/or FBI agent would provide the necessary counselling and prompting by means of an on the spot telephone call to the government agent engaged in the discussion.52

50 A taped conversation which took place on Aug. 7, 1979 reveals that Mel Weinberg told Howard Criden that during any meetings between legislators and representatives of the sheik that the legislators were to “come on strong . . . the stronger the better.”

51 Attached hereto and marked Exhibit “B” is an excerpt from the Congressional Record dated June 15, 1980 which relates an experience of the Honorable Jim Mattox, a Congressman from Texas, who was a target. This excerpt provides insight into the method by which the conspirators approached their targets.

52 The audio and visual recordings which have been disclosed to counsel for the defendant are replete with instances of telephone calls interrupting the meetings at which the targets were present. After such calls, the conversations invariably took a turn toward eliciting incriminating statements.
The aforesaid scenario continued over at least a one year period. During that time, the undercover government agents sought meetings with and surreptitiously gained access to a number of people. In some instances, they were successful in having the individuals appear to have incriminated themselves during the conversation. In other instances, politicians rejected outright the overtures of the conspirators. A review of the scheme points to the unerring conclusion that the conspirators sought out specific victims as targets and ignored others.

During the existence of the scheme/scam referred to, the government agents knowingly allowed and encouraged undercover informants to defraud innocent people through the use of "Operation Ab-scum" as a cover. For example, Mel Weinberg promoted the idea of using phony letters of credit for investment purposes. He is heard to have engaged in conversations criticizing the revenue laws of the United States of America. He advocated the idea of introducing a bill in order to have a New York judge practice law in New Jersey. He stated that he "put out" money to get a casino license. He advocated the bribery of the Chairman of the Gaming Commission. He professed intimate knowledge of the workings of the Mafia families in America. He slandered an individual who is currently making application for a casino license. He slandered the wife of a well known restaurateur, characterizing her as the "Queen of the abortionist in New York." Government agents provided that cover both passively and actively in thwarting prosecutions and intentionally delaying civil court proceedings.

As an additional highlight to the government's scheme, they intentionally leaked selected details of the operation to the media. Whether

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In a taped conversation which took place on Aug. 7, 1979, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were advised by Howard Criden that he had a rich client who was a "loan shark", and who lent hundreds of thousands of dollars each week. His identity was not sought nor was there any follow-up by the agents even though they were advised that the "loan shark" had already been convicted of a crime.

As early as Aug. 28, 1979, Weinberg was heard to have asked specifically for the name of a legislator, presumably, the defendant. From the content of the conversation it is obvious that Weinberg was reaching for a name of an individual who he had no reason, whatsoever to believe might be disposed to corruption.

On Sept. 18, 1979, Weinberg advised Criden that he had advised his people that there would be at least ten, and maybe more, thereby authorizing Criden to reach out for such a number without any cause whatsoever to believe in their corruption.

A tape of a conversation between Howard Criden and Mel Weinberg on Nov. 6, 1979 evidences a request by Mel Weinberg to Howard Criden for a meeting with Philadelphia Mayor-Elect William J. Green. In spite of repeated assurances by Criden that Mayor-Elect Green would not take money, Mel Weinberg repeatedly asked that a conference be set up and that Criden go further in trying to arrange a discussion of City contracts.

On January 18, 1980, F.B.I. agent Michael Wade advised that his people were only interested in municipal leaders with titles. Thereafter, on Jan. 24, 1980, agent Wade specifically requested a conference with G. Fred DiBona, Jr., head of the Port Authority of Philadelphia. There was at that time, and remains today, absolutely no evidence of any predisposition toward corruption on the part of Mr. DiBona.

Kenneth Gibson, Mayor of Newark, was secretly filmed handing a business card to an F.B.I. operative. Instead of there being a follow-up investigation, the Justice Department refused authorization to proceed with the investigation. This refusal reportedly followed the agents even though they were

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Attached hereto and marked Exhibit "C" are Articles authored by nationally syndicated columnist Jack Anderson which discuss the selective nature of the operation and purports to quote the government informant Mel Weinberg.

Defendants informed at least one instance where government agents and attorneys filed false affidavits with a Federal Judge sitting in the Eastern District of Brooklyn. The false affidavits were filed in an effort to cover up the government's participation in "Operation Ab-scum" and to delay the exposure of their informant agent, Mel Weinberg.
the leaks were caused by the fact that (1) the dragnet was drawing into it individuals who high officials in the United States government did not want exposed,\(^5\) or (2) because certain agents of the government had become disenchanted with cover-up activities, or (3) because the wandering dragnet was on the verge of toppling the American Democratic process, or (4) because the conspirators wished to severely prejudice and disgrace the victims of the scheme/scam, is unclear.

The misconduct then proceeded to the grand jury phase where in the government attorneys selectively and vindictively presented indictments against certain defendants.\(^6\) The trials of those defendants are scheduled to commence in New York, then Philadelphia and thereafter in New York, in such a fashion to effectively deprive them of preparation time. The government has caused certain of the defendants to be scheduled for trial at two or more locations at the same time.

The defendant seeks dismissal of the indictment against him based upon two separate legal concepts.

The conduct of the government as set forth above places before this Court a situation so outrageous that due process principles bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction. Here, the government’s conduct violated that “fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,” mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That is, the conduct is so repugnant that due process principles bar prosecution. U.S. v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev’d 411 U.S. 428, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed. 2d 366 (1973).

