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VIII. Refraining From Legislative Activity After Conviction
On April 16, 1975, the House adopted an amendment to the Code of Official Conduct pertaining to convictions. That provision, now clause 10 of Rule 23, states that
A Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner who has been convicted by a court of record for the commission of a crime for which a sentence of two or more years’ imprisonment may be imposed should refrain from participation in the business of each committee of which he is a member, and a Member should refrain from voting on any question at a meeting of the House or of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, unless or until judicial or executive proceedings result in reinstatement of the presumption of his innocence or until he is reelected to the House after the date of such conviction
The Committee cited this rule in 2002 in a publicly-released letter to former Representative James A. Traficant, Jr., following Representative Traficant’s conviction in a federal district court of ten felony counts related to public corruption. Citing House Rule 23, clause 10, Representative Traficant was admonished by the Committee that if he violated this provision he would risk disciplinary action by the Committee and the House. The Committee advised Representative Traficant that such disciplinary action would be in addition to any proceedings initiated in connection with his criminal convictions. The Congressional Record confirmed that other than during a vote on the House floor to postpone a vote on a resolution to expel him from the House, Representative Traficant did not vote in the House after the date of his criminal convictions.
This Committee’s report on the measure noted that the Committee will not, as a rule, take action on a complaint of a statutory violation by a Member while the authorities charged with the statute’s enforcement are pursuing the case. However, where the case raises allegations of abuse of official position or where law enforcement authorities do not appear to be acting “expeditiously,” the Committee may choose not to defer:
[W]here an allegation is that one has abused his direct representational or legislative position — or his “official conduct” has been questioned
— the committee concerns itself forthwith, because there is no other immediate avenue of remedy. But where an allegation involves a possible violation of statutory law, and the committee is assured that the charges are known to and are being expeditiously acted upon by the appropriate authorities, the policy has been to defer action until the judicial proceedings have run their course. This is not to say the committee abandons concern in statutory matters — rather, it feels it normally should not undertake duplicative investigations pending judicial resolution of such cases.[88]
[88] House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct, Policy of the House of Representatives with respect to Actions by Members Convicted of Certain Crimes, H. Rep. 94‑76, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
Even if the judicial process has not entirely run its course, such as when appeals are pending, the House may take notice of guilty pleas or verdicts against a Member, since the Member cannot at that point claim the presumption of innocence. As the Committee report noted:
For the House to withhold any action whatever until ultimate disposition of a judicial proceeding could mean, in effect, the barring of any legislative branch action, since the appeals processes often do, or can be made to, extend over a period longer than the two-year term of the Member.
Since Members of Congress are not subject to recall . . . public opinion could well interpret inaction as indifference on the part of the House.
The Committee recognizes a very distinguishable link in the chain of due process — that is, the point at which the defendant no longer has claim to the presumption of innocence. This point is reached in a criminal prosecution upon a plea of guilty or upon conviction by a jury or by a judge (or judges) if jury trial is waived. It is to this condition, and only to this condition, that the proposed resolution is directed.[89]
[89] Id.
Where the gravamen of the charges is abuse of official position, the full House may choose to take disciplinary action against a Member even though all appeals in the criminal process have not been exhausted.[90] Thus, while a Committee rule compels the Committee to undertake an inquiry “with regard to any felony conviction of a Member, officer, or employee of the House of Representatives in a Federal, State, or local court who has been sentenced,”[91] under the same rule, the Committee has the discretion to initiate an inquiry at any time prior to conviction or sentencing.[92]
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