In Russell, as is not the case here, the defendant was an active participant in an illegal enterprise. However, the Court found that the encouragement of the defendant by government agents was so repugnant to the fairness dictated by the Fifth Amendment that the indictment should have been dismissed. A fortiori, when the criminal enterprise was concocted by the government with a view toward inviting the defendant to participate therein, for the sole purpose of convicting him, the prosecution fails the rigors of the Fifth Amendment.

As the oft-quoted dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis so brilliantly stated in Olmstead v. U.S. (277 U.S. 435, 485):

Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rule of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Gov-

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\(^5\) Weinberg and the agents are quoted as being frustrated and bewildered at a series of preventative orders from the Justice Department even though the leads came from intermediaries who had already successfully “delivered” other Congressmen.

\(^6\) It is noteworthy that the government lawyers who were present during the prompting and cajoling of the various targets into criminal conversations are the very same Assistant United States Attorneys charged with prosecution of the indictments. These same federal attorneys witnessed the F.B.I. agents’ instructions to the con man and federal agents on how to limit the constitutional defenses which would normally be available to these targets. Moreover, these very same government lawyers presented the evidence to the grand jurors who indicted the defendant!
ernment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.

What is involved here is not merely an oversight on the part of the government agents but rather a continuing course of prosecutorial misconduct over a lengthy time span so egregious that the defendant should never be brought to trial. There is no question but that the requirements of due process in a given case extend to pre-trial conduct of law enforcement operatives. Those requirements may be invoked to bar prosecution altogether where crimes result from illegal law enforcement practice. U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d, 267, 273.

There have been a number of cases which have considered the instant principle of law with respect to the right of an accused to secure dismissal of an indictment. The factual situations have of course varied with each case.57

However, the cases are uniform in holding that if the egregious conduct on the part of government agents generated new crimes by the defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges against him when, as far as the record reveals, he was lawfully and peacefully minding his own affairs, that fundamental fairness does not permit the Court to countenance such actions by law enforcement officials. Consequently, prosecution for a crime so fomented by them will be barred. Here, the government investigation was not concerned with the existing enterprise, U.S. v. Russell, supra; the * * * U.S. v. Leja, supra. Viewing all of the circumstances of this case, it is obvious that fundamental fairness has been denied. Hampton v. U.S., supra, 425, U.S. at 494-95, N.6, 96 S.Ct. 1652, N.6 (Powell, J., concurring). There must be a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime. It is unthinkable to permit government agents to instigate illegal enterprise scams merely to gather evidence to convict participants therein. U.S. v. Archer, supra, 486, F.2d 670, 676-77, 2nd Cir. 1973 (Friendly, J.).

Over and above the “Due Process” violations, the defendant herein relies upon this Federal Court to exercise its supervisory powers in dismissing the indictment. See generally, not “The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts”, 79 Harvard L. Rev. 1656 (1963): Note, “The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts”, 53 Geo. L. Rev. 1050 (1965). In fact, “The Federal Judicial system contemplates supervision by the Federal District Courts of the nation over the government attorneys and enforcement officers acting within their districts, a supervisory jurisdiction possessed in turn on review by the several courts of appeals and ultimately by the Supreme Court.” Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1965). These supervisory powers ensure the even-handed administration of justice in the Federal system. In the case at bar, this court should assume the responsibility of ensuring that government agents do not overreach. The power of this Court over the administration of federal criminal justice

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has few limitations. There is no specific or general legislation which prohibits or prevents the district court from correcting inequities or unfair procedures within its jurisdiction.

Because this power to supervise the administration of federal criminal justice is not based on constitutional grounds, the Court has great freedom to exercise its supervisory powers. *Sturdivant v. New Jersey*, 289 F.2d 846, 848 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961). This federal district court should impose its own notions of fair play over and above the constitutional requirements of due process. This is so even if the inequities do not rise to constitutional proportions. *Hayton v. Epler*, 555 F.2d 599, 694 (5th Cir. 1977).

Not only should this court require the government agents to adhere to constitutional mandates but should also require that the methods employed be in keeping with sound judicial practice although in no wise commanded by the constitution. *Cupp v. Naughten*, 414, U.S. 141, 146, (1973). After all, the interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win the case, but that justice shall be done.” *Berger v. U.S.*, 295, U.S. 78 (1934).

The district Court's supervisory power in this case is no different than that which exists regarding the supervision and granting relief from unreasonable and oppressive grand jury process. *Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue*, 406 F. Supp., 1098. 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1976).

It has been observed that:

Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by the observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as “due process” and below which we reach what is really a trial by force. *McNabb v. United States*, 318 U.S. 332 (1942).

The supervisory power called upon here is no different than that which is exercised by a federal court over the conduct of federal prosecutors during the actual conduct of a trial. Just as a federal prosecutor may not secure a perjurious conviction by questioning an individual concerning facts which he is already in possession of and shields from the individual, *U.S. v. Slawik*, 548 F.2d 75 (3rd Cir. 1977), no sound public policy can or will be advanced by a conviction for the crimes alleged in the instant indictment since they were the product of governmental misconduct.

This court has complete control over federal personnel insofar as its notions on fundamental fairness are concerned. *U.S. v. Jacobs*, 547 F.2d 772 (2nd Cir. 1976). The Second Circuit courts have traditionally exercised their supervisory powers to exert uniform practice within that jurisdiction.

The facts of the instant case establish a high level of perjurious misconduct. Operation Abscam was initiated by the federal government in order to generate unlawful activity among local, state and federal legislators. This investigation was supervised by the Attorney General of the United States as well as the Chief Executive of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It was they who, in conjunction with a convicted felon, conceived the invidious capers about which the in-
vestigators concerned themselves. By virtue of the type of audio and visual evidence which has been gathered it is obvious that the government agents discussed in detail, among themselves on several occasions, the mechanics of the operation.

The United States, through its agents, Messrs. Weinberg, Civiletti, Welch, Hayman, as well as a score of additional agents and attorneys, knowingly and willfully participated in the unlawful activities of Abscam. Moreover, they encouraged the informant, Mel Weinberg, to arrange for meetings, without first having made the slightest determination as to whether or not the targets were willing and active participants to the crimes alleged. In so doing, the United States was an active participant in the admittedly criminal conduct dreamed up by Mel Weinberg. The inescapable conclusion is that they knowingly and purposely, and in bad faith, violated the rights of the defendant. Inasmuch as they have schemed and acted in contravention to the United States Constitution, their conduct must be deemed outrageous. The relief sought here is not the suppression of any evidence gathered as a result of those outrageous activities, but rather the outright dismissal of the indictment. This is the appropriate case for the Court to exert its supervisory power.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES J. BINNS,
Attorney for Defendant Raymond F. Lederer.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 28, 1981.


Hon. George C. Pratt,
U.S. District Judge,
Brooklyn, N.Y.

DEAR JUDGE PRATT: This letter, in part, sets forth the manner in which defendant Raymond F. Lederer was prejudiced as the result of government misconduct in Operation Abscam.

At his trial defendant Lederer relied on the defense entrapment. In addition, he moved that the government misconduct resulted in the deprivation of his right to “due process” under the Constitution of the United States.

The fact that agents of the United States government manufactured a criminal enterprise has been admitted by the government agents. Moreover, it has been established that the selection of targets was not based upon any evidence of their prior misconduct or rumored violations of the law, but rather resulted from the mere mention of their names by “middlemen”. The middlemen received their impetus to implicate the targets by promises of untold wealth and lucrative ventures in conjunction with representatives of the “sheik”. Those promises are well documented in the audiotapes and transcripts as well as the testimony of government agents throughout the trials and due process hearings held thus far.

Jurisdiction and venue was “manufactured” over the targets by having them travel across interstate lines to receive their “bribes”
at pre-arranged places designated by the government agents. Once lured into the meeting, the targets were intentionally misled as to the nature and purpose of the meeting and were invited and subtly coerced into conversations which tended to incriminate them.

The subject of impropriety was first proffered by the government agents as was the possibility of remuneration, both proper and improper. In fact, there was no limit set on the amount of inducements which were capable of being offered to a target. In the instance of defendant Lederer, the improper inducements were mingled with appeals to his civic duty and the possibility of financial opportunity for the City of Philadelphia.

There was no control over the type of inducement which the middlemen were offered, nor was there any control over what inducements the middlemen were enabled to dangle before the targets. This situation existed because the government in reality had no control over the operations in the ABSCAM investigation. Thus, the inducements and urgings of Louis Johanson and Angelo Errichetti are directly chargeable to the government.

There exists evidence that Melvin Weinberg was accused early on of "putting words into people's mouths." The tape of September 11, 1979 reflects the fact that F.B.I. agent Anthony Amoroso did just that during the meeting with Congressman Lederer.

The conduct of the government in denying defense counsel access to Brady material was a direct violation of the Constitutional rights of Raymond F. Lederer. Two weeks before his trial a memorandum was created by Assistant United States Attorney Thomas Puccio, wherein he recommended that certain material be given to defense counsel. It was not until the second day of the Lederer trial that the exculpatory material was in part delivered to defense counsel in the form of a memorandum from Assistant United States Attorney Edwin Naythan. Both the timing and the manner of the surrender of the Naythan memorandum were such that it improperly deprived defendant Lederer's counsel of a chance to adequately prepare his case or to make use of the contents of the memorandum.

In view of what has occurred with respect to the testimony of Assistant United States Attorney Edward Plaza, it now appears that not all of the Jenks Act material has been delivered to defense counsel. That is, all of the statements of Messrs. Weinberg and Amoroso were not delivered. They were important government witnesses during the trial of Congressman Lederer. This conduct is but another example of the ongoing governmental misconduct.

During the trial of Congressman Lederer, his statement was read to the jury by an F.B.I. agent. That statement was procured from Congressman Lederer on February 2, 1980 with the express purpose of prejudicing the jury which would ultimately try the Lederer case. F.B.I. agent Cyril Gamber testified that he only questioned Congressman Lederer to see if he would tell the truth. He did not question him to ascertain any new facts, as he had seen the entire videotape of the meeting of September 11, 1979 prior to visiting Congressman Raymond F. Lederer!

In addition to the reasons set forth in this letter, defendant Lederer incorporates and refers to the allegations contained in the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Violations of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, which was filed on July 5, 1980. It is the position of defendant Lederer that he was the victim of entrapment as a matter of law, and that the instances of governmental misconduct prejudiced him directly and resulted in denying him due process of law.

Respectfully,

JAMES J. BINNS, PA.

MEMORANDUM, APRIL 29, 1981

To: Hon. Louis Stokes, Chairman, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.
From: E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Special Counsel, Allen R. Snyder.
Re: Constitutional Power of the House To Expel a Member for Misconduct.

During the course of the current proceedings involving Representatives Raymond F. Lederer, a question has been raised concerning the Constitutional power of the House to expel a Member for misconduct. You requested yesterday that we prepare by this afternoon a Memorandum for the Committee's use on this matter. While the time available has precluded a comprehensive review, we are setting forth below a summary and analysis of the principal questions and precedents that may be pertinent to the Committee's consideration of this issue.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Constitution explicitly provides that each House shall have the power, by a two-thirds vote, to expel a Member. No court ever has had occasion to review Congress' exercise of this power, but it appears to be virtually unlimited by Constitutional restraints.

Some House precedents have suggested that expulsion may be improper where the offending conduct occurred prior to the Member's election to the current Congress, and thus the exercise of the House's disciplinary power may be inconsistent with the right of the electorate, with full knowledge of the Member's misconduct, to choose nevertheless to return him to office. This Committee's Report in the last Congress concerning the Diggs matter cast considerable doubt on that approach, although neither the Congress nor the courts have definitively resolved the question. In any event, this issue would appear to be irrelevant to the case of Congressman Lederer, since he was indicted after his primary election and his conviction occurred well after the general election. Thus, the voters did not have full knowledge of the offenses he committed at the time they reelected him, and there appears to be no Constitutional impediment to the Congressional expulsion power under such circumstances.

DISCUSSION

The Constitution explicitly provides in Article I, Section 5, Clause 2, that each House of Congress has the power to expel one of its own Members:

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
This language is clear on its face in providing each House with the power of expulsion.

The House has exercised the power of expulsion on four occasions. The Senate has expelled many more Members. See Bowman & Bowman, Article I, Section 5: Congress' Power to Expel—An Exercise in Self-Restraint, 29 Syracuse L. Rev. 1071 n.2 (1978); McLaughlin, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Power To Expel, To Exclude and To Punish, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 43, 52 & n.50 (1972). In none of these instances has there been a judicial challenge to Congress’ power to expel a Member, and thus there simply are no judicial precedents on the point.

In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), an exclusion (not expulsion) case, the Court in dictum seems to have assumed Congress’ broad power to expel. See id. at 506. Indeed, in a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated clearly that in his view the House could have expelled Representative Powell without its actions even being subject to judicial review:

By Art. I, § 5, the House may “expel a Member” by a vote of two-thirds. And if this were an expulsion case I would think that no justiciable controversy would be presented, the vote of the House being two-thirds or more. [395 U.S. at 553.]

Although there have been no judicial decisions, or even challenges, regarding Congress’ general power to expel, several arguable limitations on the expulsion power have been considered and reviewed by legal scholars. It has been suggested, for example, that Congress’ expulsion power might be limited to cases of “disorderly behavior,” or criminal offenses, or misconduct in office (as opposed to private misconduct), or instances not involving a Member’s expression of opinion on political issues. See Bowman & Bowman, supra, 29 Syracuse L. Rev. at 1092–1102; McLaughlin, supra, 41 Fordham L. Rev. at 48–51. There is little precedent supporting these possible limitations on Congress’ expulsion power. See id. Even more importantly, however, it must be emphasized that none of these possible issues appears relevant in any way to Congressman Lederer’s case. Based upon the record reviewed and the conclusions already reached by the Committee, it appears clear that the conduct which the Committee has found Congressman Lederer to have committed would constitute “disorderly behavior” under virtually any definition of that admittedly ambiguous phrase. His actions have been found to constitute criminal offenses. Representative Lederer’s actions were taken in connection with his office, rather than in a purely private, non-Congressional capacity. Finally, there is no issue here with regard to the Committee’s proceeding against Congressman Lederer based upon his expression of political views, or otherwise in violation of any First Amendment considerations.

It has also been argued that Congress may not discipline a Member for conduct which occurred prior to his election. There has been

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58 Representatives John Clark, John Reid, and Henry Burnett all were expelled in 1861; Representative Michael J. Myers was expelled in 1980.
59 All but one of the expulsions in each House occurred during the Civil War. See McLaughlin, supra, 41 Fordham L. Rev. at 52–53.
60 The Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack, supra, indicated in dictum that it understood that Congress had serious doubt concerning its power to punish in such cases. The Court stated, however, that it was expressing “no view” on this issue, 395 U.S. at 508–509, 510 n. 30.
extensive House consideration of this issue over the years. We are setting forth below a summary of the key House precedents on the question. While a review of these precedents demonstrates that the House has been inconsistent in its approach to this general issue, as we will discuss below these precedents simply do not apply to the particular facts of the Lederer matter.

1. Matthew Lyons—5th Congress (1799)

Congressman Lyons was convicted of violating State Sedition laws while a Member of Congress. Following conviction, he was reelected to the House. A resolution of expulsion was introduced during the 5th Congress. The opponents of the resolution argued that the Member’s constituency had full knowledge of his conviction and nevertheless reelected him. The supporters of the resolution argued that the House had unlimited power to expel a Member for acts done during a prior Congress. The House vote, 49 to 45 in favor of the resolution, indicates that a majority of the voting Members concluded that the House had power to punish a Member for conduct committed prior to the Member’s last election. The Member was not expelled, however, because the resolution of expulsion did not receive the necessary two-thirds vote.

2. Orsamus B. Matteson—35th Congress (1958)

During the 34th Congress, a committee appointed to investigate the charges against Congressman Matteson recommended that he be expelled for alleged corruption in connection with legislation. Congressman Matteson resigned before the House’s consideration of the resolution. He was reelected to the 35th Congress, and a new resolution of expulsion was introduced. The matter was referred to a Special Committee which noted that it was “not called upon to expel Mr. Matteson for any cause arising during his present Congressional term, but to expel him for causes alleged to have taken place in the 34th Congress.” In a statement supporting the supremacy of the rights of a Member’s constituency over the rights of Congress, the Committee stated:

The powers and privileges of this House are defined by the Constitution formed by the people. The exercise of power in this case is but a violation of their rights. The assertion of power in this case is but entering upon a fearful contest with the American people to deprive them of their rights and privileges. To exert it would be a flagrant usurpation of powers never granted to this body, and would ultimately annihilate the power of the people in the choice of their representatives. It is a question of usurpation upon the other side, and American freedom upon the other.

While this House should scrupulously guard and protect its own privileges and purity, it should be equally cautious not to invade the privileges of the people. Can any reasonable doubt be entertained as to the power claimed, it should be permitted to remain with the people, who, wisely under our sys-

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tem of government, are confided with the duty of selecting their representatives every two years.62

The resolution of expulsion was tabled by a vote of 96 to 69. A minority opinion was also filed which concluded that the House had jurisdiction to expel Congressman Matteson for his prior conduct.

3. Oakes Ames and James Brooks—42d Congress (1873)

Resolutions of expulsion were offered against these Members for alleged bribery during a prior Congress. Their conduct was part of the Credit Mobilier scandal. The Select Committee appointed to investigate the charges made the following conclusions as to its power to expel Members for prior misconduct:

The committee has no occasion in this report to discuss the question as to the power or duty of the House in a case where a constituency, with a full knowledge of the objectionable character of a man, have selected him to be their representative. It is hardly a case to be supposed that any constituency, with a full knowledge that a man had been guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude, would elect him. The majority of the committee are not prepared to concede such a man could be forced upon the House, and would not consider the expulsion of such a man any violation of the right of the electors, for while the electors have rights that should be respected, the House as a body has rights also that should be protected and preserved. But that in such case the judgment of the constituency would be entitled to the greatest consideration, and that this should form an important element in its determination, is readily admitted.

It is universally conceded, as we believe, that the House has ample jurisdiction to punish or expel a Member for an offense committed during his term as Member, though committed during a vacation of Congress and in no way connected with his duties as a Member. Upon what principle is it that such a jurisdiction can be maintained? It must be upon one or both of the following: That the offense shows him to be an unworthy and improper man to be a Member, or that his conduct brings odium and reproach upon the body.63

The Committee then analogized its power to expel to the power of impeachment:

It has never been contended that the power to impeach for any of the causes enumerated was intended to be restricted to those which might occur after appointment to a civil office, so that a civil officer who had secretly committed such offense before his appointment should not be subject upon detection and exposure to be convicted and removed from office. Every consideration of justice and sound policy would seem to require that the public interests be secured, and those chosen to be their guardians be free from the pollution of high crimes, no matter at what time that pollution has attached.

62 Id. at 4–5.
If this be so in regard to other civil officers, under institu-
tions which rest upon the intelligence and virtue of the
people, can it well be claimed that the law-making Repre-
sentative may be vile and criminal with impunity, provided
the evidences of his corruption are found to antedate his elec-
tion.\textsuperscript{64}

Following this report, the Judiciary Committee issued its own
report opposing the views expressed by the Special Committee and
concluding that "the power of expelling a Member for some alleged
crime, committed, it may be, years before his election, is not within
the Constitutional prerogatives of the House."\textsuperscript{65} That Committee
stated:

[T]his is a government of the people, which assumes that
they are the best judges of the social, intellectual, and moral
qualifications of their representatives, whom they are to
choose, not anybody else to choose for them; and we, there-
fore, find in the people's Constitution and frame of govern-
ment they have, in the very first article and second section,
determined that "the House of Representatives shall be com-
posed of Members chosen every second year by the people
of the States," not by Representatives chosen for them at the
will and caprice of Members of Congress from other States
according to the notions of the "necessities of self-preserva-
tion and self-purification," which might suggest themselves
to the reason or the caprice of the Members from other States
in any process of purgation or purification which two-thirds
of the Members of either House may "deem necessary" to pre-
vent bringing "the body into contempt and disgrace." ** * *
[O]ur opinion upon the whole matter, therefore, is that the
right of representation is the right of the constituency, and
not that of the representative, and, so long as he does nothing
which is disorderly or renders him unfit to be in the House
while a Member thereof, that, except for the safety of the
House, or the Members thereof, or for its own protection, the
House has no right or legal constitutional jurisdiction
or power to expel the Members.\textsuperscript{66}

After considering both reports, the House adopted a substitute reso-
lution of censure. This resolution contained a preamble stating that
two elections had intervened since the misconduct and expressing
"grave doubts" as to the rightful exercise of the House's power to expel
a Member "for offenses committed by such Member before his election
thereto, and not connected with such election." The House voted 132
to 36 and 174 to 32 to censure the Members, but the preamble was
disapproved by a vote of 113 to 98. That vote suggests that at least
a majority of the voting Members were not willing to concede that the
House lacked power to expel a Member for misconduct during a prior
Congress.

\textsuperscript{64} Id. at XVII.
\textsuperscript{65} H.R. Rep. No 81, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1873).
\textsuperscript{66} Id.
4. William S. King and John G. Schumaker—44th Congress (1876)

During the 43d Congress, the House Ways and Means Committee investigation into allegations that legislation had been procured by bribery was obstructed by Congressmen King and Schumaker. The Committee report on the obstruction was not sent to the Clerk until the 44th Congress, where it was referred to the Judiciary Committee. That Committee concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to recommend punishment for misconduct which occurred prior to the Member’s reelection. The Committee stated that Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution “cannot vest in Congress a jurisdiction to try a Member for an offense committed before his election.” The Committee’s statement, which refers to the House’s power to impose any sanctions, is of questionable precedential value since the House took no action on the report, and this same argument was asserted by this Committee during the Ames-Brooks controversy during the 42d Congress, and was rejected by the House.

5. William P. Kellogg—48th Congress (1884)

Congressman Kellogg asked the Committee on Expenditures to investigate certain accusations of misconduct charged against him. The Speaker of the House, John G. Carlisle, in rendering a ruling on whether a question of privilege was involved, stated:

The Chair has intimated heretofore that this House has no right to punish a Member for any offense alleged to have been committed previous to the time when he was elected as a Member of the House. That has been so frequently decided in the House that it is no longer a matter of dispute.

The resolution was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, but no report was subsequently issued.

The Speaker’s broad statement must be considered in light of the peculiar facts involved. The alleged improper conduct by Congressman Kellogg appears to have occurred while he was a Member of the Senate. Given the deference accorded each House to the other, it is understandable that the Speaker declined to recognize jurisdiction to punish a Member for conduct which occurred while the Member was in the Senate.

6. Brigham H. Roberts—56th Congress (1899–1900)

Representative-elect Roberts was convicted for practicing polygamy. He was subsequently elected to the 56th Congress. Based on his prior conviction, the House voted to exclude him by a vote of 268 to 50. In its report, the Special Committee considered it had the power to expel, but not exclude him, but rejected the former on the grounds that:

[N]either House of Congress has ever expelled a Member for acts unrelated to him as a Member or inconsistent with his public trust and duty as such.

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70 Congressman Kellogg served in the Senate from 1877–1883.
71 After Powell v. McCormack, supra, the House’s actions in excluding Mr. Roberts would be deemed unconstitutional.
Both Houses have many times refused to expel where the guilt of the Member was apparent; where the refusal to expel was put upon the ground that the House or Senate, as the case might be, had no right as such, or because it was committed prior to his election.12

This language also must be considered in the context of the facts of the Roberts case, which involved conduct by a Member-elect while a private citizen, which occurred prior to his initial election.

7. William B. Cockran—58th Congress (1904)

Congressman Cockran requested an investigation into allegations that he was involved in election irregularities prior to his initial election to Congress. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, after examining the House precedents, concluded that the House may not punish a Member for that which he did in his capacity as a citizen before his election as a Member. He stated that:

In view of the high constitutional importance of this question, the Chair on yesterday declined to rule until he had examined the precedents thoroughly. He finds that the question has often arisen, and that while there has been some diversity of opinion, there is in the main a well-defined line of decisions indicating that the House may not take such action.73

The rulings in the Roberts and Cockran cases recognize that the House may lack jurisdiction to punish a Member for misconduct which occurs prior to the Member's initial election. However, other precedents such as the Whaley case, discussed below, suggest the opposite conclusion.

8. Richard S. Whaley—63d Congress (1913)

Congressman Whaley was charged with violating the Corrupt Practices Act during his election campaign. While the Committee on Elections determined that the charges should be dismissed for lack of evidence, it concluded that the House's power to expel a Member for such conduct “seems to be unlimited”:

He [the Member] may commit a crime or may be disloyal or do many things that would render him ineligible as a Member. The precedents are numerous that in cases like these the power to expel a Member is invaluable. This power may be exercised for misconduct on the part of a Member committed in any place and either before or after conviction in a court of law. From a careful survey of the precedents of the House and Senate, its extent seems to be unlimited.

It seems to be a matter purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds vote. Of course, this unlimited power must be fairly, intelligently, and conscientiously made with due regard to the propriety, honor and integrity of the House and the rights of the individual Member affected. For an abuse of this discretion there is no appeal.74

13 Cong. Rec. 3750-51 (1904).
9. Investigation of Lobbying Activities—63d Congress (1914)

During the 63d Congress, the Committee on the Judiciary investigated various lobbying activities and whether Members of Congress and others had been improperly influenced by lobbyists. In its report, the Committee discussed the question of “whether or not the House had the power to expel or punish a Member for misconduct in a preceding or former Congress of which he was also a Member.” The Committee in an apparent reversal of its position in the Ames/Brooks and King/Schumaker cases stated that:

In the judgment of your committee, the power of the House to expel or punish by censure a Member for misconduct occurring before his election or in a preceding or former Congress is sustained by the practice of the House, sanctioned by reason and sound policy and in extreme cases is absolutely essential to enable the House to exclude from its deliberations and councils notoriously corrupt men, who have unexpectedly and suddenly dishonored themselves and betrayed the public by acts and conduct rendering them unworthy of the high position of honor and trust reposed in them.

But in considering this question and in arriving at the conclusions we have reached, we would not have you unmindful of the fact that we are dealing with the question merely as one of power, and it should not be confused with the question of policy also involved. As a matter of sound policy, this extraordinary prerogative of the House, in our judgment, should be exercised only in extreme cases and always with great caution and after due circumspection, and should be invoked with greater caution where the acts of misconduct complained of had become public previous to and were generally known at the time of the Member’s election. To exercise such power in that instance the House might abuse its high prerogative, and in our opinion might exceed the just limitations of its constitutional authority by seeking to substitute its own standards and ideals with the standards and ideals of the constituency of the Member who had deliberately chosen him to be their representative.

This report, which emphasizes the distinction between Constitutional power, on the one hand, and Congressional policy judgment, on the other hand, suggests that Congress’ power to punish is only in doubt when Congress seeks to expel a Member reelected by a constituency with full knowledge of the misconduct.

10. John W. Langley—68th and 69th Congresses (1924–1926)

Congressman Langley was convicted of conspiracy during the 68th Congress. While his appeal was pending, he was reelected to the House. When his credentials were presented, the matter was referred to the Select Committee which issued its recommendation that the matter be deferred until the completion of the pending appeal. The Committee expressed its view that:

Without an expression of the individual opinions of the members of the committee, it must be said that with practical
uniformity the precedents in such cases are to the effect that House will not expel a Member for reprehensible action prior to his election as a Member, not even for conviction for an offense.77

A further statement by the Committee suggests that the House has jurisdiction to take other action against the Member.

The committee, however, are just as strongly of the opinion that the circumstances require action on the part of the House at the appropriate time * * * and the Committee reserves the right to submit a report if occasion requires.78


During the 90th Congress, a Select Committee was appointed to investigate whether Congressman Powell engaged in official misconduct during the prior Congress. In its report, the Select Committee concluded that:

"[T]he power of the House of Representatives upon majority vote to censure and to impose punishments other than expulsion is full and plenary and may be enforced by summary proceedings * * *. This Select Committee is of the opinion that the broad power of the House to censure and punish Members short of expulsion extends to acts occurring during a prior Congress."79

During the 91st Congress, and following the decision in Powell v. McCormack, supra, the Committee's recommendation that Congressman Powell be fined and his seniority removed was adopted by the House.80


During the 92d Congress, Ethics Committee considered a resolution expressing the sense of the House that a Member convicted of a crime for which a sentence of two or more years imprisonment may be imposed should refrain from participating in the business of the House or its committees until his presumption of innocence is restored or "until he is re-elected to the House after the date of such conviction."81 In its report, the Committee stated:

Precedents, without known exception, hold that the House will not act in any way against a Member for any actions of which his electorate had full knowledge at the time of his election. The committee feels that these precedents are proper and should in no way be altered.82

While the House never acted on this report, similar resolutions and reports with substantially identical language were submitted during the 93rd 83 and 94th 84 Congresses, and adopted.

78 6 Cannon’s Precedents § 238 at 407. The reference to the “appropriate time” in the above quotation relates to the Committee’s acquiescence to the Member’s request that no action be taken pending completion of his criminal appeals. The Member also promised to resign if his appeals were unsuccessful.

Congressman Harrington allegedly violated rules of the House during the 93rd Congress. A resolution of expulsion was introduced during the 94th Congress and referred to the Ethics Committee. Congressman Harrington filed a preliminary motion arguing that the Committee lacked jurisdiction because the alleged misconduct occurred during the prior Congress. The Committee denied the motion, recognizing the Committee's jurisdiction to investigate a Member's conduct committed prior to his last election. Ultimately, the Committee found no disciplinary violation and dismissed the complaint.


Congressman Sikes was accused of a conflict of interest arising in connection with his stock holdings. After an investigation, the Ethics Committee recommended that he be reprimanded for having failed to report ownership of certain stock during the years 1968 through 1974. The House adopted the Committee's recommendation and voted to reprimand Congressman Sikes for misconduct. While the Committee did not recommend punishment for misconduct which occurred some 15 years earlier, it noted:

If such activity had occurred within a relatively recent time frame and had just now become a matter of public knowledge, the recommendation of some form of punishment would be a matter for consideration by the Committee.\(^5\)


During the Korean investigation, Congressman Roybal was accused of, \textit{inter alia}, failing to report a 1974 campaign contribution and giving false testimony. Counsel for Congressman Roybal filed a motion seeking to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction because the conduct occurred during a prior Congress. The Ethics Committee denied the motion. The House subsequently voted 219 to 170 to reprimand Congressman Roybal.

16. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.—95th Congress (1979)

A month after Congressman Diggs was convicted of 29 counts of a criminal indictment for, \textit{inter alia}, a payroll kickback scheme involving his Congressional employees, he was reelected to Congress. The matter was referred to the Ethics Committee where the Member argued, by motion, that his reelection by his constituency following his conviction resulted in a conflict between the powers of Congress to expel a Member and the powers and privileges of a Member's constituency to elect and have the Member serve as their representative—a conflict which, he argued, must be resolved in the Member's favor. After considering the extensive briefs on this issue filed by counsel for Congressman Diggs and by the Committee's Special Counsel, the Committee rejected this motion, concluded that it had jurisdiction

over Members for misconduct during a prior Congress, and recom-
mended that the House censure Representative Diggs:

After hearing oral argument from both counsel, the Com-
mittee unanimously denied the Member's motion, ruling that
jurisdiction to proceed was clearly conferred by Article I,
Section 5, of the Constitution.

To have reached a contrary result concerning the jurisdic-
tion of this Committee or the House in this matter would have
required it to overrule or ignore many well reasoned prece-
dents, including very recent opinions of the Committee. Vir-
tually identical claims of lack of jurisdiction were raised but
rejected by the Committee in proceedings involving Repre-
sentative Roybal (95th Congress) and Representative Harr-
ington (94th Congress). Similarly, the House took
disciplinary action with respect to conduct occurring prior to
the Member's last election in the cases of Representative Sikes
(94th Congress) and Representative Powell (90th Congress).

In recent years, the Senate has also disciplined with respect to
prior misconduct in the cases of Senator Dodd (90th Con-
gress) and Senator McCarthy (83d Congress). These prece-
dents are consistent with earlier precedents involving
punishment for prior misconduct, e.g., Matthew Lyon, 5th
Congress (1799); Oakes Ames and James Brooks, 42d
Congress (1873) and Senator William Blount, 5th Congress
1797). The proceedings cited are all discussed in Special
Counsel's memorandum.

An excellent discussion of the purpose and scope of the dis-
ciplinary power conferred on the House by Article I, Section
5, of the Constitution is found in the report of the Committee
on the Judiciary, 63d Congress (1914), from which we
quote:

"In the judgment of your committee the power of the House
to expel or otherwise punish a Member is full and plenary and
may be enforced by summary proceedings. It is discretionary
in character, and upon a resolution for expulsion or censure
of a Member for misconduct each individual Member is at
liberty to act on his sound discretion and vote according to
the dictates of his own judgment and conscience. This ex-
traordinary discretionary power is vested by the Constitution
in the collective membership of the respective Houses of Con-
gress, restricted by no limitation except in case of expulsion
the requirement of the concurrence of a two-thirds vote.

"In the judgment of your committee, the power of the House
to expel or punish by censure a Member for miscon-
duct occurring before his election or in a preceding or for-

66 A motion to expel failed 49-45. Though lacking the two-thirds required for expulsion,
It indicates a majority of the House, acting only ten years following adoption of the Con-
stitution, were of the opinion that the power to punish extended to conduct committed
prior to the Member's election.

67 Senator Blount was expelled by a vote of 25-1.

68 The Committee was investigating allegations that a Member had been improperly
influenced by lobbying activities. The Committee determined the evidence did not warrant
expulsion, but did warrant censure. The Member resigned prior to consideration of the
report by the House.
mer Congress is sustained by the practice of the House, sanctioned by reason and sound policy and in extreme cases is absolutely essential to enable the House to exclude from its deliberations and councils notoriously corrupt men, who have unexpectedly and suddenly dishonored themselves and betrayed the public by acts and conduct rendering them unworthy of the high position of honor and trust reposed in them.

“But in considering this question and in arriving at the conclusions we have reached, we would not have you unmindful of the fact that we have been dealing with the question merely as one of power, and it should not be confused with the question of policy also involved.” (Emphasis supplied) (H.R. Rept. No. 570. 63d Cong., 2d sess. (1914)).

The report proceeds to state that the House, as a matter of policy, should exercise its “extraordinary prerogative only in extreme cases, always with great caution and after due circumspection.” particularly when the Member’s conduct was known to his electorate at the time of his last election. However, as the report emphasizes, power is not to be confused with policy or discretion, and it was the power of Congress which the Member’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction challenged. * * * The Committee and the House cannot overlook entirely the reelection of Rep. Diggs following his conviction and due respect for that decision by his constituents is a proper element in the consideration of this case. [H.R. Rep. No. 96-351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. I. at 3-5 (1979).]

Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., filed supplemental views supporting the Committee’s determination in Diggs, stating:

There is substantial precedent that Congress cannot discipline a Member for acts committed during a previous Congress about which the Member’s constituents had knowledge before his re-election. In effect, this doctrine implies that re-election constitutes forgiveness.

If this proceeding accomplishes nothing else, it overrules the apparent precedents which indicate that Congress will not inquire into acts committed prior to a Member’s last election. [Id. at 21.]

* * * * *

A review of the foregoing precedents makes clear that over the years the House has been less than consistent with regard to its views concerning punishing a Member for conduct occurring prior to his last election. To the extent a recent trend may be emerging, it would appear to be summarized by the Committee last Congress in the Diggs Report, where it suggested that the issue ultimately is one of Congressional policy, and not Constitutional power. It cannot be said, however, that this issue has been definitively resolved, particularly where the sanction of expulsion is sought.

The most important point to emphasize with regard to the Lederer matter, however, is that virtually without exception all these prec-
edents—whether supporting or opposing Congressional power to discipline for prior misconduct—speak of this issue as arising only when the Member has been elected by a constituency which was fully aware of his misconduct. Thus, in the Digg8 case, for example, the Committee, in stating the issue for decision, indicated that it arises where the “alleged misconduct was known to [the Member’s] constituency prior to his reelection.” H.R. Rep. No. 96–351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. I, at 3 (1979). See also Bowman & Bowman, supra, 29 Syracuse L. Rev. at 1108–05 nn. 140, 142. Indeed, the House precedents against punishment for prior misconduct have sometimes been characterized as constituting a doctrine of “forgiveness,” resting on the assumption that the electorate, knowing full well of the Member’s misconduct, has consciously chosen to forgive those acts and return him to the House.98

In the Lederer matter, the facts do not support an argument that the electorate made such a knowing choice. Congressman Lederer won his primary on April 22, 1980, more than a month prior to his May 28 indictment on these charges. He was reelected on November 4, 1980, approximately two months prior to the jury’s January 9, 1981, guilty verdict. Thus, throughout Representative Lederer’s campaign, he told his constituents—and properly so—that he was entitled to a presumption of innocence. Under such circumstances, there is little basis for application of the doctrine of “forgiveness,” or the assumption that the electorate deliberately chose to ignore his misconduct, since the voters had not yet received any reliable information concerning the matter.99

Accordingly, the decision concerning what, if any, sanctions to apply to Congressman Lederer for his conduct during the prior Congress—which conduct resulted in his conviction after the last election—would appear to rest solely within the power and discretion of the House, free from any Constitutional restraints.

99 There were, of course, unfortunate leaks to the press in early 1980 of allegations concerning Representative Lederer’s involvement in Abscam. Such unproven and, in many cases, unreliable press accounts, however, provide little basis for any assumption that the voters assumed Representative Lederer to be guilty, and yet chose to ignore that criminal conduct and return him to office.